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A b s t r a c t
This doctoral d isserta tion is on the sem antics of propositionah a ttitude 
ascriptions. To be more precise, it is mainly concerned w ith various kinds of 
analyses of singular propositional attitude ascriptions. These are sentences of 
the general form 'X 0s that a is F', w here 'X’ can be replaced by the nam e of 
the person w ho is in the particular m ental state, '0 ' can be replaced by a 
propositional attitude verb, like 'believe', 'doubt', hope', 'desire', etc., 'a' can 
be replaced by the nam e of the individual/object about w hom /w hich  the 
particular attitude is held, and 'F' can be replaced by the name of the property 
that the individual/object is said to have. The dissertation takes belief to be a 
paradigm atic example of a propositional attitude, and, thus, focuses mainly 
on the semantics of ascriptions of beliefs. The thesis it defends is that while a 
correct analysis of belief ascriptions in general involves a relation between the 
believer and the proposition which is believed (and which can be regarded as 
the reference of the 'that'-clause of the belief report), a semantic distinction 
still needs to be m ade between de re and de dicto beliefs. This distinction can 
be m ade by distinguishing betw een tw o different kinds of propositions — 
R ussellian  propositions correspond ing  to de re beliefs, and  Fregean 
propositions corresponding to de dicto beliefs. This approach is m otivated by 
argu ing  th a t the recent proposals of the 'hybrid ' type concerning the 
semantics of belief reports, advocated by such philosophers as Schiffer, 
C rim m ins, R ichard, etc., fail. These proposals fail because of over­
generalisation, and, therefore, fail to capture the de rejde dicto distinction. 
Therefore, if the de rejde dicto distinction is genuine, and  the propositions 
occurring w ithin these two kinds of reports are essentially different, then a 
single account of belief ascriptions cannot be given. W e need two different 
sem antical accounts to cap ture  the distinction. A de re rep o rt is best 
understood by a semantics of the broadly Russellian variety, while a de dicto 
belief report is best understood by a semantics of the Fregean variety.
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I. Propositional Attitudes and their Dyadic Relational Structure
Belief, along w ith  a host of other psychological states or m ental acts, is 
called a 'p ropositional a ttitude '. P ropositional a ttitudes are generally 
expressed  by verbs like, believe', 'd isbelieve', 'hope ', 'desire ', 'w ish ', 
'know ', w ant', 'assert', doubt', 'think', 'im agine', 'understand*, 'predict', 
etc. The peculiarity of these verbs lies in the fact that their com plem ent is 
s tan d ard ly  a 'that'-clause w hich is trad itionally  taken to designate a 
p roposition . H ence m any of our psychological a ttitudes of believing, 
doubting, w ishing, fearing etc., can be regarded as relations betw een the 
subject having that attitude, and som ething else, a proposition, tow ards 
w hich the attitude is directed. So any sentence ascribing a propositional 
attitude can be said to have the following form:
X 0 that p,
w here '0' can be replaced by any one of the above verbs.
This d isse rta tio n  is concerned  w ith  p ro p o sitio n a l a ttitu d es  
involv ing  particu lar ind iv iduals /  objects — attitudes th a t are directed 
tow ards particular individuals /  objects — and how  we successfully ascribe 
them. So the kind of propositional attitude ascribing sentence that w e will 
be m ainly concerned w ith can be schematically represented as 'X 0s that a 
is F', w here 'a' can be replaced by a referential singular term .i One of the 
m ain purposes here is to give a satisfactory answ er to questions of the 
following kind :
^Following Frege we will include in the class of singular terms both proper names and 
definite descriptions.
W hen someone says 'Lois believes that Clark Kent can't fly'^, 
how  m ust things stand w ith Lois in order for the report to be 
true?
This w ay of form ulating the question makes it clear that it is impossible to 
prov ide  a sem antics of a ttitude  attributions w ithout saying som ething 
about the relation that holds betw een the person w ho has the attitude and 
the object tow ards w hich the a ttitude is directed, that is, w ithout saying 
som ething about the attitudes themselves. As Crimmins points out.
If w e cannot square an account of w hat makes belief reports 
true  w ith  a sensible theory of believing, then w e need to 
w onder w hat accounts for ou r failure. Can belief reports 
never be true? Is there really  no  such th ing as believing?
W hile som e p h ilo so p h ers  have taken  to th is  so rt of 
scepticism, m ost have hoped tha t it is our ow n fault, rather 
than  the w orld 's, tha t we lack a viable analysis of belief 
reporting. For surely our claims about w hat we and  others 
believe are systematically m eaningful and often true.3
Richard echoes the same thought w hen he says,
... it w ould be difficult to say anything illum inating about the 
m eanings of 'believes', 'desires', and  their friends w ithout 
saying som ething substantive about beliefs, desires and the 
other propositional attitudes.^
It should also become clear, in the course of the discussion, that the nature 
of the object of a propositional attitude, which varies in accordance w ith 
the context of the utterance of the attitude-attributing sentence, plays a 
very im portant role in the semantics of attitude attribution.
rely on the the famous story about Superman where his friend Lois Lane is unaware 
of the fact that her colleague Clark Kent is no other than Superman. This example will 
be used quite often and for convenience we wiU take this story to be true.
^Crimmins [1992], p.ix.
^Richard [1990], p.l.
A ccording to the  w ay of u n derstand ing  sentences of this kind 
advocated here, it becomes evident tha t ‘believes* and other propositional 
attitude verbs are taken to be dyadic relational predicates. The first term  of 
the relation is an individual referred to by the nam e replacing ’X', while 
the second term  is a proposition, designated by the complex 'that'-clause, 
w hich the ind iv idual is said to believe. This m ight be m ade clear by 
draw ing  an analogy betw een a sentence ascribing a belief like, 'Ralph 
believes that O rtcutt is a spy' and an ordinary sentence, like, '3 is smaller 
than  the ratio  of 8 and  2'. From  the latter sentence w e can get, by 
existential generalisation, the following sentences:
1. (3x)(x is smaller than the ratio of 8 and 2)
2. (Bx)(3 is smaller than the ratio of x and 2)
3. (3x)(3 is smaller than the ratio of 8 and x)
4. (3x)(3 is smaller than x).
W e have sim ilar existential generalisations from  'R alph believes tha t 
O rtcutt is a spy'.
1'. (3x)(x believes that O rtcutt is a spy)
2'. (3x)(Ralph believes that x is a spy)
3'. (3x)(Ralph believes that O rtcutt is x)
4'. (3x)(Ralph believes x).
4*, that is, existential generalisation in the position of the 'that'- 
clause suggests that belief is a relation that holds betw een Ralph and 
som ething. This dyadic predicative characterisation of the 'that'-clause 
reveals that the 'that'-clause, in a paradigm atic belief ascription such as 
'Ralph believes that O rtcutt is a spy', can be regarded  as a referential 
singular term. One m ight say, at this point, that the m ere possibility of 
taking the surface syntax of a belief ascription in this w ay is not enough to 
show  that belief is a relation betw een a believer and  a proposition, and 
th a t the 'that'-c lause is a referen tia l s ingular term  designating  the 
proposition w hich is believed. It should be noted, how ever, that we are 
m aking a m odest claim  here. W e are saying th a t one natu ra l w ay of 
understanding  existential generalisations of the above kind is to take the
'that'-clause as a singular term. It does seem to be telling us one of the 
m any things that Ralph believes. That the 'that'-clause in a belief ascribing 
sentence is a referential singular term  draw s support from  the evident 
validity of a host of ordinary  argum ents involving sentences of this form. 
Let us consider argum ents like the following :
Ralph believes that O rtcutt is a spy and so does Jane.
Therefore, there is som ething that both Ralph and Jane
believe.
Ralph believes everything that Jane believes.
Jane believes that O rtcutt is a spy.
Therefore, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
That O rtcutt is a spy is impossible.
Therefore, Ralph believes som ething that is impossible.
Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
It is true that Ortcutt is a spy.
Therefore, Ralph believes som ething that is true.
Everything that Ralph believes is true.
Ralph believes that O rtcutt is a spy.
Therefore, it is true that Ortcutt is a spy.
All the above argum ents seem  to be valid. A nd the valid ity  of these 
argum ents depends upon  a particular reading of the belief sentence, a 
reading which carves out of the whole sentence a part on which existential 
generalisation can be m ade. In other w ords, it isolates a p art which could 
be replaced and then captured by an existential quantifier. This cannot be 
anything other than  w hat is replaced by the w ord 'som ething'. A nd it is 
obvious that 'som ething' replaces the w hole of the 'that'-clause. So the 
'tha t'-c lause  shou ld  be trea ted  as a singular term  w hich can be a 
substituend of a variable in quantification. A natural explanation of the
w ay in w hich these argum ents may be valid does presuppose that 'that'- 
clauses are referential singular terms.^
One of the m ost im portan t characteristics of a that'-clause as a 
singular term  is th a t it is a complex singular term  w hose reference is 
determ ined by the references of the constituent terms. So the reference of 
'that O rtcutt is a spy' is determ ined by the references of 'O rtcutt' and 'is a 
spy ’. In answ er to the question, w hat are the references of these tw o 
expressions, philosophers have come up  w ith two broadly different kinds 
of answers. According to Frege and his followers, the term s in a 'that'- 
clause refer to modes of presentation and  the whole that'-clause refers to 
a s tru c tu red  p roposition  m ade up  of those m odes of p resen ta tion . 
Conversely philosophers belonging to the broadly Russellian tradition, 
hold that the 'that'-clauses are m ade up  of the custom ary references of the 
constituent expressions. So the  indiv idual O rtcutt and  the p roperty  of 
spyhood constitute the proposition represented by 'that O rtcutt is a spy’. 
Therefore, there are at least tw o ways in which the nature of a proposition 
as the object of propositional attitudes can be understood. This, in turn , 
has led to at least tw o different accounts of the semantics of propositional 
a ttributions — one can be said to be the Fregean account, w hile the other 
can be regarded as a broadly Russellian account. W e will com pare these 
two approaches in the chapters which are to follow in order to arrive at an 
answ er to the original question stated in the beginning of this section. But 
in the rest of the introduction I w ould like to discuss some of the puzzles 
or problems that arise in the contexts of attitude attributions and how  they 
seem  to be at odds w ith  extrem ely reasonable assum ptions abou t 
lan g u ag e ’^ . These puzzles will provide a testing ground for the various 
theories to be examined in w hat follows.
II. Frege's Puzzle and  A ttitude A ttributions
H ow  should we report a singular belief so that the belief report is true? 
W hat is necessary for a belief report like, 'Lois believes that Clark Kent 
can 't fly' to be true? The intu itive answ er, an answ er given by m any
am aware of the fact that here I am assuming that quantification in the position of the 
'that’-clause in this context is objectual rather than substitutional.
^Crimmins [1992], p.ix.
philosophers as well, is, that for the report (or the attribution) to be true, 
the expressions w ithin the belief report should refer to the same person 
and  the property  to which Lois refers w hen expressing her belief. Frege, 
how ever, thought that attitudes w ere no t the kind of thing that could be 
characterised in term s of objects and  properties th a t the expressions 
occurring w ith in  attitude attributions refer to. A ccording to Frege, an 
expression governed by an attitude verb goes through a shift in reference, 
and refers to something totally different from its usual reference. W hat led 
Frege to arrive at this thesis? To answer this we need to discuss w hat Frege 
found puzzling about attitude attributions.
The puzzle w ith attitude ascription can be set up  in the following
way'll
1. If tw o expressions t and t’ refer to the sam e object and if two 
sentences S(t) and S(t') differ from  each other only in that t occurs in the 
form er w hile t' occurs in the latter, then S(t) and S(t') express the same 
proposition.
2. If S(t) and S(t') express the same proposition, Tom believes that 
S(t) if, and only if, Tom believes that S(t').
3. But there are contexts w here Tom m ight believe S(t) bu t not S(t').
Let us take a concrete example here. Suppose Tom believes that O rtcutt is a 
spy, bu t due to his ignorance regarding the fact that O rtcutt and Mr. B are 
one and the same person, in fact due to his firm  belief that the tw o names 
refer to tw o different individuals, Tom m ay not believe that Mr. B is a spy. 
N ow , in a context like this the report T om  believes that O rtcutt is a spy’ is 
true, whereas the report Tom  believes that Mr, B is a spy' is false. H ow  is 
it that even w hen 'O rtcutt' and  Mr. B' have the same reference, the tw o 
belief reports w here these two terms occur have different tru th  values?
To understand  the answ er that Frege provides to this problem  we 
need to discuss the three theses that Frege takes into consideration in the
^See Recanati [1993], p.348.
understanding  of the puzzle.^ These are the principle of compositionality, 
Frege's law  (as called by Salmon [1986], p.57), and the further prem ise that 
a sentence of the form  'a = a ' is a priori and uninform ative, w hile that of 
the form  'a=b* is inform ative and  a posteriori. W e can call this 'the 
identity  prem ise'.
A. C om positionality : a prelim inary  investigation in to  the natu re  and 
structure  of a proposition  expressed by a singular declarative sentence 
suggests that a singular proposition is a complex entity com posed of the 
things referred to  by the com ponents of the declarative sentence. The 
proposition  th a t Russell is a philosopher (expressed by the sentence 
'Russell is a philosopher') has as one com ponent the thing it shares w ith 
the proposition  th a t Russell is a m athem atician, and  has as another 
com ponent the thing it shares w ith the proposition that W ittgenstein is a 
philosopher. So, it is m ade ou t of tw o things — the  ind iv idual the 
p roposition  is about — the m an Russell, and  the p roperty  of being a 
philosopher w hich he possesses. The puzzle occurring in the case of 
a ttitude attribution seems to challenge this principle of compositionality. 
The alternative proposal to the usual com positionality principle is tha t if 
the two propositions expressed by tw o sentences (differing only in having 
tw o different nam es for the same individual/object) are such that w e have 
distinct cognitive attitudes tow ards them  in spite of the fact they are 
com posed of the sam e referents, then there m ust be som e significant 
property had  by one and not by the other.
B. Frege's Law: the strategy that Frege takes in producing tw o distinct 
pieces of inform ation that are about the same indiv idual and  that have 
the sam e predicative com ponent is, first to offer a pair of declarative 
sentences w hich have different singular term s bu t the sam e predicative 
expressions, and  then  to argue tha t these sentences m ust be seen as 
containing different pieces of information. To do this he appeals to w hat 
m ay be called 'Frege's Law'. Suppose tw o declarative sentences S and S' 
have the very same cognitive content. In a case like this we can say that S 
is inform ative if and only if S' is. W hen we say that a declarative sentence
^Salmon [1986] has a detailed discussion of the original puzzle and the principles based on 
which Frege answers to the question.
s  is inform ative, w hat w e m ean to say is that 'the inform ation content is 
not som ehow  already given, or that the content is nontrivial, or that it is 
know able only by recourse to experience and not m erely by  reflection on 
the concepts involved, or that it is an "extension of our knowledge"
C. The Iden tity  Prem ise: connected w ith  Frege’s law  is the question 
w hether sentences expressing identity  are inform ative or not. According 
to Frege sentences of the form  'a=a' are uninform ative, know n to be true a 
priori and  do no t extend our know ledge about the sta te  of affairs. 
W hereas, iden tity  sentences of the form  'a=b' are inform ative and in 
m any cases know ledge of this identity  is a significant extension of our 
know ledge abou t the w orld. For exam ple, som eone m ight have tw o 
in d ep en d en t b its of in form ation  th a t the star w hich appears  in the 
m orning is called 'H esperus' and  that which appears in the evening is 
called 'Phosphorus'. He will also know a priori that H esperus is Hesperus 
and that Phosphorus is Phosphorus. But w hen he discovers that H esperus 
is none other than  Phosphorus and  says 'H esperus is Phosphorus’, then 
he is certainly not just saying an object is self-identical. Though the two 
term s 'H esperus' and 'Phosphorus' refer to the sam e celestial body, there 
is som ething other than  the reference, by virtue of w hich the identity  
statem ent 'H esperus is Phosphorus' is informative.
It should be noted that Frege introduced the notion of sense (over 
and  above the notion  of reference) p rim arily  to d istingu ish  betw een 
inform ative and uninform ative identity  statem ents. Frege’s puzzle, as it is 
usually  understood, is the puzzle about pairs of identity statem ents of the 
above k ind. H ow ever, the  puzzle  concerning p ropositional a ttitu d e  
attributions can be show n to be an extension of this puzzle. W hen it is 
asked, w hat is it that m akes the report 'Lois believes tha t Superm an is 
Superm an ' true , w hereas the rep o rt Lois believes tha t C lark Kent is 
Superm an' false? Frege appeals to the difference in the senses betw een the 
tw o term s 'Superm an' and  'C lark Kent' to account for the difference in 
the truth-values. As w e know, Frege thinks that a singular term  occurring 
w ith in  a propositional attitude-ascribing context refers to its custom ary 
sense. As Lois attaches tw o different senses to the nam es 'Superm an' and
^Salmon [1986], p.57.
'C lark Kent', the repo rt 'Lois believes tha t Clark Kent is Superm an' is 
false. This is ju st an  initial characterisation  of w h a t Frege found 
problem atic about propositional attitude attributions, and an indication of 
his proposal to solve the problem. We will discuss this proposal in detail 
and we will try  to show that Frege's proposal, or at least a proposal in the 
Fregean spirit, is needed in understanding some kinds of belief reports.
III. Quine and Referential Opacity.
W ith a view  to arriving at a correct analysis of sentences w hich ascribe 
p ropositional a ttitudes, Q uine, insp ired  by Frege, concluded th a t the 
sem antic function  of a nam e occurring  in a p ropositional a ttitu d e  
attribution cannot be, or cannot sim ply be, its reference. A context w here 
the function of a singular term  cannot be merely to refer, and thus, w here 
substitution of co-referential singular term s m ay fail, is w hat Quine calls 
an 'opaque context'. There are tw o things which need distinguishing at 
this stage:
(a) an occurrence of a singular term, and,
(b) a context in which a singular term  occurs.
We can say that w hen an occurrence of a nam e resists substitution by a co- 
re fe ren tia l nam e, w hatever the reason, the nam e occurs opaquely. 
W hen an occurrence of a nam e allows such substitution the occurrence is 
called 'transparent'. Now, w hether an occurrence of a nam e is transparent 
or opaque depends on the context in w hich it occurs. In  this sense, 
propositional attitude ascribing contexts m ay be said to be opacity-inducing 
contexts. We m ight com pare contexts of this kind w ith such transparent 
contexts as 'it is true  tha t', w hich clearly perm its substitu tion  of co- 
referential names. If it is true tha t Superm an can fly, it is also true  that 
Clark Kent can fly. A context of the occurrence of a term  m ay be said to be 
opaque if it induces opacity in occurrences of terms w ithin it. According to 
Q uine the  three m ost im p o rtan t contexts of opacity  are quotational 
contexts, m odal contexts and propositional a ttitude  ascribing contexts.
l^Two names are co-referential if, and only if, the identity statement formed out of these 
two terms is true. So Tully' and 'Cicero' are co-referential if, and only if, the identity 
statement Tully is Cicero' is true.
H ow  substitution of co-referential nam es fail to preserve tru th-value will 
be discussed in detail m ainly in connection w ith the Fregean account of 
belief ascription.
There is ano ther issue connected w ith  the opacity  of a ttitude  
attribution  w hich requires m entioning at this stage. It is an issue which 
plays a very im portant role in the discussion of the nature of propositional 
a ttitudes and how  w e talk  about them . A lthough Q uine argues tha t 
propositional attitude ascribing contexts are opaque, sentences ascribing 
propositional attitudes are am enable to tw o sorts of interpretations — one 
can be regarded  as the tran sp aren t reading  of p ropositional a ttitude  
ascriptions, w hile the other can be regarded as the opaque reading of the 
same. O ne of the obvious ways of understanding  a sentence like, T o m  
believes that Cicero is a Roman' is by parsing it as 'Of Cicero Tom believes 
th a t he is a Rom an' or 'Cicero is such tha t Tom believes tha t he is a 
Roman'. This interpretation entails that the sentence is really an assertion 
about the individual Cicero, an assertion which says that Tom entertains a 
certain belief about Cicero. Tom 's belief about Cicero can be regarded as a 
p roperty  of Cicero, w hich is being predicated of the ind iv idual in the 
sentence 'Cicero is such that Tom believes that he is a Rom an'. This, in 
tu rn , entails that 'C icero' w ould  really take the position of the subject, 
falling outside the scope of the belief operator. N ow , if the sentence 'Tom 
believes that Cicero is a Roman' is about the individual Cicero, and if the 
belief operator is m ade to form  a part of the predicate, w e can replace 
'Cicero' by 'Tully ', even w hen Tom does not know  tha t Cicero is Tully. 
Tully and  Cicero being the sam e individual, w hat can be predicated of 
Cicero can be predicated of Tully. If, of Cicero, Tom entertains a particular 
belief, then of Tully, Tom can entertain the same belief.
The transparent and  the opaque readings of propositional attitude 
ascribing sentences correspond to w hat is known as the de re and de dicto 
ascriptions of propositional attitudes respectively. A ttitude ascriptions that 
allow a transparent reading, that is, a reading where the singular term  can 
be exported ou t of the a ttitude verb and  can be substitu ted  by a co- 
referential singular term, are regarded as de re ascriptions of propositional 
attitude. O ne m ay reject the de re read in g  of p ro p o sitio n a l a ttitu d e
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ascribing sentences and  their reason for rejecting the de re reading may 
be p rom pted  by a k ind  of Fregean consideration. De re read ings of 
propositional attitude ascriptions are based on a m istaken assum ption on 
which they are based. The assum ption is that we can m ake an ascription of 
a propositional attitude, say a belief, about an object to a subject, w ithout 
involving the m anner in which (or, on Fregean term inology, the m ode of 
presentation under which) the object is picked up  by us or the subject. In a 
rep o rt like T o m  believes th a t C icero denounced  C ata lin e’ w e are 
im plicitly providing an answ er to the question 'W hat is Tom believing?', 
and the report is correct so long as we specify the object of Tom's belief and 
the  p ro p erty  th a t the is believed  to have. But, accord ing  to m any 
philosophers, the answ er w ould be incorrect if we totally ignore how  Tom 
picks out Cicero. It w ould be incorrect on the reporter's part to describe the 
content of Tom's belief in a w ay that is different from  the w ay in which 
the content w as initially presen ted  before Tom's m ind. It w ould  be a 
distortion of facts if w e say, in specifying Tom's belief, that it is of Tully 
tha t Tom believes he denounced Cataline, for it m ight very well be that 
Tom is unaw are of the tru th  of the identity  statem ent 'Cicero is Tully'.
So far w e have been talk ing about ascriptions of propositional 
attitudes rather than the nature  of propositional attitudes themselves. But 
the problem  that is being raised against de re ascriptions seem to depend 
on w hether there can be any de re propositional attitudes — w hether it is 
possible for someone to be able to pick ou t the object independently  of the 
particular m odes of presentation. If w e can show that there is a class of 
attitudes w hich are essentially de re, then the correct report of such an 
attitude can be claimed to be de re. We will try  to show that the de rej de 
dicto d istinction is genuine at the level of attitudes them selves and any 
account of the sem antics of propositional a ttitude ascription should  be 
sensitive to this distinction. As rem arked in the very beginning of the 
in troduction , talk  about a ttribu tions of belief and  o ther propositional 
a ttitudes m ust be, in  an im portan t w ay, based on w hat our attitudes 
them selves consist in. Therefore, questions of opaque and  transparen t 
occurrences of terms in propositional attitude attributions cannot be dealt 
w ith  p ro p erly  un less the de rejde dicto d istinction , a t the  level of
^^Just as Quine rejected de re reading of sentences involving modal operators.
11
propositional attitudes, is m ade clear. There are two traditional accounts 
of propositional attitude ascriptions — one is the Fregean account and  the 
other is the Russellian account — and they seem to fit nicely w ith the de 
rejde dicto distinction. Reserving for later the detailed discussion and  the 
com plicated issues tha t are involved, w e can just m ention here that the 
Fregean account m ay be said  to correspond to de dicto p ropositional 
attitudes, while the broadly Russellian account m ay be said to correspond 
to de re propositional attitudes. A m ajor part of the dissertation will be 
concerned w ith  try ing to m ake sense of the de rejde dicto distinction. It 
w ill also try  to reveal the im portant differences betw een Russellian and 
Fregean in  their accounts of semantics of a ttitude ascription. The m ain 
aim  is to show that once w e take the distinction betw een de re and de dicto 
propositional attitudes seriously, we cannot be satisfied w ith  one single 
uniform  account of propositional attitude attribution.
The acceptance of the dyadic relational structure of propositional i
a ttitude  ascribing sentences im m ediately leads us to the acceptance of }
propositions of one or another kind. H ow ever, this m akes our position 
vulnerable to the Q uinean objections to propositions, so, before w e can 
m ove on to the m ain discussion of propositional a ttitudes and  their 
a ttrib u tio n s , w e need  to  ad d ress  ourselves to these objections to 
propositions. This is w hat we will look at in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 1 
Quine and the Indeterminacy Thesis
1.1. The Main Objective and the Connection it has to the Quinean 
Indeterminacy Thesis
Once we accept the fact that a propositional a ttitude verb  involves a 
rela tion  betw een a subject hav ing  th a t a ttitude  and  the proposition  
tow ards which that attitude is directed, w e are im m ediately led to provide 
an acceptable account of w hat is it that A and B both believe w hen w e say 
tha t they believe the same thing, and  w hat is it tha t A and  B both say 
w hen w e claim that they say the sam e thing. But the w hole project of 
arriving at a viable account of propositional attitudes and propositions as 
their content is pu t in jeopardy by Q uine's argum ents against facts about 
m eaning from  his thesis on the indeterm inacy of translation, because by 
rejecting m eaning facts Quine directly attacks the notion of proposition.
^^The price that Quine has to pay is quite high. He has to abandon all reports and beliefs 
about what anybody says, thinks, believes, doubts, hopes etc., in their usual interpretation. 
It should be noted that with the help of the indeterminacy thesis, Quine is directly 
attacking one particular notion of proposition — it is the notion of proposition as the 
meaning of a declarative sentence. But his arguments against propositions in this sense may 
be shown to be extended to the other notions of propositions as well. In fact his rejection of 
propositions leads to his rejection of propositions as objects of propositional attitudes. In the 
last part of Yford and Object [1960], particularly in the chapter entitled 'Flight from 
Intension', Quine spends a great deal of time trying to show that there are no objects of 
propositional attitude verbs like believe', propositions or otherwise. He ends Section 44 of 
the chapter by saying there is no need to recognise believes' and similar verbs as relative 
terms at a ll;... Hence a final alternative that I find as appealing as any is to dispense with 
the objects of propositional attitudes.' [pp.215-16] According to the Quinean analysis, 
believes' in, say, 'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman’, does not stand for a relation 
between the believer Tom and the reference of the that'-clause, as there is nothing (such as 
a proposition) to which the that'-clause can refer. The verb believes' here, ceases to be a 
term and becomes part of an operator 'believes that', or believes [ ]', which, when applied 
to a sentence, produces a composite absolute general term whereof the sentence is counted an 
immediate constituent.' [p.216] So in Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman' the singular 
term 'Tom' is attached to the complex predicate 'believes that Cicero is a Roman', and the 
sentence is true iff Tom in fact is included in the extension of the predicate believes that 
Cicero is a Roman'. This way of understanding propositional attitude ascribing sentences is 
disastrous since it precludes the construction of a finitely based theory of meaning for the 
language which will have infintely many semantically primitive expressions.
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Let us try  to  elaborate this fu rther by pointing ou t the various 
reasons which prom pt philosophers to adm it propositions over and above 
w ritten  and spoken sentences. There are three m ain dem ands that the 
notion of proposition is introduced to meet. Firstly we require a noun to 
stand  for that which tw o people w ho believe the same thing both believe, 
tw o people w ho doubt the same thing both doubt and the like. The claim 
is that the best w ay of explaining w hat is involved in the case w here we 
say tha t two people share a belief is that there is some single object — a 
proposition — which is w hat they both  believe. Secondly, a proposition is 
taken  to be tha t w hich tw o declarative sentences, either of the sam e 
language or of different languages saying the sam e thing, both  say. The 
respect in which two sentences, regarded as saying the same thing, are the 
sam e, is w h at is com m only  know n  as m ean ing , an d  th erefo re , 
p ro p o sitio n s  are  taken  to be m eanings of d ec la ra tiv e  sentences. 
Furtherm ore, philosophers in troduce propositions to give an account of 
the tru th  and  falsity of an uttered or w ritten sentence. It should be noted 
that it is only regarding a sentence which has been uttered or w ritten (that 
is, a sentence conveying a particu lar thought) tha t w e can sensibly ask 
w hether the sentence is true or false. In answ er to the question, 'w hat 
m akes a sentence true or false on a given occasion of use?', they have 
come up  w ith the view that it is something other than the sentence which 
is the bearer of tru th  or falsity, because an u ttered  or w ritten  sentence 
cannot itself be true or false absolutely.
Is it p roper to introduce som ething — a proposition — as that which 
two people who say the same thing both say, two people w ho believe the 
same thing both believe, tw o people who wish the same thing both w ish, 
and  so on? Some philosophers are opposed to adm itting propositions in 
this sense. This hostility m ight take various shapes. Some m ay say that 
since propositions are abstract entities, an em piricist ought to understand  
and  p arap h rase  such talk  in  term s of som e m ore concrete notions. 
A ccording to ano ther form  of the objection, w e can p erm it talk  of 
p ropositions b u t shou ld  keep in m ind th a t they are of no value in 
clarifying any problem  in the theory  of m eaning, the value such talks 
have m ight only be pragm atic. The last and the m ost radical approach is
14
that w e cannot perm it talk about propositions at all, even as analysing or 
paraphrasing in some other terms, because the notion itself is infirm. ^  3
Q uine's reasons for d ispensing w ith  propositions are of the th ird  
and  m ost radical kind. In the very beginning of Philosophy of Logic, h e  
w rites
M y objection to recognising propositions does n o t arise 
prim arily  from  philosophical parsim ony — from  a desire to 
dream  of no m ore thing in heaven and earth  than  need be.
N or does it arise m ore specifically, from particularism  — from 
a disapproval of intangible or abstract entities. My objection is 
m ore urgent.
Again, in Word and Object he says.
The v ery  q u estio n  of th e  cond itions for id en tity  of 
propositions presents not so m uch an unsolved problem  as a 
m istaken ideal. 15
It should  be noted, a t this point, tha t the w ay Q uine approaches this 
problem  in  Philosophy of Logic is different from  the w ay in w hich he 
approaches it in  Word and Object. The 'urgent' objection tha t he pu ts 
forw ard against the notion of proposition in the former is that if w e are to 
adm it propositions, we have to adm it them  as determ inate equivalence 
classes of sentences w here the equivalence relation  is the relation of 
synonymy. But Q uine thinks that this equivalence relation does not m ake 
any sense.
In this chapter, we will, however, concentrate on Q uine’s objection 
to  p ro p o sitio n s  from  th e  argum en ts  from  the  ind e te rm in acy  of 
translation  — argum ents th a t are found in his book Word and Object 
[1960] and later on in the paper 'On the Reasons for Indeterm inacy of 
T ranslation ' [1970b]. O ur m ain  task  w ill be to show  th a t Q uine 's




argum ents from the indeterm inacy thesis do not w ork against the notion 
of proposition. H ere one m ight say that even if we succeed in show ing 
this, Q uine seems to have a separate argum ent against the notion of 
proposition  — the argum ent w hich can be found in Philosophy of Logic. 
Does Q uine really have an argum ent, independent of the one based on the 
indeterm inacy thesis, against propositions? It does not seem so. Once we 
closely scrutinise the tw o argum ents, we will come to realise that the one 
found in Philosophical Logic is a special version of the one that we get in 
Word and Object.
Quine's argum ents against the notion of synonymy can be shown to 
be related to his argum ents from the indeterm inacy thesis. This is how  the 
relation m ay be established. Once w e adm it indeterm inacy of translation 
w e will be able to show  that partition ing  of sentences into determ inate 
equivalence classes collapses, and  therefore, the notion of proposition 
m akes no sense. W hereas, in Word and Object Q uine 's a rgum ent is 
roughly that if we can establish the indeterm inacy thesis, then we have to 
reject any objective fact about m eaning and thereby reject the notion of 
proposition altogether. The two Q uinean argum ents m ay be schem atised 
respectively in the following way:
1. Indeterm inacy of Translation N o determ inate equivalence classes of 
sentences No propositions.
2. Indeterm inacy  of T ranslation  N o facts about m eaning —> N o 
propositions.
H aving schem atised the two argum ents thus, it can be show n that 1 is 
really a special version of 2. The reason w hy Quine says that the notion of 
equivalence classes of sentences does no t m ake any sense is th a t the 
equivalence relation, the relation  of synonym y, based  on w hich the 
partitio n in g  is m ade, m akes no sense. To say th a t the  re lation  of 
synonym y makes no objective sense can be interpreted as saying that there 
are no objective m eaning facts. This point can be elaborated more: in Two 
Dogm as of Em piricism ' [1953] Q uine raises doubts about the notion of 
synonym y. But one could argue tha t in this article Q uine does no m ore
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than  show  th a t the notion  of synonym y has not been satisfactorily  
explained, not that it can not be explained, and not that it makes no sense. 
W hereas if Q uine's indeterm inacy thesis is correct, then there are no 
m eaning facts, and if there are no m eaning facts there is no synonymy, as 
acceptance of the relation of synonym y implies the acceptance of m eaning 
facts. So, the indeterm inacy thesis, by rejecting m eaning facts, provides an 
im portant argum ent against synonymy. Hence, the rest of the chapter will 
concentrate on Q uine's thesis for the indeterm inacy of translation, as it is 
developed in Word and Object and  his paper 'O n the Reasons for the 
Indeterm inacy of Translation'. The m ain aim of the chapter is to state 
Q uine's doctrine of the indeterm inacy of translation, the tw o argum ents — 
the argum ent from  above and  the argum ent from  below  — try ing  to 
estab lish  the indeterm inacy  thesis, the assum ptions on w hich  the 
argum ents depend  and  how  w e m ay try  to answ er Quine. But before 
entering into any other discussion, we need to know  w hat the thesis is, 
and how  Quine argues for it.
1,2. The Indeterminacy Thesis
Before s ta tin g  the thesis itself, w e need  to m en tion  th a t w h at is 
fu n d am en ta l to m uch  of Q u ine 's  p h ilo so p h y  is th e  n a tu ra lis tic  
behaviouristic  conception of language, and  th a t his m ajor doctrines 
develop  w ith in  th is fram ew ork  of language. Q uine h in ts  at th is 
conception of language thus:
Language is a social art. In acquiring it we have to depend 
entirely on intersubjectively available clues as to w hat w e say 
and  w hen. H ence there is no justification for collating 
linguistic m eanings, unless in term s of m en's dispositions to 
respond overtly to socially observable stim ulations. An effect 
of recognising  th is lim ita tion  is th a t the  en te rp rise  of 
translation is found to be involved in a certain system atic 
indeterm inacy,
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But this naturalistic behaviouristic conception of language is explicitly 
stated thus.
Philosophically I am bound  to Dewey by the naturalism  that 
dom inated his last three decades. ... know ledge, m ind, and 
m eaning are to be stud ied  in the sam e em pirical sp irit that 
an im ates n a tu ra l science. There is no place for a p rio r 
philosophy.
W hen a naturalistic philosopher addresses him self to 
the ph ilosophy  of m ind, he is ap t to talk  of language. 
M eanings are, first and  forem ost, m eanings of language. 
Language is a social art which w e all acquire on the evidence 
solely of o ther people 's overt behaviour u n d er publicly  
recognisable circumstances. M eanings, therefore, those very 
m odels of m en ta l en titie s , en d  u p  as g ris t for the  
behaviourist's m ill . i
After having characterised language in this way, Quine goes on to say that 
m eanings, w hich are prim arily  m eanings of linguistic expressions, m ust 
be construed in term s of behaviour. But, Q uine argues, if m eaning is 
prim arily a property of behaviour, then w e have to adm it that there are no 
m eanings, nor likenesses and distinctions in m eanings, beyond w hat are 
im plicit in people's dispositions to overt behaviour. W hat, according to 
Quine, results w hen we turn  tow ards a naturalistic view of language and a 
behav ioural v iew  of m eaning is th a t w e give u p  the assurance of 
determ inacy. The question w hether tw o expressions are alike or unlike in 
m eaning has no determ inate answ er except insofar as the answ er is settled 
in principle by people's speech dispositions.
H aving said this w e can start our discussion of Quine's thesis of the 
indeterm inacy of translation. Suppose a translator, for convenience take 
him  to be an English speaker, is attem pting to understand  an unknow n 
language, w ith no link to the language he is familiar with. To study  how 
sem antic facts are m anifested in behaviour w ithout any risk of relying
l^Quine [1969a], pp. 26-7.
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upon  inform ation w hich already em bodies a sem antic in terpretation  of 
the alien language, the translator,
(a) cannot appeal to dictionaries or existing partial translation m anuals,
(b) cannot appeal to a partial translation into a th ird  language for which 
translations into English already exists, and,
(c) cannot indulge in an historical study tracing common origin of English 
and the language to be translated.
Q uine, it should  be noted, discusses this special case of w hat he calls 
'radical translation ', 'translation of the language of a h itherto  untouched 
people '. According to Quine this is a fundam ental case — a case where, 
by abstracting from  institutional fram ew orks involving both  the linguist 
and  the inform ant, we are free to focus exclusively upon  the relation 
betw een physical facts and verbal behaviour. If this is the case then Quine 
th inks.
M anuals for translating one language into another can be set 
up  in d ivergent w ays, all com patible w ith  the totality  of 
speech dispositions, yet incom patible w ith one another,
The above statem ent brings ou t the essence of Q uine's indeterm inacy 
thesis. A translation m anual can be taken to be a function w hich m aps 
expressions of one language onto the expressions of another language. 
C oncerning the variety  of transla tion  m anuals available, w e usually  
regard one to be better than the others, because we believe that it gets right 
w hat is said in the language under translation, and also believe that there 
is such a thing as the correct translation of a language, etc. Quine's thesis 
questions all these claims. According to him, between any tw o languages 
there  are likely to be m any transla tion  m anuals, all of w hich are 
adequate^® , yet w hich offer radically  d ifferent translations of m any 
sentences of that language.
i^ibid, p.28.
19ibid, p.27.
20a  translation manual, that is, a function which maps expressions of one language into 
expressions of another language, is said to be adequate, if the sentences which are the 
arguments and values of that function are semantically equivalent.
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To u n d ers tan d  the  argum ents p u t fo rw ard  by Q uine for his 
indeterm inacy thesis, it is essential to be clear about som e of Q uine's 
general concerns. These m ay be clarified by pointing out w hat Quine is no t 
c o n c e rn e d  w ith .21 In the  first p lace, Q uine, in  his thesis of the 
indeterm inacy of translation, is no t offering a description of the actual 
experience and process of translation. He is aware that, as a m atter of fact, 
translato rs d o n 't encounter a huge num ber of m anuals of translation  
w hich are incom patible w ith  one another. N either is he suggesting that 
translation is m uch harder (or easier) than w e usually suppose it to be. He 
is no t denying the fact that m ost of the time we come across a translation 
m anual which is obviously the best and reasonably take other translators 
to agree w ith it. N or is he m aking the obvious claim that the differences in 
nuances and tones m ake it im possible for any translation to be adequate. 
As Hookw ay points out. The problem  runs deeper than that and concerns 
how  w e are to describe w hat occurs in translation.'^^ it  is usually taken to 
be the  case tha t it is an objective factual m atter w hether or no t the 
m eaning of an  alien utterance is the same as the m eaning of the utterance 
of an English sentence, and therefore, in the case of translating an alien 
utterance w e come to discover this objective fact and  translate the alien 
utterance accordingly so that it conforms to the objective fact of the matter. 
Q uine challenges this assum ption itself. The translator does not discover 
any fact of the m atter about w hether an alien utterance is synonym ous to 
some utterance in English sim ply because there is no fact of the m atter to 
be discovered.22
1.3. The A rgum ents for the Indeterm inacy Thesis
1.3.1. Prelim inary Rem arks
There are m ainly tw o argum ents advanced to establish the thesis of the 
indeterm inacy of translation. They are, the argum ent from above based on 
the u n d e r de term ina tion  of physical theory  by observation  and  th e
21See Hookway [1988], pp.128-9.
22lbid, p.l28.
23The thesis does not say that there may be a uniquely correct translation, but that we 
cannot get at it because our evidence is inadequate to settle the matter. Quine's scepticism is 
not of this kind — what he says is that there is no such fact of the matter — whether 
adequate or inadequate — to settle the issue.
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a rgum ent from  below  based on Q uine's fam ous 'gavagai' exam ple or 
inscrutability of reference. Quine clearly distinguishes these tw o elements 
in his thought about indeterm inacy of translation in the following way,24
There are two ways of pressing the doctrine of indeterm inacy 
of translation to maxim ise its scope. I can press from  above 
and press from below, playing both ends against the m iddle.
At the upper end there is the argum ent, early in the present 
paper25, which is m eant to persuade anyone to recognise the 
indeterm inacy  of transla tion  of such portions of natu ral 
science as he is willing to regard as underdeterm ined by all 
possible observations. If I can get people to see this empirical 
slack as affecting not just highly theoretical physics bu t fairly 
common-sense talk of bodies, then I can get them  to concede 
indeterm inacy of translation of fairly com mon-sense talk of 
bodies. This I call pressing from above.
By pressing from  below  I m ean w hatever argum ents 
for indeterm inacy  of tran sla tio n  can be based  on  the  
inscrutability of terms.
So it seems that the fact about 'gavagai' and the fact about the empirically 
underdeterm ined character are tw o separate issues. Though it should be 
pointed ou t here that some philosophers, like Blackburn [1975], think that 
the argum ent from  below  is needed  to bolster up  the argum ent from  
above and  therefore should not be treated separately. It does not seem, 
reading Quine, that he himself takes the relation to be so. W e will follow 
him  and try  to develop the argum ents separately.
Both the argum ent from  above and the argum ent from below start 
from  the sam e considerations. Q uine takes the exam ple of a radical 
translator w here the language which is being translated into English is 
com pletely  w ith o u t any  pre-ex isting  aids to tran sla tio n . The tw o 
considerations from  w hich both  the argum ents s ta rt are, according to 
Quine, as follows:
24Quine (1970b), p.l83.
25This argument is encapsulated in the doctrine of the underdetermination of physical 
theory.
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As alw ays in radical translation, the starting  po in t is the 
equating of observation sentences of the two languages by an 
inductive equating of stim ulus meanings. In order afterw ard 
to construe the foreigner's theoretical sentences we have to 
project analytical hypotheses, w hose ultim ate justification is 
substan tially  ju st th a t the  im plied  observation sentences 
m atch up.26
So the first step in radical translation consists of translating a significant 
class of observation  sentences. This is done by m aking  inductively  
checkable guesses as to w hat the native's sign of assent and dissent are. In 
this w ay the radical translator correlates native utterances w ith sentences 
of his ow n having the same stim ulus m e a n i n g . 2 7  The second step consists 
of going beyond observation sentences and gaining access to the rest of the 
native language by adopting certain analytical hypotheses^*. It will become 
clear, from a detailed discussion of the argum ents, how  they diverge after 
starting  from  the sam e considerations. So let us pass on to the m ain 
argum ents.
26Quine [1970b], p.l79.
27a  note about stimulus meaning and observation sentences. Stimulus meaning (either 
affirmative or negative) of a sentence S for a given speaker is the class of stimulations 
which would prompt assent to or dissent from S. Two sentences for a given speaker are 
stimulus synonymous when they are assented to in just the same circumstances for a given 
speaker. Observation sentences are a subset of the set of occasion sentences. An occasion 
sentence (like, 'It is snowing'), as opposed to a standing sentence (like, 'Snow is white' or 
'2+2=4'), is assented to on some occasions and not on others. An occasion sentence is an 
observation sentence if all speakers assent to it in response to the same stimulation. Quine's 
suggestion is that stimulus meaning of an observation sentence does full justice to its 
meaning. (See Quine [1960], pp.31-4).
2*A note on analytical hypothesis. Unlike observation sentences, most of a person's 
utterances cannot be correlated with publicly observable situations. But in case of radical 
translation, where no translation is yet available, the translator needs to go beyond 
observation sentences. The strategy he follows is to dissect the unconstrued sentences into 
smaller parts and then hypothetically correlate them to words and phrases of his native 
tongue. These are called 'analytical hypothesis'. By means of these analytical hypotheses 
we construe analogies between those sentences that have been successfully translated and 
those which have not. As Quine says (See Quine [1960], p.70). The method of analytical 
hypotheses is a way of catapulting oneself into the jungle language by the momentum of the 
home language. It is a way of grafting exotic shoots onto the old familiar bush...'. In this 
subtle way the linguist superimposes his home language and conceptual scheme upon the 
foreign language in almost every act of translation, and it is here that translational 
indeterminacy becomes philosophically interesting.
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1.3.2. The A rgum ent from  Above
Q uine (1970b) rem arks th a t philosophers w rongly  take the 'gavagai’ 
exam ple as the ground for his doctrine of indeterminacy and hope, that by 
resolving the exam ple, doubt can be cast on the doctrine itself. But 'the 
real ground is very different, broader and  deeper.'29 That is w hy we start 
ou r discussion w ith  the argum ent from above. It should be noted that we 
are not, contrary to w hat Q uine's rem ark suggests, assum ing tha t the 
argum ent from  below  has a lesser value. It, in fact, seems to be a very 
im portan t argum ent and  will be discussed in full. The argum ent from 
above is based  on the und erd e te rm in a tio n  of physical theory. The 
essential feature of underdeterm ination of a physical theory consists in the 
fact tha t a physical theory  transcends all observational evidence, and 
hence, different com peting physical theories can be developed from  the 
same set of observational evidence. Q uine argues for this in the following 
way:
N aturally  it [i.e., a physical theory] is underdeterm ined  by 
past evidence; a fu tu re  observation  can conflict w ith  it. 
N aturally  it is under determ ined by past and future evidence 
combined, since some observable event that conflicts w ith  it 
can happen to go unobserved. Moreover, m any people agree, 
far beyond all this, that physical theory is underdeterm ined 
even by all possible observations.... Theory can still vary  
though all possible observations be fixed. Physical theories 
can be at odds w ith  each other and yet com patible w ith  all 
possible data even in the broadest sense. In a w ord, they are 
logically incom patible and  em pirically equivalent.
It should be noted that there is a basic difference betw een the third 
characterisation of underdeterm ination  on the one hand , and  the first 
tw o, on the other. In the first tw o characterisations Q uine says tha t
29Quine [1970b], p.l78.
^®lbid, p. 179. A small note on the last two lines in this quotation may be made here. It 
seems to be one thing to say that two different theories might be empirically equivalent 
and another thing to say that two empirically equivalent theories might be logically 
incompatible. Quine seems to be making a further point here.
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physical theories are, in  fact, u n d erd e te rm in ed  — they  are e ither 
underdeterm ined by past observations because future observations could 
conflict w ith  them , or u n d erd e te rm in ed  by bo th  p as t an d  fu tu re  
observations because some conflicting observations m ay go unnoticed. 
W hereas in the th ird  characterisation he m akes the stronger claim that 
they are, in principle underdeterm ined. Quine's m ain assum ption here is 
tha t physical theories are, a t least to som e extent, undeterm ined by all 
possible empirical evidence.
H aving noted this underdeterm ined character of a physical theory, 
suppose we set up  to translate a foreigner's physical theory from scratch. 
We begin by pairing observation sentences of the foreign physicist w ith 
ours, on the  basis of iden tity  of stim ulus m eaning, subject only to 
inductive uncertainty. In translating theoretical sentences of this foreign 
physicist we adopt some analytical hypothesis, the justification for which 
is th a t they deliver results consistent w ith  all the evidence bearing on 
sameness of stim ulus m eaning of observation sentences we have already 
obtained. Q uine thinks tha t it w ould now  become clear w hat happens in 
radical translation of a radically foreign physicist's theory.
Insofar as the tru th  of a physical theory is underdeterm ined 
by observables the translation  of the foreigner's physical 
theory is underdeterm ined by translations of his observation 
sentences. If our physical theory can vary though all possible 
observations be fixed, then our translation of his physical 
theory  can vary  though  o u r translations of all possible 
observation reports on his part be fixed. O ur translation of his 
observation sentences no m ore fixes our translation of his 
physical theory than our ow n possible observations fix our 
ow n physical theory.^i
As G ibson points out,^2 Q uine's argum ent for the indeterm inacy  of 
translation is directed tow ards those w ho already accept underdeterm ined 
character of physical theory. So w e accept tha t a physical theory  is
3lQuine [1970b], p.l80. 
32See Gibson [1982], p.91.
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undeterm ined insofar as observation by itself is insufficient to fix, in any 
unique way, the theoretical sentences of a theory. Now, w hen setting out 
to  translate  a physical theory, the linguist does so by translating  the 
observation sentences of the theory, and this he does by equating stim ulus 
m eaning. To go beyond the observation sentences, he  has to  use the 
analytical hypothesis. H owever, the same old em pirical slack^3, as Quine 
p u ts  it, arises at this level as well. The analytical hypotheses are 
them selves underdeterm ined by all possible observation, and the linguist 
could have chosen a different set of analytical hypotheses compatible w ith 
the observational evidences.
This, however is not the whole story, because Quine rem arks.
The indeterm inacy of translation is not just an instance of 
the em pirically underdeterm ined  character of physics. The 
point is not just that linguistics, being a part of behavioural 
science an d  hence u ltim a te ly  of physics, sh ares  the  
em pirically under deter m ined character of physics. On the 
contrary, the indeterm inacy of translation is additional.
Q uine says tha t w here we have tw o physical theories — A and B — 
com patible w ith all possible data, we m ay adopt A for ourselves and still 
rem ain free to translate the foreigner either as believing A or as believing 
B. N ow  our choice betw een the translations of A and B m ay be guided by 
simplicity. It m ight be tha t betw een the two translations one is sim pler 
and m ore direct, involving less elaborate contextual paraphrases. If both A 
and  B involve com plicated and  cum bersom e transla tion  rules, then  
another possibility m ight be to refrain from  ascribing to the foreigner 
either A or B. W hat w ould  happen in a case like this is to attribute to the 
foreigner a false physical theory w hich can be refuted, or some obscure 
physical theory, or hold that he has no coherent physical theory at all. It 
m ight, how ever, happen  tha t A and  B are both  equally  attributable.
3^When a theory is said to have empirical slack it is methodologically underdetermined 
by observation, that is, observation by itself is insufficient for fixing, in any unique way, 
the theoretical sentences of a theory.
34Quine [1970b], p.l80.
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N othing is there for us to decide betw een the tw o theories. In a situation 
of this kind, Quine says.
The question w hether, ... the  foreigner really believes A or 
believes ra ther B, is a question w hose very significance I 
w ould p u t in doubt. This is w hat I am getting at in arguing 
for the indeterm inacy of translation.^^
Indeterm inacy of translation , no t just being an  instance of the 
em pirically underdeterm ined character of physics, should have properties 
w hich do no t follow  solely from  the u n d erdeterm ined  character of 
physical theories, bu t from some other principles. Before specifying these 
additional principles, w e m ight m ention the respect in w hich translation 
is parallel to a physical theory by quoting Quine once again.
In respect of being under-determ ined  by all possible data, 
translational synonym y and  theoretical physics are indeed  
alike. The totality of possible observations of nature, m ade and 
u n m ade, is com patib le  w ith  physical theories th a t are 
incompatible w ith one another. Correspondingly the totality of 
possible observations of verbal behavior, m ade and unm ade, is 
compatible w ith systems of analytical hypotheses of translation 
that are incom patible w ith  one another. Thus far the parallel 
holds.
O n the other hand, the add itional principles on w hich indeterm inacy of 
translation is based is Quine's naturalism  and his adherence to scientific 
realism . Though there is a parallel betw een transla tion  and  physical 
theory, at a certain po in t this parallel breaks dow n. Being a scientific 
realist, Q uine believes that all facts are physical facts and all explanations 
are physical explanations. Physical theory is the ultim ate param eter, and 
despite its underdeterm ined  character, the currently  accepted physical 
theory  serves as the last w o rd  reg ard in g  the tru th  of n atu re . In 




param eter. So w hile w e can expect to settle questions like 'A re there 
electrons?' in science, w e can never expect to settle questions like 'W hat 
does 'gavagai' really refer to?' in  linguistics. Indeterm inacy of translation 
is its infactuality. But science is the paradigm  of facts. As Gibson says.
The form er k ind  of question has a (physical) fact of the 
m atter, by din t of physics being the court of last appeal; the 
latter k ind of question has no (physical) fact of the m atter 
because w hen all the (physical) facts are in, the question (i.e., 
th e  in d e te rm in acy ) rem ain s u n an sw ered . T ran sla tio n , 
therefore, is indeterm inate, for there is no fact of the m atter 
for the translation to be right or w rong about.2?
Quine's adherence to physicalism — that is physical facts are all the facts — 
plays an extrem ely im portan t role in his indeterm inacy thesis, and  we 
will come back to this point later on in the discussion. According to Quine, 
the correctness of a translational m anual is not determ ined by facts, facts 
here being physical facts. H is claim, as Hookw ay points out, is that the 
only  physical facts w hich could  possib ly  be re lev an t to fixing the 
correctness of translational m anuals are facts about stim ulus m eanings. ... 
H e holds that a unique correct translation m anual is not determ ined by 
facts about stim ulus meaning. A nd he also holds that if a unique correct 
translation m anual is not determ ined by facts about stim ulus m eanings, 
then  neither is it determ ined  by physical facts. O rd inary  talk  about 
synonym y and translation is not determ ined by physical facts, so it is not 
factual discourse.’^ *
1.3.3, The A rgum ent from  Below
In Word and Object Q uine alm ost entirely concentrates on show ing how  
indeterm inacy can be derived from  the argum ent from below  involving 
the fam ous 'gavagai' example. In On the Reasons for Indeterm inacy of 
Translation', he points out that the 'gavagai' exam ple w orks as a direct 




translation as such. But it does have a very im portant, though indirect, 
bearing on the argum ent for indeterm inacy of translation. According to 
Q uine the 'gavagai' exam ple is 'aim ed not at proof b u t at helping the 
reader to reconcile the indeterm inacy of translation im aginatively w ith  
the  concrete reality  of radical t r a n s l a t i o n . '^9 gy w orking as a concrete 
exam ple of rad ical transla tion  it helps in p e rsu ad in g  us of the 
indeterm inacy thesis. Let us now  see how  it proceeds.
As has already been m entioned, the first step in trying to translate 
an utterance of a wholly unknow n foreign speaker into English consists 
of the  linguist's observation of the agent speaking — th a t is, a close 
observation of the overt behaviour of the speaker in a particular context of 
lingu istic  behav iour. Thus the  m ost e lem entary  step  invo lved  in 
tran sla tin g  the  foreign language is the transla tion  of the  speaker's  
utterance associated w ith  the p resent event that is conspicuous to the 
linguist and his subjects. The linguist experiences that w henever a rabbit 
scurries by, the foreign speaker u tters 'gavagai'. So he notes dow n that 
'rabbit' is the ten tative transla tion  of the  u tterance gavagai' in this 
unknow n foreign language, bu t w ith the proviso that it is subject to future 
test.
The next step in  the translation  consists in  testing  w hether the 
speaker assents to the utterance 'gavagai' w hen spoken by the linguist. 
This step is necessary for two reasons:
(a) There m ay be situations w here the foreign subject could have said 
something, bu t in fact does not. It m ay very well happen that a rabbit runs 
by bu t the speaker does not u tter the sentence 'gavagai'. The only w ay to 
find a solution to this difficulty for the linguist is to u tter the sentence 
under consideration himself and see w hether the native speaker assents to 
it or dissents from it;
(b) Furtherm ore, the linguist m ust be able to discrim inate am ong term s 
that overlap in their reference, and he can do so only if he has settled on 
the native expressions of assent and  dissent. For exam ple, the linguist 
w ould  have to discrim inate betw een the foreign equivalence of rabbit'
39Quine[1970b], p.l82.
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(which is 'gavagai') and the foreign equivalence of the term  'animal'. So, 
on the basis of these observations the linguist makes a guess as to w hat is 
the assent and dissent behaviour of the native, and if any difficulty follows 
in his taking assent and dissent in the w ay he does, he m ay discard his first 
hypothesis and guess again.
Once the linguist decides on the native's expressions of assent and 
dissent, his next task is to equate observation sentences of the foreign 
language w ith observation sentences in  English. This is done by learning 
to u tter sounds in the foreign language sufficient to the task of querying a 
native speaker for assent or d issent under various stim ulus conditions. 
W ork ing  in d u c tiv e ly  th e  lin g u is t is able to m ake ap p ro x im ate  
identification of stim ulus m eanings. It is true that the lingu ist cannot 
directly com pare his ow n stim ulus m eaning for some sentence of English 
w ith  his subject's stim ulus m eaning for some sentence in the particular 
foreign language, b u t the linguist can learn that his subject is prepared  to
assen t to o r d issen t from  the  query  'gavagai?' in  the  sam e public
conditions w here the linguist him self w ould be prepared  to assent to or 
dissent from  the query 'rabbit?'. So he concludes that the tw o stim ulus 
m eanings are approxim ately the same.
All these careful observations suggest that the stim ulus m eaning of 
the alien utterance 'gavagai' is the sam e as that of the English sentence 
'rabbit' or 'there is a rabbit'. H ow ever, m any other English sentences m ay 
have the same stim ulus m eaning as 'there is a rabbit'. We m ay list a few 
here:
(a) This is an undetached part of a rabbit.
(b) This is an instance of rabbithood.
(c) This is a stage in the history of a rabbit.
The poin t to be noted is tha t all these sentences, although derived from 
d ifferent translation  m anuals, are com patible w ith  all the facts about 
stim ulus m eaning w hich helps us in translating gavagai' as 'there is a 
rabbit'. The linguist m ay be reasonable enough to equate 'gavagai' w ith 
'rabbit', b u t he will be m istaken if he thinks that the correlation of tw o
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observation sentences fixes the reference of the term  ’gavagai’ uniquely. It 
m ay quite well be possible that instead of being a concrete general term, 
'gavagai' is an abstract singular term  referring to rabbithood, or even if it is 
a concrete general term , it m ay be one that is true not of rabbit b u t of 
undetached rabbit parts or rabbit stages. W hat this suggests is that meaning 
and  reference are indeterm inate on behavioural grounds, and  to enquire 
beyond the possible behavioural evidence for a un ique m eaning or a 
unique reference is a mistake. So, we give up  determ inacy of m eaning and 
w e recognise th a t there  is no fact of the m atter reg ard in g  un ique  
translation. That is, there are no unique meanings or unique referents of 
native expressions beyond  w h at can be established  on behavioural 
evidence.
It should be noted that Q uine does not deny that a com m unity of 
translators are m ore likely to have terms for rabbits rather than for parts of 
rabbits or, m ore unlikely, for stages in the history of rabbits. There m ay be 
supplem entary  argum ents w hich w ill help us in narrow ing  dow n the 
choice am ong different candidate translations. But w hat he suggests is that 
they are really pragm atic reasons for preferring one m anual over another 
w ithout giving any reason for thinking it to be true. The choice betw een 
m anuals of translation does not rest on any preference for the m anual 
w hich is actually true, it is grounded in pragm atic considerations, and is 
not, if Quine's argum ent is right, settled by the observable data.
N ow , in trying to decide w hether we should equate 'gavagai' w ith 
'undetached  rabbit part' or 'rabbithood ', the linguist m ight follow  the 
technique of u ttering  'gavagai' and  at the sam e tim e po in ting  to an 
undetached rabbit part. But this technique of ostension is ineffective in 
deciding the issue because it so happens that in pointing to a part of rabbit 
the linguist points to the rabbit as well. The questions that the linguist is 
concerned w ith at this stage are two-fold: is the term  gavagai' used to talk 
about an object at all, and if it is used to talk about an object, which object 
is it talking about? Quine believes that the facts about stim ulus m eaning 
do no t give a determ inate answ er to either of these tw o questions. The 
only w ay for the linguist to start to settle these questions is by fixing the 
English equivalences of plural endings and pronouns, etc. of the language
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u n d er study  — only then can he ask questions like, is this gavagai the 
sam e as th a t one?’ or 'Is there  one gavagai or two?'. But w hile this 
m ethod of translation is the best one could hope for, given the fact that all 
w e have to go on is the individual utterance and its stim ulus meaning, it 
is no t sufficient for settling  abso lu tely  the indeterm inacy  betw een  
transla ting  'gavagai' as 'rabbit' or as 'undetached rabbit part', and  as 
'rabbithood', and so on. The reason for its not being sufficient is due to the 
fact that we can, by appropriately varying our analytical hypotheses about 
th e  tran sla tio n  of th e  n a tiv e 's  p lu ra ls , id e n tity  p red ica tes , etc., 
accom m odate w hatever answ ers they supply  to the queries w e p u t to 
them . Therefore, according to  this thesis, it is possible to form ulate 
alternative system s of analytical hypotheses all of w hich are com patible 
w ith the totality of speech dispositions of all concerned, and, at the same 
time, produce translations that are incom patible w ith one another. Quine 
adm its that 'there is an obstacle to offering an actual exam ple of tw o such 
rival system s of analytical hypotheses. K now n languages are know n 
through unique systems of analytical hypotheses established in tradition 
or painfully arrived at by a unique skilled linguist.^® But he goes on to say,
...one has to reflect on the natu re  of possible data  and  the 
m e th o d s to  ap p rec ia te  th e  in d e te rm in acy . Sentences 
translatable outright, translatable by independent evidence of 
stim u la to ry  occasions, are  sp arse  and  m u st w oefu lly  
underd e te rm in e  the analytical hypotheses on w hich  the 
translation of all further sentences depends. To project such 
hypotheses beyond the independently  translatable sentences 
at all is in effect to in p u t ou r sense of linguistic analogy 
unverifiably to the native m ind. N or w ould the dictates even 
of our ow n sense of analogy tend to any intrinsic uniqueness; 
using  w h a t firs t com es to m in d  engenders  an  air of 
determ inacy though freedom  reigns. There can be no doubt 
that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fit the totality 
of speech behaviour to perfection, and  can fit the totality of 
dispositions to speech behaviour as well, and still specify
40Quine[1960],p.72.
31
m utually  incom patible translations of countless sentences
insusceptible to independent control.*^ ^
We can sum  up  the whole argum ent as follows. It is impossible, on 
behavioural grounds, to settle the  m eaning or reference of term s of a 
foreign language. We can depend  on ostension to settle the stim ulus 
m eanings of observation sentences like, 'gavagai', bu t ostension can never 
tell us determ inately that 'gavagai' and  'rabbit' are term s, and neither can 
it help in settling once and for all that they have the same m eaning or that 
they are coextensive. Further, resorting to analytical hypotheses m ay settle 
these questions in a relative w ay, for it is quite possible th a t another 
linguist w orking independently m ay arrive at another system  of analytical 
hypo theses hav ing  the  consequence of equating  'gavagai' w ith  an 
'undetached  rabbit part'. Both linguists can account for all the speech 
dispositions of the subject. But, by m aking different adjustm ents in their 
respective system s of analytical hypotheses, u tilised  in translating  the 
gram m atical particles and constructions they bear on reference, the tw o 
linguists can come up  w ith  m anuals that differ in the ontologies they 
attribute to the subject. So the analytical hypotheses are not sacrosanct and 
there can be no useful sense to question w hat 'gavagai' really m eans — 
there is no fact of the m atter corresponding to the utterance.
1.4. The Philosophical implications of the Indeterminacy Thesis
H ookw ay [1988] discusses w hat consequences, about m ind and meaning on 
the one hand, and  reference and  tru th  on the other, follow  from  the 
indeterm inacy thesis.^2 Semantic notions which are intensionaH3 — such 
as synonym y and analyticity — have no place in Q uine's account of logic 
and  ph ilosophy  of language. O ur o rd ina ry  conception  of m ind  is 
intensional, we explain hum an actions in terms of propositional attitudes 
like belief, desire etc. O ur o rd inary  ways of describing and  explaining 
m ental events presuppose tha t they have propositional content, and  we 
try  to identify these propositional contents. There are tw o things on which
4llbid, p.72.
42Hookway [1988], pp.139-45.
^^Quine has no hesitation in using concepts which are properly extensional in logic and 
philosophy of language.
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w e rely  on in doing this. On the one hand, we observe the external 
behaviour of the agent and try  to guess w hat beliefs and desires they have. 
O n the other hand, w e attend  to their verbal behaviour and treat their 
utterances as m anifestations of their beliefs and  desires. A ccording to 
Q u in e ’s thesis  of in d eterm in acy , the  b ehav iou ra l ev idence never 
de term ina te ly  fixes the  contents of p ropositional a ttitudes. 'V erbal 
behaviour fixes the propositional contents of beliefs only relative to a 
translation m anual. W hen w e ascribe a belief to somebody, we specify its 
content by using  a sentence: it is the belief that there are rabbits in the 
g a rd en , or th a t snow is white. If th a t sentence does n o t express a 
determ inate content, then w e have not assigned a definite content to the 
belief th ro u g h  u sin g  it.'^^ The consequence of ad h erin g  to  the 
indeterm inacy  thesis is th a t Q uine rejects p ropositions, senses, and 
attributes. So there is no point in  asking questions like, do these tw o 
sentences express one proposition  or two?'. Propositional content, thus, 
being indeterm inate, propositional attitudes have no place in the scientific 
s tu d y  of m ind and  language^^. The sam e argum ent he p u ts  forw ard  
against intensional notions like necessity and possibility.
Indeterm inacy of translation  casts doubt not only on intensional 
concepts, it affects the w ay in which we think about the reference, tru th  
and  ontological com m itm ent. The answ er to the question, 'w hen the 
native u tters 'gavagai' w hat is he talking about?', can be, according to 
Quine, rabbit, rabbit parts, rabbit stages, rabbithood, etc. As it is possible to 
construct adequate  transla tion  m anuals, betw een w hich no possible 
evidence could decide, suggesting that the native m ay be talking about 
rabbit, rabbit parts, etc., there is no fact of the m atter concerning which of 
them  is correct. It should be pointed ou t that, although it is meaningless, 
in a Q uinean fram ew ork, w hether a term  like 'gavagai' really refers, we 
can ask the  question  in  a d ifferen t b u t m eaningful w ay. W e can 
m eaningfully  ask this question only relative to a translation  m anual. 
Therefore, statem ents about the ontological com m itm ent of theories will 
always be relative to a particular m anual of translation.
^^Hookway [1988], pp.139-40
'^Scientific study of mind and language, according to Quine, is purely extensional as well, 
remaining faithful to the Watsonian behaviourist approach to mind.
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This is a problem which not only affects radical translation, it affects 
th e  u n d erstan d in g  of one speaker by another speaker of the sam e 
language. Suppose th a t one English speaker is try ing  to  u nderstand  
another English speaker. Q uine's claim is that even in this case w e are 
engaged  in  w h at m ay be called 'hom ophonie transla tion ', so, w hen  
someone says 'there is a rabbit', w e take him to mean exactly that and not 
that there is a rabbit-stage (or rabbit part or whatever) by translating the 
speaker's u tterance onto his ow n idiolect. It is true  th a t hom ophonie 
transla tion  has a role in a case of dom estic und erstan d in g  to w hich 
nothing corresponds in radical translation — the basic w ords and phrases 
of our m other tongue are learned by im itating our elders and it is here 
tha t hom ophonie translation becomes useful. But this special role is n o t 
to be explained by saying that, in the hom ophonie case, w e uniquely 
capture the fact of the m atter corresponding to w hat our fellow speaker 
says. So Quine's claim is m uch stronger than it appears. As Hookway says, 
'Reflection should m ake clear that Q uine denies that even w hat I say has 
any  determ inate m eaning for me: the ontological com m itm ents of m y 
ow n assertions are inscrutable to me. I can system atically reinterpret m y 
ow n utterances and  conclude that 'rabbit' in m y m outh is true of rabbit 
parts or stages. The conclusion is that there is no fact of the m atter about 
the ontological com m itm ents of any sentences of t h e o r y . '46 So if Quine's 
indeterm inacy thesis is correct, then there is no objective fact of the m atter 
w hether a sentence (this includes sentences involving perfectly ordinary  
term s and not just vague ones) is true or false, other than  relative to a 
particular m anual of translation.
1.5. The Indeterm inacy Thesis Evaluated
This is, in brief, Q uine's thesis for the indeterm inacy of translation 
an d  the  p h ilo so p h ica l im p lica tio n s it has. By a rg u in g  for the 
indeterm inacy thesis Q uine questions the basic sem antic concepts, like, 
reference, m eaning, propositions and rejects that our verbal behaviour can 
have any psychological explanation. As H ookw ay rem arks, 'It w ill be 
evident that it^? leaves intact very little of our fam iliar concept of m ind
46Hookway [1988], pl42.
47that is, the indeterminacy thesis.
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and underm ines m ost of the traditional aspirations of philosophy. We are 
left w ith  an im poverished, highly naturalistic vocabulary for describing 
and explaining hum an practices, including the search for knowledge.'
O verw helm ed by this attack philosophers have tried  to disprove it 
on various grounds. This has given b irth  to a huge literature, trying to 
show  w here Q uine m ight have gone w rong. We are concerned w ith  
propositions — that w hich tw o synonym ous declarative sentences (either 
they be of the same language or of different languages) have in common, 
w hich is com m only know n as m eaning, w hich our translations try  to 
preserve and w hich constitutes the object of propositional attitudes like, 
belief. By casting doubt on determ inate translation Q uine casts doubt on 
determ inate m eaning (a determ inate m eaning fact) that tw o sentences of 
the above kind are taken to have in common.
In order to see w hat are the debatable aspects of Quine's position, it 
m ay be w orthw hile to start the discussion by considering some of the 
objections raised by  Evans in his paper 'Identity and Predication' [1985]. 
Evans starts by pointing ou t the difference between a translational m anual 
and a theory of meaning. A translation m anual is nothing b u t a m apping 
from expressions to expressions. So it tell us that
'Snow' is the English translation of German 'Schnee'.
The m ain purpose  of prov id ing  a translation m anual is to help us in 
arriv ing , for each sentence of the  language under study , a t a quoted 
sentence of another language having the same meaning. The translation 
m anual has a lim ited capacity. It tells us which pairs of expressions have 
the same meaning, bu t not w hat their m eaning is. For m any philosophers 
theory of m eaning, on the other hand, aspires to offer m ore than this. For 
them , it should explain the meanings of expressions by show ing how  they 
relate to the w orld. So, a theory of m eaning, for each expression of the 
language under study, w ould  provide a statem ent of w hat it means, a 
statem ent like the following:
'Schnee' in G erm an m eans snow.
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The m ost im portan t difference betw een a theory  of m eaning  and  a 
translation m anual is that the former is an explanatory theory (explaining 
how  the m eanings of sentences depend upon the sem antic properties of 
their parts) while the latter is not. Being explanatory in nature, 'it is hoped 
that the construction of theory of this sort, w hich w ill do  justice to the 
com plexity of natural language, will provide revealing insights into the 
underly ing  logical s tructure of our language and  into ou r ontological 
com m itm en ts '.4* The dem and that a theory of m eaning provides a good 
explanation of sem antic com petence will ru le ou t those theories w hich 
entails that the aliens are talking of rabbit stages or undetached rabbit parts.
A ccording to Evans, Q uine 's argum ents can be reg a rd ed  as 
philosophically im portant only if they point tow ards an indeterm inacy in 
the theory of meaning. Evans thinks that it does not do so. The particular 
argum ent that Evans wants to attack is as follows:
Some expressions th a t d iv ide  their reference d ifferently  
('rabbit', 'rabbit stage*, 'rabbit part') and some expressions that 
do not divide their reference at all ('rabbithood', the rabbit 
fusion ', 'rabbiteth ') have incontestably the sam e stim ulus 
m eaning w hen used in one-w ord sentences.49
As H ookw ay p o in ts  out,^® Evans relies upon  tw o claims in 
critic ising  Q uine 's  a rg u m en ts. The first, w hich  w e have a lread y  
m entioned, is that constructing a theory of m eaning is a m ore deeper and 
fundam ental enquiry, and that a translation m anual should be answerable 
to  the kind of facts uncovered by theories of m eaning. Secondly, in 
constructing a theory of m eaning w e should  choose theories tha t are 
'na tural' on the grounds that they provide better explanation of verbal 
behaviour. A nd the theory which provides a better explanation is true as 
the explanatory pow er is the indication of truth.
Before explain ing  w h at Evans m eans by a n a tu ra l theory  of 
m eaning, a few rem arks about the form of such a theory needs to be made.




In giving a theory of m eaning of an alien language, w e have to see that 
the theory gets, 1. the truth-conditions of the sentences right, and, 2. it 
explains the psychology underlying verbal behaviour. Now, let us suppose 
that we have the following two axioms for the alien predicate H:
1. (x)(x satisfies H  if and only if H  is a rabbit)
2. (x)(x satisfies H  if and only if H  is an undetached rabbit 
part)
N ow , to prove the indeterm inacy in the theory of m eaning, we have to 
establish the tru th  of the claim if there is an adequate theory incorporating 
1. then  there  w ill ano ther such theory  inco rpo ra ting  2, w hich is 
cognitively equivalent to 1. Evans point is that this cannot be established 
because use of the second axiom will leave us unable to give a correct 
account of the tru th  conditions of some complex sentences in w hich H  
occurs. Take another predicate W, for w hite. Then w e w ill have the 
following complex axioms for W and H  thus
1'. (x)(x satisfies W ^H  if and only if x is a white rabbit)
2'. (x)(x satisfies W ^H  if and only if x is a w hite undetached 
part of rabbit).
But 2' gets the stim ulus meaning w rong as it allows to be satisfied by 
a w hite foot on an otherw ise brow n rabbit.^ ^  So it seems that the axiom 
for W m ust be
3. (x)(x satisfies W if and only if x is a part of a w hite animal).
How ever, that w ould prevent us from  m aking good sense of statem ents 
about w hite pieces of paper or w hite handkerchief. H ere som eone m ight 
come up  w ith  a suggestion which appears to be quite ad hoc. The axiom 
for W m ight be construed in a complicated way so that this problem  m ay 
be avoided:
^^It seems that different parts of the same rabbit and also a rabbit and its part are 
indistinguishable by the predicate 'white' of the language. This is surely an absurd 
consequence.
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3'. (x)(x satisfies W if and only if, either
(a) W occurs together w ith H  and is part of a white 
anim al, or
(b) W occurs in some other context and x is white).
Therefore, we see that the above kind of m anoeuvre m ay be em ployed to 
overcom e the difficulty raised against the Q uinean proposal. N ow , the 
im portant point is that, we shall obviously prefer a theory which involves 
a sim pler axiom, like,
(x)(x satisfies W if and only if x is white)
N ow  the crucial question revolves around the ground for such preference. 
A re the grounds for choosing a theory  incorporating a sim pler axiom 
factual or are they pragmatic? A nd the m ain difference betw een Quine and 
Evans lies in the contrasting responses to this question. Q uine w ould 
agree that it is better to prefer a natural theory to an ad hoc one. But he 
w ou ld  n o t attach any cognitive significance to th is judgem ent. T h e  
different approaches fit the fact equally well. The preferred choices are 
justified on pragm atic g r o u n d s . * ^ ^
W hat, for Evans, is a n atu ra l theory  of m eaning? — A natu ra l 
theory, in the first place, being a theory of m eaning, points tow ards a 
system  of d ispositions w hich p ro v id e  psychological exp lanation  of 
lin g u is tic  b eh av io u r. The n a tu ra l th eo ry  h y p o th esise s  a s ing le  
dispositional state underlying all the uses of a particular term , while the 
m ore ad hoc one theories hypothesis varied dispositional states to explain 
all underlying uses of the term. Therefore, 'if that is correct, we can choose 
betw een the two theories by noting which provides the best explanation of 
the subject's linguistic behaviour and which fits best into all other things 
we know  about his psychology. For example, if we find that initial training 
in how  to use W equips an alien child to do it in all contexts — there is no 
need  for separate tra in ing  in  how  to use the term  in connection w ith 
rabbit stages and how  to use it for other purposes — then we shall conclude 
that the natural theory will fit best into a general psychological theory
^ ^ H o o k w a y  [ 1 9 8 8 ] ,  p . l 5 6 .
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w hich  accounts for language learn ing  and  colour p ercep tion  in  a 
satisfactory way.'53
The reason w hy Quine's argum ent does not follow this line m ay be 
tha t he does no t think that a translation m anual or a theory of m eaning 
should give a satisfying psychological explanation of the speaker's verbal 
behaviour. It is sufficient tha t it describes their verbal dispositions. As 
H ookw ay rem arks, 'Some of Q uine's suggested translations lead us to 
a ttrib u te  desires and  beliefs to peop le  w hich are psychologically  
a b s u r d . '54if ^ translational m anual leads us to regard  that 'gavagai' refers 
to undetached rabbit part and not to rabbits, then we have to say that they 
are perceptually sensitive to undetached rabbit parts and not to rabbit, they 
w ant an undetached rabbit part rather than rabbits, and ascribe to the agent 
a w hole lot of other very curious psychology. In choosing a translation 
m anual we should  be gu ided  by a netw ork of considerations — our 
un d erstan d in g  of hum an  percep tual capacities, the n a tu re  of hum an 
desire, psychology of reasoning and deliberation as well as sociological and 
anthropological inform ation. Quine seems to be ignoring them  altogether. 
As Evans sum s up  about Q uine's analytical hypothesis, w here the actual 
indeterm inacy crops up:
..., the novel theories cut the referent of 'rabbit' either coarse 
or finer than  it is cut in the orthodox theory. The coarser 
theories appear not to w ork a t all. The finer theories have a 
better chance of w orking, b u t involve a ttribu ting  to the 
speakers of the language unw arranted dispositions.^^
The reason w hy Q uine does not accept Evans's poin t that cognitive 
psychology and semantic theory have explanatory autonom y can be traced 
back to his adherence to physicalism. Adherence to physicalism  underlies 
both the argum ent from above as well as the argum ent from  below. There 
are several strands to his physicalism. Physical facts are all the facts and all 
explanations are physical explanation. Physics is the paradigm  of scientific 





explanation, or s tudy  distinctive feature of reality. Being a realist about 
physical theory Q uine accepts tha t there are physical facts of the m atter 
about w hich physical statem ents are true. Quine, in this respect is very 
close to the trad itional behaviourists. As H ookw ay remarks,^^ Q uine's 
position can be viewed as a combination of two claims: 1. the metaphysical 
assum ptions of the traditional behaviourism  are unassailable, and, 2. the 
bahaviouristic outlook cannot do justice to the kind of discourse about 
m eaning and  the m ind w hich are fam iliar from  ord inary  language and 
the w ork of cognitive psychologists. So cognitive psychology should be 
ban ished  and  o rd in a ry  language shou ld  be replaced  by a su itab ly  
regim ented form  of discourse for purposes of scientific understanding . 
'Full coverage' is the business of physics. No change takes place in this 
w orld w ithout some redistribution of physical states.
One cannot b u t feel acute uneasiness to this Q uinean position. It 
seems that Quine has a very narrow  vision about philosophy. Quine m ay 
have been aw are of this fact and  has m ade initial attem pts explain our 
o rd inary  practises of using concepts like belief or necessity. But he is 
alw ays ham pered  by his w orking w ith in  the physicalistic fram ew ork. 
W hat Q u in e  m isses m ay be co n s titu tiv e  of h u m an  experience. 
Furtherm ore, as Hookway asks, 'w hy should we take the point about 'full 
coverage' to show that the physical fact exhaust all the facts at allT'^^That 
all changes involve physical changes does no t entail th a t all facts are 
physical facts.
If, again, as the argum ent from  above requires, underdeterm ination 
of physical theory is com patible w ith realism about physical theory, w hy 
can't w e say that underdeterm ination of translation theory is compatible 
w ith  realism  about them ? W hy can't w e say that there is a fact of the 
m atter about which either of a pair of rival translation scheme is correct? 
If w e say that the intrusion of pragm atic considerations in deciding which 
of the two rival translation schemes is sufficient for the conclusion that 
there is, in general, no fact of the m atter, w hy isn 't the parallel intrusion 




theories enough to  ensure th a t there  is no fact of the  m atter either? 
Q uine’s answ er m ay be that though  a translation theory is parallel, it is 
additional. But the fact rem ains that it is parallel. The logical possibility of 
alternative interpretation of m eaning cannot possibly feature in an attack 
on th e  concept of m eaning  in  the w ay Q uine th inks it does. As 
Blackburn^* points out,
... if the logical possibility of choice about m eaning in the face 
of evidence w ere taken to d iscredit tha t concept, then the 
logical possibility of choice about almost anything in the face 
of ev idence w o u ld  d isc red it v irtua lly  all concepts. In 
particu la r there w ould  be an exact parallelism  w ith  the 
concepts of physical science, w here m ost philosophers, bu t 
especia lly  Q uine, believes th a t th e re  is n o t log ically  
conclusive evidence for the tru th  of theories containing 
th e m
Quine m ight say that we do not need semantic concepts as m uch as 
w e need scientific concepts. But this kind of pragm atism  itself seems to be 
too narrow . The task of a current physical theory is to seek a correct 
description of w hat are taken to be facts behind the appearance of things. 
In a similar way, one can say that a current theory of translation w ants to 
describe and explain facts about linguistic behaviour. A nd a linguistic 
b eh av io u r involves m uch m ore th an  w h at Q u in e 's  thesis of the  
indeterm inacy of translation takes it to involve. As Simon Blackburn says.
It is difficult to im agine a m ore valuable intellectual goal 
than  rem oval of the fear that there is no fact of the m atter 
w hich explains and  in terprets the hum an signs w hich are 
such an im portant com ponent of everyone's experience.^^
Therefore, it seems tha t Q uine's argum ents for the indeterm inacy thesis 
are based on the assum ption that physical facts are all the facts. In this 
section we question this assum ption, and by so doing cast doubt on the
SSBlackburn [1975], p.l96. 
59ibid, p.l97
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argum ents. We try to show that meaning facts or semantic concepts play a 
very  im p o rtan t ro le in  the u n d erstan d in g  of hum an  behav iour and  
language, and realism  about m eaning facts is unavoidable. If it is essential 
to adm it m eaning facts over and  above physical facts, then w e have to 
adm it propositions. Once we adm it propositions, w e can take them  to be 
objects of propositional attitudes. Hence, for now  we can leave aside the 
in itia l challenge p o sed  by  Q u ine 's  in d e te rm in acy  th esis  ag a in s t 





Bertrand Russell starts his essay 'On Propositions: w hat they are and how 
they m ean' by saying 'A Proposition may he defined as: What we believe 
when we believe truly or falsely'. A m ong the m any uses th a t the notion 
of proposition is traditionally  taken to have, Russell's definition brings 
o u t one of its m ost im portant. After defining the notion of proposition in 
this way, Russell goes on to say 'In order to arrive, from the definition at 
an account of w hat proposition is, we m ust decide w hat belief is That 
is exactly w hat we w ant to do in this chapter. O ur discussion will follow 
tw o distinct stages. In the first stage, to decide on w h at belief as a 
paradigm atic case of propositional attitude is,^^ we will try  to understand 
its nature by m otivating the distinction between tw o kinds of belief — the 
de re and  the de dicto belief. It should  be noted tha t in terest in the de 
re/de dicto d istinction is no t som ething new. The distinction  was first 
applied  to m odal contexts, and then extended generally to attitude (and 
m ore specifically to epistem ic) contexts. The intuitive idea behind  the 
d istinction  w as th a t besides the class of de dicto beliefs, w hich are 
indiv iduated  by their content and  m ode, there is a class of beliefs which 
are essentially about objects.
In spite of its w idespread use, im portant questions have been raised 
concerning the very  d istinction  itself — particu la rly  concerning the 
existence of de re beliefs. O pposition to the distinction has taken various
60Russell [1956], p.285.
^^Note that the discussion which is to follow will concentrate mainly on examples of 
belief-ascribing sentences. In the philosophical literature on propositional attitudes, 
philosophers very often concentrate on discussing belief and belief-reports. The reason may 
be that many (of course not all) other propositional attitudes can be said to involve belief in 
some way (e.g. my intention to have an ice-cream involves my belief that I can have an ice­
cream) and the ’that’-clause in all the odier cases can be given a reading uniform to the one 
in the case of belief-ascription. Therefore what is true of belief could be regarded as true of 
other propositional attitudes as well. We are not committing ourselves to this position, but 
as it is true that belief is the paradigm of propositional attitudes, and as there seems to be 
no reason why it should not be taken to be a typical example of a propositional attitude, it 
is convenient to concentrate our discussion on belief-ascribing sentences to bring out the 
general features of sentences which ascribe propositional attitudes.
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forms. Some philosophers have claimed that there m ay be a distinction to 
be d raw n  at the level of belief reports, b u t this d istinction  does no t 
correspond to any distinction at the level of beliefs them selves. Another 
line of attack consists in  reducing  de re beliefs to de dicto beliefs, and  
claim ing that de re beliefs are really a species of de dicto beliefs. Simply 
saying tha t de re beliefs are a special case of de dicto beliefs because the 
form er can be reduced to the latter, however, does not necessarily im ply 
that they are the same. In the second stage, we will try  to show  that there is 
a genuine distinction at the level of the beliefs themselves. The reason for 
adm itting de re beliefs is based on the very nature of our thoughts about 
the world.
2.1. The Distinction between De Re and De Dicto Beliefs
2.1.1. Preliminary Remarks
The orthodox distinction m ay be set up  in a very sim ple way: belief de 
dicto is a belief that a certain dictum  (or a proposition) is true, w hereas 
belief de re is about a particular res (or an individual) tha t has a certain 
p ro p e rty . In this sense, we can say, following W oodfield^^, that a de re 
belief can initially be taken to have two features:
(a) It is about an object.
(b) It is tied to objects constitutively.
The second feature really suggests that the thought could not exist w ithout 
the object existing, because, to individuate the thought, it seems essential 
to ind iv iduate  an object. It should  be noted tha t there is a difference 
betw een the orthodox w ay and ou r w ay of understand ing  the de re/de 
dicto  d istinction. A ccording to the s tan d a rd  w ay of explain ing  the 
distinction w e allude to here, in a de dicto belief the thinker has a belief in 
a proposition, but does not in the case of a de re belief. W hat we are trying 
to defend here, however, is that even in a de re belief context the belief is 
in  a proposition  — a singular proposition , w hich has as its essential 
constituen t an object and  a p roperty . So even if the discussion m ay
62Woodfield [1982], p.l.
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som etim es suggest tha t de re beliefs have non-propositional content, it 
really m eans that they do not have as their contents propositions in the 
Fregean sense. This term inological po in t is b rought o u t by McDowell 
[1984]. A ccording to him , in  the case of a de re a ttrib u tio n  one should  
recognise a 'Russellian proposition’. As he says. It w ould  be a m erely 
term inological question  w hether one shou ld  say th a t there  are no 
propositions b u t "complete" ones, so tha t de re a ttribu tions involve no 
propositions; or w hether in connection w ith de re attributions one should 
recognise propositions of a different kind: "Russellian propositions"
A w idely held view  am ong philosophers^^ is that all beliefs are de 
dicto. The support comes from  Frege's argum ents for adm itting a thought 
or a sense of a sentence to be the content of a propositional attitude — like 
belief. Philosophers w ho adhere to this view  think tha t if the thought or 
the sense of a sentence is the content of belief, any correct ascription of 
belief w ould  involve a com plete specification of the thought, th a t is, 
specification of the sense w ithout any specification of the reference of the 
constituent expressions, and so the belief has to be a de dicto belief. In the 
case of a singular belief, expressible by a sentence like, 'Tom believes that 
Cicero is a Roman orator', the Fregean view, in one of its interpretations, 
has to be supported  by the idea that know ledge of a particular object is 
essentially  indirect, because even the so-called referring  expressions 
require the m ediation of sense to determ ine the reference. The relation 
betw een thought and object is also indirect. In dealing w ith nam es which 
do not have any reference, a Fregean w ould say,
... the sense of a nam e, if expressible otherw ise than  by the 
nam e itself is expressible by a definite description. Definite 
descriptions are taken to have w hatever sense they have 
independently  of w hether or no t objects answ er to them.
Thus a nam e w ithout a bearer could, in Frege's view, have a 
sense in exactly the same w ay as the name w ith a b e a r e r . ^ 5
^^See McDowell [1984], p.99.
^^See, for example, Searle [1983] and Sosa [1970]. Crimmins [1992] expresses his reservations 
against de re beliefs.
65 McDowell [1977], p.l72.
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If this is the case, then w hether the object exists or not w ould be m erely 
incidental to the availability  of the thought. O ne w ho is against de re 
propositional attitudes is com m itted to this view, and  thus w ould claim 
that there is no need to specify beliefs in terms of objects, in fact, a correct 
specification of belief should be m ade in term s of the specification of the 
com plete thought.
A non-Fregean may, at this point, argue that w hether a nam e has a 
bearer or no t does m ake a difference as to the  ascrip tion  of belief 
containing that name. So McDowell says,
A sincere assertive utterance of a sentence containing a nam e 
w ith  a bearer can be understood  as expressing a belief 
correctly describable as a belief, concerning the bearer, that it 
satisfies some specified condition. If the nam e has no bearer 
(in the in terpreter's view), he cannot describe any suitably 
related belief in that transparent style. He can indeed gather 
from  the utterance, th a t the subject believes him self to  be 
expressing such a belief by his words. That m ight make the 
subject's behav iou r, in  speak ing  as he does, perfectly  
intelligible; bu t in a w ay quite different from  the w ay in 
which, in the first kind of case, the belief expressed makes the 
behaviour intelligible.^^
So, in cases w here the nam e occurring w ithin  a belief context has a 
reference, it seems essential to specify the belief in term s of the object in 
question. W hen som eone sincerely and  assertively u tte rs  a sentence 
containing a proper nam e, one does not m ean to be expressing a belief 
w hose availability  to be expressed is indifferent to the existence, or 
otherwise, of the bearer of that name.
Here, one m ay take up  the first line of attack m entioned at the very 
beginning and argue that the de re/de dicto distinction is a genuine one at 
the level of belief ascription bu t not at the level of belief itself. W hen we 
give a de re report of a belief, that is, just specifying the object about which
66lbid, pp.172-73.
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the reported  thinker has her belief, w e are doing so because w e do no t 
w ant to commit ourselves to a claim about the w ay in which the reported 
th inker thinks of the object of her belief. The general distinction is a 
distinction betw een a belief repo rt w here the  m odes of p resen tation  
associated w ith expressions used in  the report are in tended to m atch the 
m odes of presentation the believer uses in having that particular belief 
(this being the case of a de dicto belief report), and, on the other hand, a 
belief report w here the intention is m erely that the reference is preserved 
(this being the case of a de re belief report). But this distinction w ithin 
belief reports cannot be extended to belief itself. To counter this argum ent 
w e need  to show  th a t there  are  som e genuine de re beliefs. The 
discussion which follows will try  to do this. By taking clues from Gareth 
Evans's argum ents for s in g u la r/ R ussellian though ts, w e w ill try  to 
establish that some beliefs themselves are to be characterised as de re .
These are all prelim inary remarks. But one thing that they seem to 
suggest is that the de re/de dicto distinction is not as unproblem atic as it 
appears. M ost ph ilosophers are doubtfu l about the de re side of the 
distinction. So it seems essential to see w hy, if at all, this distinction is 
needed, w hat is the m otivation for adm itting a class of beliefs which are de 
re over and  above the de dicto beliefs.
2.1.2. Q uine and De Re Beliefs
O ne m otivation  for d istingu ish ing  betw een de re and  de dicto beliefs 
comes from  considerations of Q uine's distinction betw een notional and  
relational senses of belief, or, as has been indicated in the Introduction, his 
distinction betw een transparent and opaque contexts and  the problem  of 
substitu tion  in these contexts.^^ We have already m entioned, sentences 
reporting beliefs and other propositional attitudes, according to Quine, are 
am biguous. They m ay have either a transparen t reading or an opaque 
reading. The tw o sentences 'There is someone whom  Ralph believes to be 
a spy' and  Ralph believes there are spies' m ay both  be am biguously 
expressed by the sentence, 'Ralph believes that someone is a spy'. But the 
distinction betw een the tw o sentences is vast. In one case there is a
67See Quine [1960], pp.138-56,166-70, pp.206-16, and [1966], pp.185-96.
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particular m an w hom  Ralph has in m ind, and believes of him  that he is a 
spy. In the other case Ralph is just like one of us w ho believes that there 
are spies w ithout having the belief about any particular individual. Let us 
take another exam ple. Suppose th a t there is a particu lar spy Holm es 
suspects of being a m urderer, w hile W atson suspects only that there is a 
spy w ho is a m urderer. Quine thinks that there is an essential difference 
betw een H olm es's belief and  W atson's belief. W atson is inclined to 
believe the proposition tha t a t least one spy is a m urderer. But Holmes 
does more: he suspects about a particular spy that he is a m urderer. So 
Holm es's belief, being about a particular individual, is de re and  m ay be 
reported  as 'Of A, w ho is a spy. Holmes believes that A is a m urderer', 
w hile W atson 's belief is de dicto, and  his belief m ay be repo rted  as 
'W atson believes that a spy is a m urderer'. This seems to suggest that a 
subject does sometim es have a belief which is essentially about an object 
and thus, is de re.
According to Q uine the test which really helps us in identifying a 
belief to be of a particular kind is the test of substitutivity of co-referential 
singular terms. For example, suppose Ralph believes de re that O rtcutt is a 
spy. Then we can characterise Ralph's attitude by substituting any correct 
descrip tion of O rtcutt, like 'the m an in  the brow n coat', regardless of 
w hether Ralph could or w ould describe O rtcutt in that way. The intuition 
seems to be that our ascription relates Ralph to the individual in such a 
w ay that the particular description or conception that Ralph w ould use to 
represent O rtcutt plays no role in this sort of ascription. A belief ascription 
is de dicto, if a t every place in the content clause, substitu tion  of co- 
referring expressions fails.
Burge [1977] has tried  to show  th a t the Q uinean  criterion of 
substitu tiv ity  does no t adequately d raw  the de re/de dicto d istinction. In 
som e cases (w hen, say, Tom is acquain ted  w ith  the  m an  in  d irect 
perception) w e m ay attribute to Tom a belief like, Tom believes that the 
m an in the brow n coat is a spy', and m ay refuse unlim ited substitution of 
term s deno ting  the  m an on the g ro u n d  th a t Tom 's belief involves 
thinking of the person as the m an in the brow n coat, and not, say, as the 
m an w ho killed Smith. We m ay attem pt to answ er Burge here in the
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follow ing way. The criterion of substitu tiv ity , as used by Q uine, is a 
criterion for distinguishing betw een de re and de dicto belief-reports. De re 
belief reports, which presum ably satisfy the criterion of substitutivity, are 
n o t complete. They are not com plete in the sense that the report leaves 
one in the dark  as to how  the reported believer thinks of the object of his 
belief. But tha t does not m ean that in a particular context they are not 
correct. Incompleteness of a belief-report should not be confused w ith the 
report being non-truth-preserving — and this is the confusion that Burge 
seems to be m aking here.
Let us try  to explain this w ith  the help of an example. Suppose, 
Tom wants to tell m e how  his friend Ralph got into an argum ent w ith my 
sister at a party, and says,
Ralph thinks that your sister is rude.
H ow ever, it happens tha t Ralph him self does not know  tha t the person 
w ith w hom  he got into this argum ent is my sister (he know s m y sister by 
descriptions which he gathered by im m ediate social interaction w ith her at 
the party). The report is not a complete guide to Ralph's thought, bu t it is, 
nonetheless, correct. Tom could have used any other fam iliar description 
of m y sister, and  the report w ould have been correct. Contrary to w hat 
Burge says, co-referential expressions m ay be substituted in a correct de re 
belief rep o rt salva veritate, and  Burge confuses the  fact th a t such 
substitu tions m ay resu lt in belief reports which leave o u t inform ation 
abou t how  the believer being repo rted  thinks of the object w ith  the 
rep o rt's  being  n o n -tru th  p reserv ing . So, it seem s, th a t a Q uinean  
substitutivity criterion can be applied to bring out a significant distinction 
betw een de re and de dicto belief reports, w here the form er is correct, and 
the latter is complete. De re belief reports are correct in the sense that in a 
repo rt of this k ind  substitu tion of co-referenential nam es do no t fail to 
preserve truth. But in case of a de dicto report, we aim  at com pleteness, 
tha t is, w e w an t to report how  the believer thinks of the object. W hen a 
rep o rt aim s a t being  a com plete gu ide to the believer's  though t, 
substitu tion  of co-referential nam es results in false reports. Therefore,
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there does seem to be a w ay of using Quinean criterion of substitutivity to 
bring out a distinction betw een de re and de dicto ascriptions of beliefs.
2.1.3. Burge and De Re Belief
A part from Q uine's logical basis for distinguishing betw een de re and de 
dicto beliefs, Burge [1977] brings out an epistemic basis for distinguishing 
betw een these two kinds of beliefs. From an epistemic point of view  a. de 
dicto belief is
a belief th a t is fu lly  conceptualised . That is, a correct 
ascrip tion  of the  de dicto belief identifies it p u re ly  by 
reference to a 'content' all of w hose sem antically relevant 
co m p o n en ts  c h a rac te rise  e lem en ts  in  th e  b e liev e r 's  
conceptual repertoire.68
For exam ple, suppose A lfred believes that the m ost pow erful m an on 
earth  in 1995 is a crook, w ithout know ing w ho this particular m an is. As 
Alfred's epistem ic state depends completely on concepts in his repertoire, 
and not on his relation to a particular individual, his belief is de dicto.
In characterising de re beliefs as opposed to de dicto ones, Burge 
writes,
A de re belief is a belief w hose correct ascription places the 
believer in  an ap p ro p ria te  non-concep tual, con tex tual 
re la tion  to objects the  belief is about. The term  non- 
conceptual does not im ply that no concepts or other m ental 
notions enter into a full statem ent of the relation. Indeed, the 
relation m ay well hold betw een the object and  concepts, or 
their acquisition or use. The crucial point is that the relation 
no t be m erely that of the concepts' being concepts of th e  
object — concepts that denote or apply to it.69
68Burge [1977], pp.345-46. 
69ibid, p.346.
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W hat Burge seems to be saying here is that in a de re belief the subject is 
related to the object in a non-conceptual way. This does not m ean that the 
subject's w ay of individuating an object is purely non-conceptual. M ost of 
the  tim e, perhaps alw ays, the  subject's thought about an  object does 
involve some concept of the object. The point is that the object of a belief 
of this sort is no t determ ined by the concepts which apply  to it, b u t by 
som e contextual relations betw een the subject and  the  object — the 
believer's relation to the relevant object of belief is not m erely tha t he 
conceives of it or otherw ise represents it. This is often the case w here the 
subject perceives the object. We can explain this po in t w ith  the help of 
Burge's example. Suppose we see a m an coming from a distance in the fog. 
We m ay believe about him  that he is w earing a red cap. But it m ight very 
well be the case that w e do not see the m an well enough to describe him in 
such a w ay that we are able to individuate him  fully. There is no purely 
conceptual means for individuating the object of our thought. According 
to Burge these are cases w here the requirem ent of denotation in addition 
to the causal or contextual connection w ith  the object of thought rem ains 
unfulfilled. The requirem ent of denotation is the requirem ent tha t the 
sub jec t has som e p u re ly  co n cep tu a l, n o n -co n tex tu a l m eans of 
ind iv iduating  the object of his or her thought. This requirem ent can be 
fu rther explained by show ing th a t it is a stricter requirem ent than  is 
needed to understand  cases of the above kind. Philosophers, for example 
Kaplan, who take de re belief to be a species of de dicto belief, contend that 
a singular term  w ithin a belief report can be said to represent an object if 
that nam e denotes the object. But for the name to denote in this way, that 
is, in a w ay which w ould help in showing that de re belief is only a species 
of de dicto belief, the nam e m ust pick ou t or indiv iduate the object in a 
context-independent way. H ow ever, in our perception of a m an coming 
from  a distance in the fog and in having subsequent thoughts about him, 
w e do not seem to have a purely  conceptual means of individuating the 
object (or the individual), that the thought is a thought of. We m ay be able 
to pick ou t the m an ostensively w ith  the help of a descrip tion tha t is 
available in this context (like, 'the m an ou t there'). But there seems to be 
no reason to hold  that w e can always conceptualise the entities we rely on 
in our dem onstration. Therefore,
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These considerations indicate that there will often be no term  
or individual concept in the believer's set of beliefs about the 
relevant object which denotes the object. This is no t to deny 
th a t the believer alw ays has som e m ental or sem antical 
instrum ent for picking ou t the object — a set of concepts, a 
perceptual image, a dem onstrative. But w hatever m eans the 
individual has depends for its success partly  b u t irreducibly 
on factors unique to the  context of the encounter w ith  the 
object, and  not p art of the m ental or linguistic repertoire of 
the believer.70
So Burge’s claim is that sometimes one's w ay of thinking about the object 
depends ultim ately on one or other dem onstrative or contextual factors. 
That is w hy we can have a de re thought about the m an seen in the fog, 
and believe of him  that he is w earing a red cap. Therefore de re th o u g h ts  
are thoughts in which the relationship between the subject and the object 
is not just the application of concepts; the relationship betw een them  is 
determ ined by the causal and contextual factors which connect them. If the 
relationship betw een the thinker and  the object of thought is determ ined 
by a direct contextual relation of the above kind, then it seems to follow 
th a t the thinker's de re thoughts of this k ind  are essentially  d irected  
tow ards the object.
Burge takes a further step and  argues that a de re belief is in  some 
im portant ways m ore fundam ental than a de dicto belief. H e tries to argue 
for this in  two ways. First, he tries to show  that if an entity lacks de re 
propositional attitudes w e cannot attribute to it the use or understanding 
of language. As Burge rightly points out, the first sentences that children 
actually use or understand  are invariably related to their im m ediate and 
perceptually  accessible environm ent. A nd so the attitudes accom panying 
such assertions are de re. An obvious objection to this view  m ay be that, 
from  the fact th a t our understand ing  of language necessarily involves 
indexical elements, it does not follow that understanding  of language in 
general is of this kind. W e can think of some other organism s or robots 
w hich are program m ed in  such a w ay that they are able to understand
70Burge [1977], p.352.
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indexical-free languages. This objection, according to Burge, is m isguided. 
M achines that are program m ed to use indexical-free languages cannot be 
sa id  to  u n d e rs ta n d  o r u se  lan g u ag es  au to n o m o u sly . For them  
m anipulations of symbols are nothing m ore than  m echanical or purely  
syntactic activities. To indicate the fact that symbols have some semantical 
or extra-linguistic significance they m ust be able, at least sometim es, to 
correlate symbols w ith which they symbolise — correlate either through 
som e non-linguistic  o r th ro u g h  som e linguistic  activ ities, or by a 
com bination of both  of them . W hen someone says that she w ants a piece 
of cake, you m ight go and get it from the fridge, or tell her 'there's a piece 
of cake in the fridge', or do both — that is utter those w ords and  at the same 
tim e get the cake from the fridge. The case w ith subjects w ho are said to 
have propositional attitudes is similar. In having a propositional attitude, 
the subject m ust ultim ately indicate some ability to correlate his thoughts 
w ith  objects that those thoughts are thoughts of. Failure to  do so w ould 
indicate that there is no adequate ground for attributing an understanding 
of language. A nd any p ro p o sitio n a l a ttitu d e  accom panying  such 
understanding of language m ust necessarily involve de re attitudes.
A part from this argum ent from  the understand ing  of languages, 
Burge tries to  show  th a t evidence or justification for purely  de dicto 
em pirical beliefs depend on support from some de re belief or other. He^i 
says.
Consider our purely de dicto empirical beliefs, w here all such 
beliefs in singular form  are nonindexical and  w here the 
definite descriptions can be used  attributively, ... Taken by 
them selves, these beliefs are clearly lacking in evidential 
support. The attributively in tended singular beliefs have the 
force of 'the F, w hatever object that is, is G’. Justification for 
the belief that there is an F or that it is G requires some m ore 
specific identification. ... M any of our de dicto beliefs are 
justified because they are based on authoritative hearsay from 
others. But then, at a m inim um , the 'o thers ' m u st have
71 ibid, p.349.
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some de re belief in order to ground their au thority  on the
subject.
So even a purely  de dicto em pirical belief is based on som e de re beliefs, 
and  in this sense de re beliefs have a primacy over de dicto beliefs.
De re beliefs then are beliefs w hich are essentially object-directed. 
W hat the subject is thinking about is determ ined by im m ediate contextual 
connection and  the  subject’s rela tion  to the object is no t just the 
application of concepts.
2.2. The M otivation for A dm itting Irreducibly De Re Beliefs
W hat m otivates ph ilosophers to adm it a class of beliefs w hich are 
irreducibly  de re? We can begin by considering Q uine once again. There 
are tw o insights involved in Q uine's notional and  relational senses of 
belief which are im portant and should be highlighted at this point. Firstly, 
there really seems to  be a class of beliefs irreducibly ab o u t objects. That 
means that there are beliefs which relate the believer to an object, so w hen 
w e say 'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman’, it is not only a fact about 
Tom (under the circumstances it is a fact about Cicero as well), it is a fact 
about Cicero that Tom believes him  to be a Roman. Hence, the belief state 
in trinsically  is a sta te  concerning Cicero. Secondly, there  is clearly a 
distinction between propositional attitudes which are directed at particular 
objects and those w hich are not. Q uine's example^^ w ould  bring ou t this 
point. Suppose someone says, 'I w ant a sloop'; now  in a case like this we 
need to m ake a distinction betw een the desire that the m an m ight have 
for a sloop, where any sloop w ould do (as Quine says, w hat he seeks 'is a 
m ere relief from  slooplessness ) and  the desire tha t a m an m ight have 
w hich is directed at a particular sloop. The two desires are definitely not of 
the same nature.
O ne im p o rtan t p o in t seem s to  be em erg ing  from  all these 
discussions: the ultim ate m otivation for adm itting a class of beliefs which 
are de re or are about particular objects comes from our nature of thought
72Quine [1956]; reprinted in Linsky [1971], pp. 185-7.
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and the relation that obtains between our thought and the world. Suppose 
w e cannot have any  de re thoughts. That w ould  m ean th a t all ou r 
thoughts about the w orld w ould be descriptive, that is, w e could think of 
objects only by description, each m erely as som ething belonging to a 
certa in  sort. 73 N ow , if all ou r thoughts about th ings could only be 
descriptive, our total conception of the w orld w ould be m erely qualitative. 
But our perceptual beliefs provide us w ith  a class of beliefs w here the 
thought involved is no t just descriptive. To quote Kent Bach74 here.
W hen w e perceive som ething, w e can think about it in a 
fundam entally different w ay than if we thought of it m erely 
by description. To think of something by description is just to 
think of w hatever happens to have the properties expressed 
by the description. But to perceive something is to be in a real 
relation  to  it, to  be in  a position  to th ink  th a t object in 
particular, no m atter w hat its properties. ... O ur thoughts 
about it are not DESCRIPTIVE bu t DE RE7^
O ur perceptual beliefs do not alw ays have associated w ith  them  
som e descriptions w hich ind iv iduate  the individual completely. Burge's
73vvithout going into a detailed and intricate discussion surrounding the relation involved 
between the subject and the object of a de re thought, we can, following Bach [1987], point 
out one thing. According to Bach the object of a descriptive or de dicto thought is 
determined satisfactionally, that is, the fact that the thought is about that object does not 
require any connection between the thought and the object, and therefore the connection is 
not, what Bach would call a real or a natural' relation. Whereas, in the case of a de re 
thought there is an intimate contextual causal relation between the thinker and the object 
the thought is about.
74Bach [1987], p.l2.
75 Note that although the objects of perception make up the basic kind of de re thoughts, 
they are not the only kind. We may also have de re thoughts also about things which we 
have perceived before and now come to remember, and even about things others have 
perceived and informed us of. This will become clear in the course of the discussion. It is, 
however, correct to say that objects of our de re thoughts are essentially objects of 
perception, objects which we perceived now or have perceived previously or objects which 
have been perceived by someone else. This view, that is, a view where perceptual or 
demonstrative factors are essential in having belief about a particular object, despite 
applying to de re thoughts about concrete individuals other than oneself, does not apply to 
de re thoughts about abstract objects and about oneself. Whether it is at all possible to have 
de re thoughts about abstract objects is itself debatable — it may be argued that our 
thoughts about particular abstract objects do not involve any causal or contextual relation, 
individuation of abstract objects being purely conceptual. This is a complicated issue which 
won’t be addressed here.
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exam ple of seeing a m an coming from the distance in the fog and forming 
the belief about him  that he is w earing a red cap clearly brings out the de re 
nature of perceptual cases.
2.3. Evans and De Re T houghts
2.3.1. P relim inary Rem arks
The view  tha t to th ink of an object or m ake a judgem ent about it one 
m ust be in an intim ate relation to the object has been argued for by Evans 
[1982]. In arguing for the Russellian status of w hat he calls inform ation- 
invoking singular term s, Evans considers the n a tu re  of thoughts, in 
particular the nature of thoughts needed in order to understand sentences 
containing those terms. These are inform ation-based thoughts, and  are 
though ts  abou t objects in w hich they are g rounded . In  this sense 
inform ation-based thoughts seem to  correspond to the notion of de re 
thoughts that w e tried to explain in the previous section. So, the main task 
of the  rest of the chap ter w ill be firstly  to explain  the n a tu re  of 
inform ation-based though ts and  inform ation-invoking singular term s, 
then to bring ou t the principles on which they are based, and  finally to 
show  in w hat w ay Evans’s notion differs from ours. As Sainsbury [1985] 
points out, the in tended upshot of Evans’s argum ent is ’that for a w ide 
range of singular terms the kinds of thoughts we m ust have to understand 
sentences containing them  are thoughts that w ould be sim ply unavailable 
in the absence of a referent of the term .’76 Therefore, thoughts expressed 
by utterances involving singular term s of this kind, thoughts which are 
called  'in fo rm atio n -b ased  th o u g h ts ' and  w hich  are  g ro u n d e d  in 
inform ation derived from objects referred to by Russellian singular terms, 
seem to provide us w ith a definite class of de re thoughts.
There are a w ide variety of ideas that are being referred to in the 
previous paragraph which need unpacking. The questions that we need to 
answ er to understand  Evans's position concerning de re thoughts are:
(a) W hat are inform ation-based thoughts?
76Salnsbury [1985], p.l23.
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(b) W hat are inform ation-invoking singular terms?
(c) W hen do w e say th a t an inform ation-invoking singu lar term  is 
R ussellian?
These are all complicated questions involving a w ide range of issues that 
Evans [1982] deals with. M ost of them  will rem ain undiscussed in this 
chapter. For our purpose of understanding  the nature of de re th o u g h ts , 
w e w ill concentrate on his argum ents for the R ussellian  sta tu s  of 
inform ation-invoking singular term s and the nature of inform ation-based 
thoughts.
2.3.2. Evans on Frege and Russell
W hat does Evans m ean w hen he says singular term s are Russellian? A 
singular term  is Russellian in the case w here the significance of the 
singu lar term  depends u pon  its hav ing  a reference. Therefore, if a 
sentence containing a p roper nam e of this k ind  is significant, th a t is, 
expresses som ething true  or false, then  the proper nam e in  that context 
m u st s tan d  for som ething. Evans, how ever, in an  im p o rtan t w ay, 
distances him self from  Russell’s notion of logically p roper nam es — 
which, according to Russell, are the only kind of expressions that fulfil the 
requ irem ent laid  dow n. The tw o m ost im portan t differences are the 
following:
(a) According to Russell, the connection between a logically proper nam e 
and its bearer is direct, that is, the connection is not m ediated by the sense 
of the name. A Russellian singular term  in Evans’s sense has associated 
w ith  it some w ay of thinking of the reference, and thus has a sense.
(b) Russell further w anted  a logically proper nam e to have a guaranteed 
reference, the question of failure of reference does not arise in the case of a 
logically proper name.
In contrast, in Evan's fram ework w e can attem pt to use an expression as a 
R ussellian  s ingu lar term  b u t fail to have a reference d u e  to  the 
unavailability of a suitable object.
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An im portan t po in t should  be noted here. Though Evans thinks 
that a Russellian singular term  is like any other term  th a t has sense as 
w ell as reference, for him  the  reference of such an expression has a 
prim acy over sense. In the case of a Russellian singular term  its possession 
of sense depends upon its having a reference. This is a point w here Evans 
departs from Frege as he is usually understood. That is w hy to understand 
w hat Evans means by the 'Russellian' nature of a singular term , it m ight 
be helpful to state, very briefly, Evans' understand ing  of the Fregean 
theory of sense.
As has already been m entioned, according to one fam iliar w ay of 
understand ing  the Fregean theory of sense, it is usually  held  that the 
understand ing  of an expression does not, in any w ay, presuppose the 
know ledge of the referent of the expression. The knowledge of a particular 
object is essentially indirect, because even so-called referring expressions 
require the m ediation of sense to determ ine the reference. The relation 
betw een a thought and an object is also indirect. If this is the case then 
w hether or not an object exists is irrelevant in  determ ining the sense.
Evans does not accept this interpretation of the Fregean notion of sense.
He, following Russell, and opposing Frege, holds that it is im possible to 
understand  a sentence containing a p roper nam e, th a t is, to grasp the 
p roposition  it expresses, w ithou t know ing w hich object it stands for.
According to Evans, Frege's theory of Bedeutung, or w hat he translates as 
m eaning or semantic value, starts w ith the idea that the significance of a 
sentence consists in its being either true or false. Given this starting point, 
it seems natural for Frege to proceed by saying that the semantic value of a 
substantival expression consists in its pow er to affect the tru th-value of 
the sentence in w hich it occurs. It is natural to th ink  further that this 
pow er is determ ined  by the  expression 's association w ith  an extra- 
linguistic entity  — w hich m ay be called the referent of the expression in 
question. But Frege also claimed that a full account of the significance of 
an expression cannot be given solely in terms of the semantic value of an j
expression, it has to be given in terms of some further property, which he 1
called 'sense'. Sense explains the difference in cognitive value of tw o I
sentences having the sam e sem antic value, like, 'H esperus is H esperus' 
and 'H esperus is Phosphorus'.
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For Evans, the essence of the Fregean notion of sense consists in the 
w ay in which the sem antic value is presented. The consequence of this 
w ay of understanding Fregean sense is that it seems that there can be no 
sense w ithout reference. But in that case, this view conflicts w ith the usual 
Fregean view  that an expression, like an em pty singular term , can have 
sense w hile lacking reference. A ccording to Evans, Frege's ascription of 
sense to em pty singular term s should not be taken seriously. Though it 
seems that Frege ascribes sense to em pty singular terms, this is, for Evans, 
'equivocal, hedged around  w ith  qualification, and dubiously  consistent 
w ith  the fundam entals of his philosophy of l a n g u a g e . v a n s  'rejects 
Russell's obliteration of the distinction betw een sense and  reference, yet 
he does not go to the other extreme of allowing sense w ithout reference.'7® 
So his stra tegy  is to show  th a t grasp  of sense essentially  requires 
identifying knowledge of the referent.
This w ay of interpreting the Fregean notion of sense leads Evans's 
Frege to be close to Russell. Evans quotes79 Russell's criterion for testing 
terms which are classified as referring expressions.
W henever the gram m atical subject of a proposition can be 
supposed  n o t to exist w ithou t rendering  the proposition  
m eaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a 
p roper nam e, i.e., no t a nam e directly represen ting  some 
object.
Evans takes a singular term  which passes this test to be Russellian. And 
the m ain task of the book is to establish the Russellian status of a large 
group of singular terms. It should  be noted that Evans is not try ing to 
show  that all kinds of singular term s are Russellian. N am es which are 
introduced by explicit stipulation (like his example of the nam e 'Julius'®®)
77Evans [1982], p.38.
78Sainsbury [1985], pl22.
79Evans [1982], p. 43.
8®See Evans [1982], p.31. We might introduce a name into our language by some kind of 
reference-fixing stipulation such as, 'let us call whoever invented the zip "Julius' ". They 
are descriptive names and understanding a name of this kind does not require possession of 
information flowing from the object which is being referred to by the name. We will have 
occasion to come back to this example again.
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are referring expressions b u t non-Russellian referring expressions. W hat 
he w ants to argue for, is that for a w ide range of singular terms, the kinds 
of thoughts w e m ust have to understand  sentences containing them  are 
though ts w hich cannot be had  if the singular term  failed to have a 
reference.
As Sainsbury remarks,
his [that is, Evans's] view  lies betw een tw o extrem es, ... At one 
extrem e is Russell’s view, on w hich the existence of Russellian 
thoughts is, of course, granted, bu t it is denied that there can be 
two such thoughts predicating the same p roperty  of the same 
object. At the other extreme is the view  which some, though not 
Evans, attribu te  to Frege, on w hich there is no  problem  about 
allowing thoughts to be distinct, even though they predicate the 
same property of the same object, but it is denied that thoughts are 
Russellian. Let us call these, respectively, the Russellian and the 
Fregean poles. Evans, of course, has a view com bining elem ents 
from  each pole: Russellian status together w ith  allow ing the 
Fregean distinction.®^
Frege held the view  that for com m unication to be successful, the thought 
that the speaker and  the hearer associates w ith the utterance m ust be the 
same. Evans thinks that this is too strong a claim to make. Though it is 
tru e  that com m unication depends upon  a certain overlap betw een the 
inform ation possessed by the speaker and the inform ation possessed by 
the hearer, a considerable difference m ay exist betw een their information, 
and  so it is sufficient for com m unication that the speaker and  the hearer 
think of the right object. It is not, in addition, required that they think of it 
in  the sam e way. Therefore the Fregean condition of com m unicatively 
successful use of singular term s should be replaced by the requirem ent 
th a t for the hearer to u nderstand  the speaker, both  m ust th ink of its 
referent. If there  w ere no such object the u tterance w ou ld  no t be 
u n d ersto o d , and  no th ing  w ou ld  have been said. So the n a tu re  of 
successful com m unication itself suggests that the terms be Russellian.
8^ Sainsbury [1985], p.l30.
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This is no doubt an im portan t argum ent, bu t Evans uses it as a 
supplem entary  argum ent to establish the Russellian status of singular 
term . The m ain reason is tha t the sam e conclusion can be reached by 
considering the nature of the thought in which such singular term s occur. 
If we can, following Evans, show  that thoughts of this kind are Russellian, 
then that w ould  provide us w ith good grounds for adm itting  a definite 
and  irreducible class of de re thoughts.
2.3.3. Russell’s Principle and Information-Based Thoughts
According to Evans, our thoughts about particular objects m ust satisfy 
w hat he calls 'Russell’s Principle’.®^ This Principle states
A subject cannot m ake a judgem ent about som ething unless
he knows which object his judgem ent is about.
The P rinc ip le  suggests  th a t, in  o rd e r  to  be th in k in g  ab o u t an  
indiv idual/ob ject or m aking a judgem ent about h im /it, one m ust oneself 
know  which ind iv idual/object he or she is thinking about. W hat is it to 
have such know ledge? The know ledge w hich is req u ired  in th is 
connection is, according to Evans, ’d iscrim inating  know ledge’. So, a 
subject cannot be said to m ake a judgem ent about som ething unless he 
has d iscrim inating  know ledge abou t the object of his judgem ent. 
Knowledge of this kind w ould enable the subject to distinguish the object 
of his judgem ent from  all other things®®. There are three w ays in which a 
subject can come to know  which object his judgem ent is about. They are 
descriptive, dem onstrative and recognition-based, and they help us in the 
determ ination of the identity of the thought. Thus a sentence of the form 
’that G is F' m ay express a thought involving a descriptive kind of m ode 
of identification if the identification exploits the fact th a t the object is 
uniquely G. An utterance of the same sentence, in a different context, may 
also express a th o u g h t in  w hich recognition-based iden tification  is 
involved, th a t is, if w e recognise th a t the cu rren tly  perceived G is 
som eone we have previously encountered. A nd an utterance of the very
®2Evans [1982], p.89. 
®®ibid.
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sam e sentence m ay express a th o u g h t invo lv ing  a d em onstra tive  
identification if the relevant G is currently  perceived by us. W hen an 
object is identified in any one of these kinds of modes of identification, it 
can be called the thought’s object. So, according to Evans, thoughts about 
particu lar objects are governed by Russell's Principle, and  therefore, a 
defence of this Principle is necessary. A defence of Russell’s Principle 
w ould  be helpful in tw o ways. In the first place, it w ould provide us w ith 
an account of w hat common thing a subject is able to do in the case of 
descrip tive , dem o n stra tiv e  an d  recognition-based  iden tifica tio n  by 
show ing us w hy it is that thought about a particular individual requires 
the subject to be able to do it. In the second place, it w ould  help us in 
answ ering questions about the boundaries of dem onstrative identification. 
Q uestions like, 'Does perception of an object alw ays provide us w ith  
discrim inating know ledge of it ?’ or 'Can we dem onstratively identify an 
object seen in a photograph or heard on the radio, or m ust w e rather think 
of them  descriptively?’, can be answ ered properly  only w hen Russell’s 
Principle is defended as an acceptable principle governing our thoughts 
about particular objects.
Evans initially  defends Russell's Principle w ith  the help  of the 
example of tw o indistinguishable steel balls. The example goes like this,®4
S u p p o se ,..., that on a certain day in the past, a subject briefly 
observed tw o indistinguishable steel balls suspended  from 
the  sam e po in t and  ro ta ting  about it. H e now  believes 
nothing about one ball w hich he does not believe about the 
other. This is certainly a situation in which the subject cannot 
discrim inate one of the balls from  all other things, since he 
cannot discrim inate it from  its fellow. And a principle which 
precludes the ascription to the subject of a thought about one 
of the balls surely has a considerable intuitive appeal.
In this kind of case, if we try to think of just one of the tw o balls, we will 
try  to  do th a t by focusing  on  som ething  w hich w ill help  us in  
d istinguishing it from  the other ball. Now, if there is no distinguishing
®4ibid, p.90.
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m ark w hich allows us to do so, we shall have to adm it tha t we are 
incapable of thoughts about one of them , as d istinct from  the  other, 
because, if the subject has no w ay of distinguishing betw een the two balls, 
his effort to think about one of the balls is bound to fail. We will come to a 
fuller discussion of Russell's Principle later on.
Thoughts that are about particu lar objects and  are governed by 
Russell's Principle are called inform ation-based thoughts' by Evans. Very 
often a thinker can entertain  thoughts about an object because they are 
based on the inform ation they have about the w orld, inform ation which 
flows from  the object itself. Perception, m em ory and testim ony m ay all 
three provide this inform ation link. To quote Evans®®,
O ur p a rtic u la r  th o u g h ts  are very  o ften  b ased  upon  
in form ation  w hich w e have abou t the w orld . W e take 
ourselves to be inform ed, in w hatever way, of the existence 
of such-and-such an object, and we think or speculate about 
it. A though t of the k ind  w ith  w hich I am  concerned is 
governed by a conception of its object w hich is the result 
neither of fancy ... nor of linguistic stipulation ..., bu t rather is 
the result of a belief about how  the w orld is which the subject 
has because he has received inform ation (or m isinform ation) 
from the object.
Evans explains this point w ith the help of an example. Suppose A and B 
w ent for a hunting  trip  and came across a beautiful bird. Years later A 
m ight w ant to talk about that b ird  w ith  B by using expressions which 
w ould  invoke inform ation in B's m ind. A m ight say 'Do you rem em ber 
the b ird  we saw  on the hunting  trip  w e w ent on?' and  fail to m ake B 
rem em ber the b ird  he w as ta lk ing  about. H e m igh t e laborate  the 
description in different ways (like, m entioning the date, the place etc. of 
their trip, or show  a picture of a b ird  sim ilar to the one he was talking 
about). B, taking A to be trustw orthy, m ay believe all that A is saying, bu t 
as Evans points out, 'I do not think that he can be said to have understood 
the rem ark, as it was intended to be understood, until he remembers the
®®ibid, p.l21.
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bird  — until the right inform ation is retrieved.'®® A nd once the hearer is 
able to identify the b ird  the speaker w as talking about, he will be in a 
different inform ation state than the one he was in.
The above example shows only one of the three w ays in which the 
subject m ay provide an information-link. Inform ation of the object w ould 
control the thought about the particular object if and only if the subject, 
due to his acquiring and retaining inform ation, is d isposed to evaluate 
an d  appreciate®^ thoughts about the object th a t it is so-and-so. For 
example, suppose a subject is looking a t a black and w hite cat which he has 
never seen or heard  about before. H e m ay entertain  different thoughts 
about th a t cat, bu t it is the content of his perception  and  no o ther 
inform ation w hich controls his thought.
So there  is a duality  of factors involved in the notion  of an  
inform ation-based  thought. O n the one hand , the subject possesses 
in form ation  w hich he derives from  the object and  he regards this 
inform ation to be germ ane to the evaluation and  appreciation of the 
thought. O n the other hand, the subject fulfils the requirem ent im posed 
by Russell's Principle, th a t is, he identifies (that is, has discrim inating 
know ledge of) the object that his thought concerns. Therefore, in all cases, 
the overriding purpose of the subject's thinking consists in thinking about 
the object from w hich the inform ation is derived. H e aims at this object, 
w hich Evans calls a 'target'®®, b u t like all other aim ing he m ay miss it. 
N ow  a necessary condition for the existence of an  inform ation-based 
thought about the particular object is the following:
It is only w hen the procedure which determ ines the object 
and  the procedure w hich determ ines the target locate the 
sam e object can the subject be credited w ith an inform ation- 
based particular thought about that object.®^
®®ibid, p.308.
®7We will be discussing more on evaluation and appreciation of a remark in the next 
section.
®®ibid, p.l38.
®9See Evans [1982], p.l39.
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N o such procedure governs the having of purely descriptive thought, for 
the notion of target plays no role in stating the conditions for having such 
a thought.
If this be the necessary condition for having an inform ation-based 
thought, then if a m ode of identification in fact fails to identify anything, it 
cannot figure in an inform ation-based thought about an object. So, for an 
inform ation-based though t to be about an object, h ad  no t the object 
existed , th a t th o u g h t could  no t have existed either. In  th is sense, 
inform ation-based thoughts are Russellian. Evans insists that Tt is no part 
of this proposal that his m ind is w holly vacant, im ages and  w ords m ay 
clearly pass through it, and various ancillary thoughts m ay even occur to 
h im .'9® H e m ay have general thoughts, but, as Sainsbury points out, this 
view  of tho u g h t is perfectly  consistent w ith  the fo llow ing view  of 
thought-expression: w here an attem pt to express a Russellian thought fails 
because there is no appropriate object.
2.3.4. The Main Argument for the Russellian Status of Singular Terms
H aving  characterised  the  n a tu re  of in form ation-invoking  particu la r 
thoughts in this way, Evans tries to show that the role it plays in the m ain 
argum ent is the following: for m any singular term s one m ust th ink an 
inform ation-based thought in order to understand  utterances containing 
them. Inform ation-based thoughts are Russellian, that is, provided that if 
the particular object (the thought is said to be a thought about) d id  not 
exist then the thought itself could not have existed. Hence singular terms 
occurring in utterances whose understanding requires inform ation-based 
thoughts are Russellian — if they d id  not refer, there could be no thought 
sufficient for understanding  utterances containing them . A n inform ation- 
invoking singular term  is one w hich is typically in tended, as used in an 
u tterance, to m ake the h earer b rin g  to  bear, in u n d ers tan d in g  the 
utterance, inform ation antecedently in his possession.
O ne m ay here  w o n d er w hy  u n d e rs tan d in g  of an  u tterance 
involving inform ation-invoking singular terms requires tha t the singular
9®ibid„ pp.45-6.
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term  refer? We can, at this point, state the argum ent very briefly. H aving 
done that, w e can discuss how  Evans argues for each step in the argum ent. 
The argum ent proceeds in the following way:
In o rder to understand  an utterance involving inform ation- 
invoking singular term s, an utterance of the form  'A(t)’, one 
m ust oneself believe tha t there is som ething to w hich the 
term  'V refers. U nderstand ing  any u tterance is know ing a 
tru th ,  th a t  is, k n o w in g  w h a t has been  sa id . But 
understanding, being a species of knowledge, cannot be based 
on a false belief — that is, the belief t ha t ' t '  refers cannot be 
false. Therefore, 'f ,  that is the inform ation-invoking singular 
term, m ust have a reference.
Evans justifies the claim th a t to understand  an inform ation-invoking 
singular term , one m ust oneself believe that there is som ething to which 
the term  refers, by first show ing that for the hearer to understand  an 
inform ation-invoking singular term , som e inform ation already  in  his 
possession m ust be invoked. A nd the inform ation that the hearer invokes 
and the speaker has are derived from  the same object. H ere we m ay refer 
back to the exam ple of talking about a bird  which tw o persons saw on a 
hunting trip. As has already been pointed out, the hearer cannot be said to 
understand  the speaker unless he connects the speaker's use of the phrase 
'th a t b ird ' w ith  the inform ation he him self has about the bird. Evans 
makes this point clear w ith another example.^i Suppose a speaker makes a 
dem onstrative reference to a m an in an environm ent he shares w ith  the 
hearer and says 'this m an is F' — now  the hearer can be said to understand 
the  rem ark  only if he perceives the particu lar m an and  brings his 
perceptual inform ation to bear upon  his in terpretation  of the rem ark. 
Examples of this kind, therefore, show  that there are m any cases w here 
understand ing  an expression requires activating antecedently  possessed 
inform ation. One m ay, how ever, w onder w hether understanding  of this 
kind  (a) has to involve some belief, and  (b) has to involve only belief 
which is true. In the following paragraphs we will see how  Evans tries to
91ibid, p.305.
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show  that the notion of understanding  of an expression in  the relevant 
sense not only involves belief, bu t involves a true belief.
According to Evans, invoking inform ation in this connection really 
m eans th a t the hearer m u st evaluate (that is, arrive a t a provisional 
assessm ent of its tru th  and falsity) and  appreciate (that is, think out w hat 
the consequences of the rem ark w ould  be if it w ere true) the rem ark in 
accordance w ith  the  content of the  re levan t inform ation . Invoking  
inform ation, according to Evans is no t m erely a m atter of calling the 
inform ation to m ind, it should be brought to bear upon the interpretation 
of the remark^2^ Evans here concentrates on the process of appreciation of 
the rem ark in the use of information.
Some m ight argue that although bringing inform ation to bear in 
appreciation  of an u tterance involves the fact that one m ust oneself 
believe that there is som ething to w hich the term  refers, it does not follow 
that the term  really has a reference. Suppose someone says t is F' w here t 
invokes inform ation w hich m ay be represen ted  as '0%, ...., On'. Then 
understanding  an utterance of this kind consists in nothing bu t realising 
that w hat the speaker said is true, if, and only if, som ething is both 01, . . ,  
0n and F. This example is analogous to the example of a descriptive nam e 
like, 'Julius'. Som eone w ho u n d erstan d s the  u tterance involving a 
stipulative nam e like 'Julius', an utterance saying 'Julius is a genius', will 
come to believe tha t if w hat the speaker said w as true  then  there is 
someone w ho invented the zip and w ho was a genius. But, none of these 
beliefs commit the hearer to the existence of som ething w hich is 01...0n 
nor to the existence of someone w ho invented the zip. In answ er to this 
objection, Evans tries to  show  th a t u n d erstan d in g  is a species of 
knowledge. Then, w ith the help of this notion of understanding  and  the 
seam lessness principle (the principle that asserts 'there can be no tru th  
which it requires acceptance of a falsehood to appreciate'^^)^ he shows that 
know ledge cannot be based on false belief and this, in turn , shows that 




Evans thinks that the picture is not as simple as the opponents take 
it to be. In appreciation of a rem ark we m ust try to find out a justification 
for the hearer's arriving at such a belief. Let us first take the example of a 
rem ark involving the nam e Julius. In cases like this, understanding  such 
a rem ark on the part of the hearer requires being faithful to the speaker's 
in ten tion , and  the speaker's  o v errid in g  in ten tion  is to  convey his 
conception, which can be conveyed even in a case w here there is no object. 
As Evans says,
..., the hearer's belief results from  an attem pt to be faithful to 
the speaker's conception of the object, if any, to which he is 
referring. Such a conception m ay be conveyed, and  such a 
belief arrived at in the absence of any object it concerns.^^
The belief arrived at by the hearer in understanding of utterances l ike ' t  is 
F' (where the hearer draw s upon the properties of being 01...0n) cannot be 
given a sim ilar kind of justification as the Julius case. In cases like this, 
although the speaker intends his hearer to bring inform ation to bear, the 
inform ation  th a t the hearer brings to bear, honouring  the speaker's 
intentions, m ay not figure in the content of the belief of the speaker about 
reference. So in bringing inform ation to bear the hearer m ust draw  upon 
his ow n resources in order to select appropriate information.
The only possible justification of the belief that, if w hat the 
speaker said is true, there is something which is 0%,...,0n and 
F is that it follows from some belief of the form 'The speaker 
is referring to a', together w ith a view  as to how  things stand 
w ith  a. So, unlike the belief tha t one m ight form  on hearing 
an u tterance of Julius is F', the  appreciation-constitu ting 
belief in the case of an inform ation-invoking rem ark is of the 
hearer's belief about the w orld — about how  things stand w ith 




This, therefore , show s th a t even th o u g h  it is possib le  to possess 
inform ation in the absence of belief on the part of the hearer, concerning 
the existence of the relevant object to which the speaker is referring, it is 
n o t possible to b ring  th is inform ation  to bear coherently  upon  the 
interpretation of the referential remark.
But it is no t enough tha t the hearer believes th a t the speaker is 
referring to something. H e can bring his inform ation to bear on the basis 
of this belief, even if the belief is not true, so that there is nothing to which 
the singular term  refers. The argum ent so far 'shows only that a certain 
belief is required on the part of those who understand the rem ark, not that 
the belief m ust be true.'^^ H ere Evans provides the final argum ent. He 
says that understanding an expression am ounts to the know ledge of w hat 
is said. That means, to understand an utterance u  of a speaker S is to know 
w hat the speaker says by uttering u. U nderstanding is a kind of success — it 
is know ing w hich thought w as expressed. H ow ever understand ing  or 
know ledge of tru th  cannot be based on a falsehood. This is know n as the 
seamlessness principle, which is expressed by Evans thus.
T ruth is seamless; there can be no tru th  w hich it requires 
acceptance of a falsehood to appreciate.^^
Therefore, understand ing  an utterance containing inform ation-invoking 
singular term  implies that a belief, on the part of the hearer, to the effect 
that the speaker is referring to an object by the use of that singular term  
has to be true. And for this belief to be true, the singular term  m ust refer — 
that is, it m ust be Russellian. As Evans concludes the discussion,
...thinking about the w orld, even if it consists in entertaining 
thoughts rather than  judging them  to be true, requires us to 
m ake intelligent use of the inform ation th a t w e possess.
W hat we m ust realize is that using information in this w ay is 
no t a neutral activity. One can intelligibly use inform ation in 





This, then, is Evans’ argum ent for the Russellian status of some singular 
term s — singular term s that are inform ation-invoking. By exploiting the 
special characteristic of understand ing  utterances involving inform ation- 
invoking singular term s and  by appealing to the seam lessness principle, 
h e  arrives at th is conclusion. To u n d erstan d  u tterances contain ing  
inform ation-invoking  singular term s one m ust th ink  an  inform ation- 
based thought, which itself is regarded as having a Russellian status, and 
the argum ent also appeals to this property of inform ation-based thought.
I do not w ant to question this m ain argum ent of Evans regarding 
the Russellian status of a w ide variety of singular terms. W hat I w ant to 
look into, in m ore detail, is the nature of inform ation-based thought — 
thoughts which are required in order to understand utterances containing 
those singular term s — and try  to com pare it w ith  our notion of de re 
thought. O n a closer scrutiny it will become evident th a t inform ation- 
based thoughts are governed by Russell's Principle, and  it is particularly 
this principle which I w ant to question.
2.4. Russell’s Principle Evaluated
It is essential, at this point, to try  and see w hether the analogy w e drew  
betw een de re thoughts as we characterised it in section 2.1 and Evans's 
notion of inform ation-based singular thoughts works. W e need to  see 
w hether de re thought as we understood  it is exactly the sam e as the 
notion of inform ation-based particular thought. If they are not, we need to 
show  w here exactly they differ. O ur aim  in this section is to show  how  
Evans's notion of inform ation-based thoughts, though  sim ilar to our 
notion of de re thoughts, differs from  the latter in an im portant respect 
and  is a m uch stronger notion than ours. It will become clear that we do 
not need this stronger notion, and it does face some difficulties.^^
Inform ation-based thoughts are de re thoughts in the sense that 
they are of the objects from  w hich inform ation is derived, and  in which 
they are grounded. As Evans rem arks, '... according to m y explanation of
^^There is a detailed discussion of where Evans may have gone wrong at this point in 
Rozemond [1993] and in Sainsbury [1985], section J/.3.
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the notion of inform ation-based thoughts, such though ts com m it the 
subject to the existence of som ething as their object.'^ 0® But, according to 
Evans, it is not enough that a thought of this kind is g rounded  in an 
object. Over and above this the subject m ust satisfy Russell’s Principle (the 
Principle th a t says, to repeat, th a t in order to have a though t about a 
particular object the subject m ust know  about which object he is thinking) 
w hich w ould  enable him  to  have discrim inating know ledge about the 
object of his judgem ent, know ledge th a t will help  th e  subject to  
d istinguish the object of his judgem ent from all other things. One m ight 
object, at this point, that Russell's Principle seems to be too strong. One 
can think of something w ithout being able to identify it by the process of 
discrim inating it from  all o ther objects, that is w ithout know ing w hich 
object it is, at least, not in  any useful sense of know ing w hich'. The 
distinction which m ay be draw n here is a distinction betw een identifying 
an object and merely thinking of one.
It should be noted that Evans defends Russell's Principle by arguing 
against counter-examples to it. Evans thinks that there are intuitions both 
in favour and against this Principle, and therefore, w hether or not we are 
to  accept it d epends on theoretical argum ents. H e develops these 
argum ents, and then  uses this to deal w ith apparen t counter-exam ples. 
Two m ain strategies can be distinguished in this connection. The first one 
depends on the application of his 'Generality Constraint' to the example of 
a child w ho, according to Evans's opponent, can think of an individual 
w ithout having discrim inating knowledge. The second strategy is to claim 
that in order to be able to think that p  one m ust know w hat it is for p to be 
true and then apply it to the counter-example involving steel balls.
There are two examples w hich will be discussed here — examples 
w hich, Evans claims, violates Russell's Principle and  therefore preven t 
the subject to have thoughts about the particular object in question.
The first exam ple concerns a child 's th inking about Socrates by 
hearing merely that Socrates was a Greek p h i l o s o p h e r . i ^ i  In a case like this
lOOEvans [1982], pp.326-7. 
lOlibid, pp.73-4.
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the child w ould  violate Russell's Principle because she w ill no t have 
discrim inating knowledge.
Application of Russell's Principle in a case like this depends on the 
application of the Generality Constraint, — a 'fundam ental constraint that 
m ust be observed in all our r e f l e c t i o n s ' . ^ ® ^  According to this principle,
if a subject can be credited w ith the thought that a is F, then 
he m ust have the conceptual resources for entertain ing the 
thought that a is G, for every property of being G of which he 
has a conception.i®^
According to Evans, a singular thought, that is, a thought w hich can be 
in terpreted  as having the content that a i s F , involves the exercise of tw o 
separate capacities — one being the capacity to think of a and the other 
being the capacity to th ink of F. Once a subject is credited  w ith  the 
exercising of these conceptual abilities, there is no conceptual barrier to his 
being able to entertain the thought that a is G or the thought that b is F. 
For exam ple, som eone w ho is able to think that John is happy, has the 
ability to think that John is sad or that H arry is happy. As Evans points 
o u t 'in order to overthrow  Russell's Principle, one w ould  have to show 
that this general capacity to think of an object, and grasp indefinitely many 
hypotheses about it, can be possessed entirely in the absence of any 
discrim inating conception of the o b j e c t . W h a t  Evans tries to show  is 
that counter-exam ples to Russell's Principle involve exam ples of subjects 
having  thoughts that violate the G enerality C onstraint, and  thus these 
subjects cannot be credited w ith a singular thought.
W hat w ould a counter-exam ple to Russell's Principle be like? Here 
is a case that Evans considers. Suppose a subject does no t associate w ith a 
nam e anything which can be said to provide an individuating description 
of the person w ho is the bearer of the name. For example, suppose a child 
comes to acquire the use of the nam e 'Socrates' by hearing that Socrates is 
a Greek Philosopher. In a case like this the child has no discrim inating
l® 2 ib id ,  p .lO O .
^®^p.l04. 
l ® 4 b i d ,  p .7 5 .
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know ledge, no capacity to distinguish the object of her judgem ent (that is 
Socrates) from all other objects. Evans thinks that the child in this case is 
violating the Generality Constraint:
If the ignorant child has got hold of the w idely dissem inated 
piece of inform ation (or m isinformation) 'Socrates w as snub­
nosed', we m ight well be inclined to say that the child has a 
tru e  or false belief about Socrates, or at least acquired 
in fo rm atio n  (or m isin fo rm atio n ) ab o u t h im . But the  
inclination to say that the child has, and is expressing, a belief 
about Socrates is far less strong w hen we envisage the child 
no t m erely  rep ea tin g  a w ide ly  d issem inated  p iece of 
inform ation, bu t u ttering the w ords 'Socrates w as fat' (say), 
perhaps as the result of some confusion.^®^
W hat Evans tries to do w ith the help of this example is to show  that the 
child does no t have the ability to think that Socrates is fat. In order to 
defend Russell's Principle against this counter-example Evans has to  argue 
further that w e will have to give up  the view that the child has the ability 
to th ink that Socrates is snub-nosed. Suppose we agree that the  child 
cannot have the thought that Socrates is fat. N ow , if she could have the 
th o u g h t th a t Socrates is snub-nosed, she should be able to have the 
thought that he is fat. So w e can say that she cannot have the thought that 
Socrates is snub-nosed. Let us therefore consider w hether the child is 
indeed unable to think that Socrates is fat.
It is a hypothesis of the example that the child d id  say, in so m any 
w ords, 'Socrates is fat'. So, w e need to explain in the first place, how  the 
child came to say 'Socrates is fat'. There m ay be tw o w ays in which she 
might^®^:
(a) she m ight have confused Socrates w ith someone else, or,
(b) she does not confuse Socrates w ith anybody else, bu t comes to utter the 
sentence 'Socrates is fat' due to some other reason.
i®5ibid, p.75.
^®^ For a detailed discussion see Rozemond [1993].
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In the case of the second alternative, the child m ight have come to utter 
the w ords 'Socrates is fat' as a result of an inference. Maybe she thinks that 
all philosophers are fat, and  came to know  from  her o lder sister that 
Socrates is a philosopher, and thus came to hold that Socrates is fat. In this 
case the child comes to think of Socrates as being snub-nosed, as well as 
being fat, and therefore seems to fulfil the Generality Constraint. Some 
m igh t say here th a t th is just postpones the question  ra ised  at the 
beginning. They m ay ask how  does the child get to have the thought that 
Socrates was a philosopher as opposed to the merely general thought that 
there was once a philosopher called Socrates'? Therefore, this answ er to 
Evans’s objection m ay not work.
The other case is the one w here the child confuses the philosopher 
Socrates w ith  som ebody else. We have to see w hether she violates 
Generality C onstraint and  thereby cannot be credited w ith  any thought 
concerning Socrates. It m ight very well appear that if the child is in  a 
confused state as this we are disinclined to say that she is thinking of 
Socrates. In cases w here we think that the child m ay be confusing Socrates 
w ith somebody else, we will say loosely 'she can't be thinking of Socrates'. 
W hat this rem ark am ounts to  is expressing our view  tha t it is u n lik e ly  
that she is thinking about Socrates. But this does not m ean that she cannot 
th ink of Socrates. Let us fu rther elaborate the exam ple of this child to 
m ake this point clear. Suppose the child was told by her older sister that 
Socrates is a Greek philosopher and is snub-nosed; suppose, on another 
occasion the older sister w anted to tease her and, pointing to a guest in a 
party  said that he was Socrates. This guest was fat. The child m ight later on 
say to her sister 'Socrates is fat'. N ow  her sister will of course realise that 
the child was talking about the guest at the party. It is also natural to say 
that she is thinking about the guest and not about Socrates, bu t we cannot 
say that the child can never think that Socrates is fat. If the child confuses 
Socrates w ith someone else then w e m ay have to say that at one point she 
does think about Socrates and that at another she does n o t. But this is as 
close as we can get to a violation of the Generality Constraint. We can 
never judge that she can think that Socrates was snub-nosed, bu t cannot 
think that he was fat.
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A second im portant point should be noted here. In order to explain 
our hesitation to ascribe to the child a thought about Socrates, we do not 
need to appeal to Russell's Principle. The hesitation can be explained by 
pointing ou t that there has been a confusion in the inform ation chain — 
the though t tha t Socrates is fat and the u tterance 'Socrates is fat' was 
grounded in someone other than Socrates. So any problem  in applying the 
G enerality C onstrain t in  exam ples of this k ind  does no t im m ediately 
im ply that we need Russell's Principle to explain it.
Finally we m ight grant tha t in one version of this exam ple, the 
child is too confused to have thoughts about Socrates, bu t this concession 
is compatible w ith the fact that there are other possible cases that do pose 
problem s w ith  Russell's Principle. For example, imagine a situation w here 
the child is not confused about Socrates, bu t that the knowledge she has is 
no t discrim inating know ledge. I guess here, Evans w ould  say that the 
child lacks inform ation-based thoughts. H owever, one can say that the 
child can have thoughts about Socrates by virtue of some causal link going 
back to the philosopher.
The best exam ple in support of Russell's Principle comes from the 
steel ball cases. There are two cases that Evans considers. We will discuss 
them  separately. In the first exam ple, already m entioned, a subject sees 
tw o indistinguishable steel balls hanging from the same point. The subject 
has access to no facts w hich w ill help in discrim inating the tw o balls. 
T herefo re , Evans concludes th a t d u e  to  the  u n a v a ila b ility  of 
discrim inating knowledge, he can think of neither of the tw o balls, and, so 
the example provides a strong case for Russell's principle.
N ow , the  observation th a t w e cannot have any  d iscrim inating 
capacity in a case of this kind is quite correct. It seems to be quite correct to 
say that if we try to think of just one ball w here we are aw are of two, we 
will focus on one of them  by virtue of something which will distinguish it 
from  the other ball. If w e are unable to recall anything that w ould help us 
in distinguishing one ball from  the other, we will have to give up trying 
to do so and  not seem to have any thought about one of the balls. 
How ever, the reason for this failure m ay not be due to the fact that the
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subject is no t able to d istingu ish  the object from  all o ther objects, as 
Russell's Principle requires. The reason m ight be due to the unfulfillm ent 
of a m ore m odest requirem ent — the requirem ent is, that in order to focus 
on an object w hen attem pting to think about it, a subject m ust find a w ay 
of distinguishing the object from the other objects he or she is aware of at 
that time. A nd the reason w hy he or she cannot distinguish one ball from 
the other is due to the fact that 'there has been a m erging of causal lines 
(whereas w hat is required, it m ay be said, for a thought-episode to concern 
an object, X, is that there be a single causal line running  from  X to the 
episode).'!®^ It is not due to his or her lack of discrim inating know ledge of 
the very  exacting k ind  th a t Russell's Principle requires. This can be 
com pared w ith the second point raised regarding the previous example of 
the confused child. O ur hesitation to say that the child is thinking about 
Socrates is due to som ething being w rong in the causal line, sim ilar to 
w hat is happening in this case
Evans now  considers another exam ple w here the subject does not 
have a problem  in  distinguishing one steel ball from  another. The story 
goes in this way^®^. Suppose a subject saw two distinct steel balls on two 
consecutive days, bu t due to some localised am nesia, forgets completely 
about the first episode. N ow , suppose m any years later she thinks about 
'that shiny ball', now  Evan's point is this.
If asked which ball he is thinking about, our subject cannot 
produce any facts which w ould discriminate between the two.
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Therefore,
There is no question of his recognising the ball; there is 
nothing else he can do w hich will show that his thought is 
really about one of the tw o balls (about that ball), rather than 
about the  other. The supposed  though t — the  supposed
l®7Sainsbury, p. 133. 




surplus over the ex hypothesis non-ind iv iduating  descrip tive
thought — is apparently not connected to anything.^
The difference betw een this exam ple and  the previous one is that the 
subject has no problem  of distinguishing one ball from the other because 
he has m em ory of just one ball. The origin of the current thought is the 
ball which the subject rem em bers. H e has no trouble focusing on the ball 
he remembers because he is aw are of seeing only one ball, but, according to 
Evans, although the subject behaves as if he is subscribing to Russell's 
Principle, he cannot have thoughts about one of the balls. The poin t of 
form ulating the steel ball exam ple in  the second w ay is two-fold. In the 
first place, in this case it seems that the subject satisfies the requirem ent 
laid dow n by Russell's Principle. In the second place, there seems to be no 
hesitation to say that the subject is thinking of the second ball. These are, 
no doubt, due to the fact that the subject has a loss of m em ory about one of 
the balls. But, as Evans argues, 'if asked which ball he is thinking about, 
our subject cannot produce any facts which w ould discrim inate betw een 
the two.'^^^ And, thus, the subject cannot be credited w ith  thoughts about 
the second ball.
But someone m ight argue against Evans in the following way. It is 
an indubitable fact that in a case w here a subject has encountered just one 
ball (w ithout there being any further relevant circumstances), he can have 
subsequent thoughts about it. It is also w ithout doub t th a t if a subject 
actually saw one ball and very nearly saw  another (maybe he w ould have 
seen the other one unless it was rem oved from his sight just as he entered 
the room, he m ight even have been told that an exactly sim ilar ball was 
rem oved from the room  just a m inute ago), he m ust be able to  th ink 
about the particular ball he saw. The m ere possibility of seeing a ball 
cannot in any w ay affect thought about the ball actually perceived. These 
are uncontroversial claims that Evans w ould have to accept, bu t if he 
accepts that w e can have thoughts about the ball in the second case, then, 
'how  does this differ from the case under discussion, in which though two 
balls are seen, the m em ory of one incident is obliterated? Since the second
llOibid, p .ll5 . 
l^^ibid, p.90.
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ball now  im pinges in no w ay upon  your consciousness, its nullified 
im pact can m ake no difference to w hether or not you can think of the first 
o n e , I t  should  be noted  th a t there is no qualita tive difference in 
recognitional capacities betw een the case where only one ball is seen and 
the case w here tw o balls are seen bu t the m em ory of one experience is 
obliterated. In both  the cases the subject has low -grade recognitional 
capacities. N ow , if the recognitional capacities are the sam e in both the 
cases, and  if Evans accepts the uncontroversial claim that the subject can 
think of the ball in the first case, then w hy can we no t say that the subject 
can th ink  of the ball in the second case (that is, the case w here he 
rem em bers perceiving just one ball) as well?
As Sainsbury rem arks, 'the essence of the position he (Evans) has to 
defend, ..., is tha t having a particu lar-thought is know ledge-involving: 
you m ust know  w hich object our though t concerns. ... Evans m ust 
therefore hold that a situation which w ould prevent any know ledge of an 
object w ould  p revent any thought of that object.’^ Know ledge in this 
case has to be discrim inating knowledge. But it seems that the steel ball 
case (in either of its formulation) can be interpreted in a w ay which w ould 
su p p o rt the claim  th a t w e can th ink  of an object w ith o u t hav ing  
discrim inating know ledge of it.
W hat w e have tried  to show  by discussing these exam ples is that 
Russell's P rinciple is too restrictive a requ irem ent for hav ing  de re 
thoughts. We agree w ith Evans in m aintaining that to refer to an object, 
w e m ust be able to th ink of that object. Inform ation-invoking singular 
term s seem  to have reference in  this sense and  inform ation-based  
thoughts seem to be about objects in the above sense. But Evans's point is 
that inform ation-based thoughts m ust further satisfy Russell's Principle. 
A nd it is here that they differ from de re thoughts.
One can think of something w ithout being able to identify it, that is 
w ithou t know ing which object it is, at least, not in any useful sense of 
know ing which. The distinction which m ay be draw n here is a distinction
ll^Sainsbury [1985], p.l33. 
ll^ibid, p.l34.
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betw een identifying an object and m erely thinking of one. Some examples 
m ay be given to m ake the point clear. We can think of perceptual objects 
by m erely attending to them. It m ight happen that if you look aw ay and 
then tu rn  back, you need not be able to perceptually pick this object out of 
a crowd. Similarly you can think of an object which you have perceived 
previously merely by rem em bering it. That you rem em ber something, and 
therefore, have the ability to think of it, does not require that how  you 
rem em ber it distinguishes it from  others. And if som eone refers you to 
som ething by nam e, you can think of it sim ply by the name. In all three 
cases the possibility rem ains that you can think of an individual w ithout 
know ing which particular one it is. For our purpose of providing a viable 
explanation of de re thoughts, this weaker thesis, that is, thinking about an 
object or m aking a judgem ent about it w ithout having discrim inating 
know ledge about it, seems to be adequate. For, if some thoughts are of this 
nature, then they will be essential about an individual, and hence be de re.
In conclusion, we can say that Evans’s inform ation-based thoughts 
initially seem to bear an affinity to de re thoughts as characterised at the 
beginning of the chapter. They are sim ilar in the sense that both of them  
are though ts g rounded  in objects from  w hich pieces inform ation are 
derived. Inform ation-based thoughts are dissim ilar to de re thoughts 
insofar as they are supposed  to fulfil the add itional requ irem ent of 
satisfying Russell's Principle, If we said that de re thoughts are exactly the 
sam e as Evans's inform ation-based thoughts then w e w ould  have had  to 
say th a t know ledge of objects of de re thoughts w ou ld  have to  be 
discrim inating knowledge. But w e do not think that know ledge of objects 
of de re thoughts has to be discrim inating knowledge in Evans's sense.
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CHAfTER 3 
The Hybrid View of Belief Ascription
3.1 Prelim inary Rem arks
Let m e sum m arise briefly w hat I have tried to do in the last three chapters, 
and  how  the discussion of the H ybrid View of belief ascription becomes 
essential in the light of the conclusion reached in the  previous chapter. 
A fter having given, in the in troducto ry  chapter, a general account of 
propositions as the content of belief and other prepositional attitudes by 
show ing that prepositional attitude verbs are dyadic in nature — that is, 
they refer to a relation betw een a believer and a proposition; and  the 
puzzles tha t arise in contexts w here an ascription of a prepositional 
attitude, like belief, takes place, the next chapter attem pts to answ er some 
of the w ell-know n Q uinean objections to any notion of proposition. The 
m ain aim  of the chapter on de re thoughts was to show  that there is a 
genuine class of beliefs w hich are de re as opposed to de dicto, by  taking 
clues from  Gareth Evans’s notion of a singular (or a Russellian) thought 
as developed in his book Varieties of Reference [1982].
The strategy taken here is that the distinction betw een the de re and 
the de dicto reports of belief depends upon  the nature of the proposition 
occurring w ithin the tw o reports. In fact, the tw o kinds of belief reports 
relate the believer to tw o different kinds of propositions. In the case of de 
re reports, the proposition involved is a broadly Russellian one, w here 
the reference of the 'that'-clause is the singular proposition involving the 
indiv idual and  the p roperty  itself. W hereas in  the case of de dicto belief 
reports, the proposition involved is broadly  Fregean, w here the ’that'- 
clause is constituted by Fregean senses or modes of presentation. All these 
discussions lead to the conclusion that.
If the  d istinction  betw een  de re and  de dicta  reports is genu ine, and  the 
propositions occurring w ith in  these two k inds of reports or the content of 
the two reports are essentially  d ifferent, then  a single account of belief
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reports  cannot be given. We need  tw o d ifferen t sem antical accounts to 
explain the difference in  content betw een de re and de dicto belief reports.
N ow , if this be the conclusion of our discussion, it can very  well be 
challenged by philosophers w ho w ould prefer to give a unified account of 
belief reports, an account which w ould be able to explain any belief report 
w hatsoever. A num ber of philosophers^ have tried to do so, and their 
type of account of belief ascription is w hat I w ould like to call a 'H ybrid 
View' of belief ascription^ The reason w hy I call accounts of this kind 
'hybrid' will be explained in due course.
There are three things that I w ould like to do in this chapter. In the 
first place, I w ould like to see w hat m otivated philosophers to develop a 
semantics of belief ascription of the hybrid kind. This can be understood 
only if we com pare it w ith  other accounts of belief ascriptions and  the 
reasons why the hybrid theorists think that they do not work. The second 
part will be concerned w ith explaining and clarifying the hybrid view  itself 
follow ing m ainly the discussions of Schiffer [1992], and  of Crim m ins 
[1992]. Finally I w ould like to discuss some of the specific objections raised 
against accounts of this kind and, furtherm ore, a particu lar incoherence 
involved in any account of this kind.
3.2. A H ybrid View of Belief Ascription
W hat w ould be the correct w ay of analysing belief reports, such as, Tom 
believes that Cicero w as a Roman orator'? H ow  should things stand in
ll^See Crimmins and Perry [1989]; Crimmins [1992]; Mark Richard [1990]; Fodor [19901; 
Schiffer [1992].
^l^The kind of hybrid view that I am talking about is different from the hybrid view that 
Richard Heck [1995] talks about. According to his characterisation of the hybrid view, the 
content of a belief report is a Fregean thought, where some notion of sense is needed in a 
proper account of belief, but no such notion is needed in a proper account of meanings of 
sentences outside the belief context. So, the contribution of the expressions in the sentence 
'Cicero is a Roman orator' occurring outside the belief operator are just their references. But 
when the same sentence is used to report a belief, that is, when someone says 'Tom believes 
that Cicero is a Roman orator', the expressions within this report refer to senses, and the 
'that'-clause refers to the Fregean thought. His kind of hybrid view differs from mine on 
the point that it does not seem to take the content of belief itself to be of a hybrid variety — 
consisting of both a Russellian singular proposition and some kind of mode of presentation or 
sense.
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relation to the believer Tom in order for the report to be true? It is a fact of 
the m atter tha t people do believe things and w e very often report their 
beliefs correctly, bu t problem s crop u p  w hen w e w ant to be clear about 
w hat it is that makes the report of Tom's belief a correct report. Quine's 
dissatisfaction w ith  vagueness and  circum stantiality^ of belief reports 
have led him  to th ink  th a t a lthough  belief reports are a p a rt of our 
language it is doubtful w hether they m ake any real sense at all. But m any 
philosophers think tha t the fact of circum stantiality and  the resu ltan t 
variations in tru th-values should  no t be taken as a m ark of sem antic 
weakness. Far from being a weakness these are the m erits of such reports, 
enabling us to explain w hy belief reports involving co-referential singular 
term s and  co-referential predicates differ in tru th-value. Belief reports 
exhibit a context sensitivity analogous to a use of the sentence 'it is 
rain ing ' o r of the term  'you'^^7. Frege’s in troduction  of the notion of 
m ode of presentation to account for a difference in tru th-value betw een 
'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman orator’ and that Tom believes that 
Tully is a Roman orator', given the fact that the tw o nam es ’Cicero' and 
'Tully' refer to the sam e indiv idual, is a w ay of explaining aw ay the 
app aren t contradiction arising from  the peculiar circum stances of the 
utterance of the tw o sentences. The tw o names Cicero' and  'Tully', w hen 
occurring w ithin belief reports, refer to senses, and  insofar as the sense 
Tom attaches to the nam e Cicero’ is different from  the sense he attaches 
w ith the nam e 'Tully', then the two belief reports will differ in their truth- 
value. The fact that the tw o nam es refer to the same individual does not 
pose any problem  in th is case as nam es go th rough  a shift in their 
reference w hen occurring w ith in  the scope of an a ttitu d e  verb. So a 
coherent semantics of belief reports m ust accom m odate explanations of 
these nuances involved in belief reports.
To understand w hat a H ybrid View of belief reports is, let us first try 
to be clear about the overall p ictu re  of the philosophical discussion 
centring round  the semantics of singular belief reports like, 'X believes 
tha t a is F ', w here X is the believer w ho is related to  the proposition 
referred to by the 'that'-clause. A survey of the philosophical literature on
the 'circumstantiality' of a belief report we mean the context of the utterance of the 
report.
^I'See Crimmins [1992], pp.141-2.
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the semantics of belief reports will show that there are three m ain possible 
w ays in w hich  ph ilosophers have tried  to p rov ide  an  account of 
ascriptions of this kind. They are:
(a) The Direct Referential (b) The H ybrid Account (c)The Fregean
Accounts of Belief Reports of Belief Reports. Account of
(Sometimes called the Belief Reports,
'naive view'^^®).
To highlight the differences betw een these three accounts, let us 
begin by giving a fam iliar kind of story. Tom, w ho goes jogging every 
m orning to the W est Sands, m eets a very friendly dog w hom  he nam es 
'Fido' and  w hom  he believes to be male. W hen he goes shopping every 
evening, he also meets a very friendly dog that is w aiting for its m aster in 
front of the grocers. Tom calls this dog Fi Fi' and th inks that Fi Fi is 
female. U nbeknow nst to Tom, Fido and Fi Fi are the sam e dog. N ow , 
w hen w e ascribe to Tom the beliefs 'Tom believes that Fido is male', and 
'Tom believes that Fi Fi is male', our intuition is that one of them  is a true 
ascrip tion, w hile the o ther is false; though  'Fido and  Fi Fi' are co- 
referential singular term s, they cannot be substitu ted  in belief contexts 
w ithout changing the truth-value of the whole sentence.
According to the Direct Referential Theory of belief ascriptions, or 
the naive view, uses of the two sentences Fido is male' and 'Fi Fi is m ale’, 
express the same proposition, both being about the same dog. They further 
suppose that this equivalence holds even w ithin a belief report, and so the 
following two sentences about Tom express the same claim, in spite of our 
intuition that due to Tom's ignorance about the identity of Fido and Fi Fi 
the sentence
(1) Tom believes that Fido is male 
is true, while the sentence




In fact they claim that both of these attributions are true attributions. So on 
the D irect Referential account, the role of the singular term  and the 
predicate w ithin a belief context is nothing m ore than in troducing  the 
ob jec t/in d iv id u a l referred  to by  the singular term  and  the p roperty  
referred to by the predicate. So the logical form of a sentence like, T om  
believes that Fido is male', m ay be represented as
B ( Tom, < Fido, being male > ),
w here the o rdered  pair of the object and the p roperty  represents the 
proposition expressed by the 'that'-clause; and the occurrences of the terms 
w ithin the corner brackets are transparent, that is, they can be substituted 
for term s having the same reference w ithout changing the truth-value of 
the sentence which is arrived at as a result of the substitution.
Salm on has defended this kind of account of belief ascription. 
D efenders of this k ind  of analysis focus on the d istinction  betw een 
sem antic and  pragm atic facts about statem ents. Semantic facts are facts 
about m eaning, reference, content, tru th  and falsity. W hile the pragm atic 
facts include those about propriety , purpose and in tended  effect of the 
statement. Now, w hat the naive theorists w ant to point out is this: it is not 
controversial that it w ould be w rong to use (2) to describe Tom's belief. 
W hat is controversial is to p inpoint w herein lies this incorrectness. Is the 
incorrectness a semantic fact about the use of (2), or is it only a pragm atic 
fact? Is the report false or is it only m isleading or inappropriate? To reveal 
the pragm atic inappropriateness in using (2) to describe Tom ’s belief, 
Salmon has argued that although belief is a two-place relation betw een a 
believer and  a singular (or a Russellian) p roposition , it is also the 
'existential generalisation ' of a three-place relation BEL' w hose th ird  
place represents the guise or the w ay of believing. Though (1) and (2) 
involve the same proposition, it is only by pragm atic im plicature that they 
indicate the w ay in w hich it is believed. But the guise or the w ay of 
believing does not enter into the truth-conditions of belief report — it is 
not the semantic content of the belief report. It is true that there seems to 
be a strong in tuition  to hold  tha t (2) is false. Suppose w e w ere to ask
119see Salmon [1986a], [1986b] and [1989].
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som eone, 'Does Tom believe th a t Fi Fi is m ale?', the correct answ er 
obviously w ould  be 'no'. H ow ever, the naive theorists th ink  that our 
intuition that the assertion of (2) is incorrect cannot, by itself, decide the 
issue of its tru th  — it is no t alw ays clear w hether our in tu itions of 
incorrectness are really intuitions about tru th  or about propriety.
The naive theorists support their view  by developing argum ents 
th a t lead us to question the tru th  in tuitions that we have about these 
reports. Four m ain sorts of argum ents have been provided:




It m ight be w orth outlining them  very briefly here. ^  A ccording to the 
first argum ent the naive theory  is supported  by som e independen t 
semantical principles, m ainly the principle of articulated com positionality 
and  d irect reference. A principle of com positionality tells us th a t the 
content of a com plex expression is m ade ou t of the con ten t of its 
com ponent expressions. Com ponent expressions of a complex expression 
are taken to be those which are overtly used in the complex expression. So 
the principle of articulated com positionality tells us that the content in a 
statem ent of any complex expression depends only on the contents in the 
sta tem ent of its overt com ponent expressions. The p rincip le  of d irect 
reference, on the o ther hand , says th a t the s ta tem ent of a sim ple 
predication, like 'P(a% ...an)\ expresses the proposition  th a t a certain 
property  holds am ong certain objects. The nam e refers to the object, and 
the predicate refers to  the p roperty  or the relation. The naive theorists 
identify  the princip le of d irect reference w ith  the p rincip le  of d irect 
contribution of an expression, which says that the contribution of a nam e 
to the content of a containing statem ent is simply the object it denotes. By 
appealing to this principle, they argue that if all that the nam e contributes 
to the content of the statem ent is its referent, then the nam es w ith  the 
sam e referent w ould  m ake the sam e contribution. This is the case even
l^Opor a detailed discussion see Crimmins [1992], chapter 1, pp.5-34.
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within a belief report. So, we can substitute 'Fi Fi' for 'Fido' in (1) and (2) 
without any change in their truth-conditions.
Another reason for supporting the naive analysis is provided by the 
fact of cancellability of extra information. It is true that one of the main 
interests in semantics is grounded in the assumption that communication 
involves statements in which what is expressed is a big part of what is 
stated. But in a typical statement there may be propositions that are 
'conveyed' apart from what is literally said. An assertive use of a sentence 
may convey non-expressively the information which is the primary goal 
of the sentence. For example, in the case of making an ironical remark the 
speaker intends to convey a proposition which is directly contrary to the 
proposition expressed. Following Grice, propositions that are thus 
conveyed non-expressively are called 'pragmatic implicatures'. In cases 
like these it is impossible to tell what proposition is being expressed by a 
statement: it could be the proposition the statement is primarily intended 
to convey, or the proposition it typically conveys, or it could be a 
proposition that the statement is conventionally understood to convey. 
Accepting this phenomenon, the naive theories agree that in a particular 
context, sentences (1) and (2) convey different propositions — (1) is typically 
used to convey something true, while (2) is used to convey something 
false. But from this we cannot conclude that (1) and (2) express different 
propositions. In fact the principles of articulated compositionality and 
direct reference definitely imply that in both (1) and (2) the 'that'-clauses 
refer to the same proposition. According to Grice, these conveyed 
propositions or the implicatures, as he calls them, can be cancelled — that 
is,
we have devices by which we can use the sentence to express 
its semantic content w ithout conveying the usually implied 
information. We can, in this case, say "Caius believes that 
H esperus is H esperus. So, though he w ould not say 
'Hesperus is Phosphorus', he really did believe that H esperus  
is P h o s p h o r u s  . .. The observation that the "extra" 
inform ation is cancelable provides an instance of the 
predictive success of the hypothesis that this information.
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w h en  co n v ey ed , is co n v ey ed  th ro u g h  p ra g m a tic  
im plicature.
Therefore, there is no semantical difference betw een the sentences 'Caius 
believes that H esperus is H esperus' and  'Caius believes that H esperus is 
P hosphorus '.
There are two other argum ents in support of the naive view. One is 
that the facts of translation show  that the two sentences 'Caius believes 
that H esperus is an evening star' and 'Caius believes tha t Phosphorus is 
an evening star' have the sam e truth-value, as both the reports w ould 
receive the translation  'Caius believes that Venus is an evening star'. 
M ark R ichard w ith  the help of an example, tries to show  w hy our 
o rd inary  tru th -in tu itions about belief reports are incorrect, and  this 
exam ple also provides a support for the naive account of belief report. 
Suppose A is talking on the telephone to B, and  w hile talk ing sees a 
steam roller about to crush a telephone booth. B does not realise that the 
person inside the booth and the person on phone are the same. Reporting 
the whole thing to B, A says,
(i) I believe that she is in danger.
But, surely A cannot not say,
(ii) I believe that you are in danger.
So, ordinarily we think that while (i) is true (ii) is false, bu t Richard argues 
tha t (i) and (ii), in the described context, can be show n to be true a t the 
sam e time. Suppose, B w atching A s  panicked behaviour, says,
(iii) The m an watching m e believes that I am  in danger.
B's use of (iii) in this context is true, just as A s  use of (i) is. H earing B, A 
can now  say,
(iv) The m an watching you believes that you are in danger.
N ow , as (iii) is true so is (iv). But in the described context the sentence 'I 
am the m an watching you' is also true. But from this sentence and (iv) we 
can im m ediately derive (ii). And as both (iv) and  the sentence 'I am  the 
m an w atching you' are true, so is (ii). Therefore, both (1) and  (ii), which
^^^Crimmins [1992], p.23.
^^^Richard [1983] and [1990] discusses this example. We will come back to this example in 
detail later on in the dissertation, and so it will just be outlined here.
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appeared to have different truth-values, are true. This seems to be a clear 
counter-exam ple to our truth-intuitions about belief ascriptions. Such are 
the different argum ents p u t forw ard by the naive theorists in support of 
their claim.
A part from the Direct Referential analysis, another w ay of analysing 
belief reports is the traditional Fregean way. According to the orthodox 
Fregean approach, if we take the 'that'-clauses w ithin belief reports to be 
referential singular term s, then the entire 'that'-clause w ould  refer to a 
structured  proposition m ade up  of m odes of presentation of objects and 
properties. Therefore, the reference of the 'that'-clause, that Fido is a dog' 
in  Tom believes that Fido is a dog', is a com bination of the m ode of 
presentation of the reference of 'Fido' and the m ode of presentation of the 
reference of 'dog'. A ccording to this account, the belief report Tom 
believes that Fido is a dog' can be represented in the following way:
B (Tom < m £, m j  >),
w here m f is the m ode of presentation of Fido and  m j  is the m ode of 
presentation  of being a dog. This account provides a stra igh t forw ard 
answ er to the question as to w hy is it that the report 'Tom belives that 
Fido is m ale’ is true w hile the report 'Tom believes tha t Fi Fi is male' is 
false, by appealing to the difference in the mode of presentation of the dog 
in both cases.
The H ybrid View of belief reports is fundam entally different from 
these tw o previous accounts in the sense that it does not th ink that the 
semantic content of a belief report consists merely of a Russellian singular 
proposition, nor m erely of a Fregean thought. According to philosophers 
adhering to this kind of analysis, the content of belief is both  a singular 
proposition  referring to particular objects and properties and  im plicitly 
referred to and contextually determ ined types of m ode of presentation.' 
The sentences used to m ake belief reports are like sentences containing 
indexicals, not tru e  nor false sim pliciter bu t only w ith  respect to the
123schiffer [19921 , p.503.
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context of utterance. On Schiffer's view, the logical form  of an utterance 
of the sentence T om  believes that Fido is a dog' m ay be represented as
(3m) (0*m  & B ( Tom, (<Fido, doghood>, m))), 
w here 0*m  is the type of m ode of p r e s e n t a t i o n .  ^ 2 4
The reason w hy such an account can be said to be an H ybrid 
account is that the analysis of belief report involves b o th  a R ussellian 
proposition  and  some kind of m ode of presentation. This will become 
clear in discussing in detail Crim m ins’s view. As Schiffer points out, the 
representation of 'Tom believes that Fido is a dog’ as
(3m) (0*m  & B ( Tom, (< Fido, doghood >, m))) 
implies the following things: 2^5
(a) It implies that 'believes' is a three-place relational predicate relating a 
believer to a Russellian singular proposition and m odes of presentations 
of those propositions.
(b) The 'that'-clause in the belief ascribing sentence is a referential 
singular term  referring to the singular proposition <Fido, doghood>, and 
the referents of the two expressions 'Fido' and 'dog' are Fido and doghood 
respectively.
(c) It further implies that an utterance of the sentence requires reference to 
a type of m ode of presentation, so that an utterance of 'Tom believes that 
Fido is a dog' is true just in the case w here (3m) ( 0*m  & B ( Tom, < Fido, 
doghood>, m)) holds.
i  24According to Schiffer, a type of mode of presentation is a property of modes of 
presentation. 0 * might be a property that a prepositional mode of presentation has 'when 
and only when it requires thinking of Fido as being the dog who appears in the morning and 
requires thinking of doghood as a property shared by such-and-such similar-looking 
creatures.'
1 2 5 i b i d ,  p . 5 0 4 .
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(d) It also tells us that this contextually determ ined reference to a m ode of 
presentation is by a 'h idden indexical' as there is no actual indexical in the 
belief ascribing sentence to refer to it. ^ 26
3.3. M otivation for the H ybrid View
There are tw o kinds of considerations which have tended  to m otivate a 
v iew  of th e  H ybrid  variety . The firs t m otivation  com es from  the 
inadequacies that the proponents find in both the orthodox Fregean view 
as w ell as the D irect R eferential view . The second, m ore positive, 
m otivation is the desire for generality, that is, the desire to develop a 
sem antics of belief ascriptions that w ould  account for all kinds of belief 
attribution.
W e can, a t th is po in t, m ention  some of the  difficulties th a t 
philosophers like Crimmins, Richard and Schiffer find in the Fregean and 
the Russellian account of belief ascription. We have noted that the reason 
for Frege's view  of reference shift of term s in belief contexts is to provide 
an explanation for the difference in tru th-value of reports like 'Caius 
believes th a t H esperus is the evening star' and  C aius believes tha t 
Phosphorus is the evening star'. But the concept of a m ode of presentation 
itself has difficulties. In the first place, as Schiffer points o u t ,  ^  27 there are 
different ways in w hich the notion of a m ode of presentation  m ay be 
understood and w e need to give well-m otivated argum ents for choosing 
one  am ong  t h e m .   ^28 F u rth erm o re , w hatever w e tak e  m odes of 
presentation to be. Schiffer gives an exam ple of a general belief report to 
show w hy modes of presentation cannot be regarded as the content of the 
belief report. Suppose someone says
126Tbe reference to a type of mode of presentation is contextually determined in the sense 
that different types may be referred to on different occasions of utterance, and therefore the 
word 'indexical' is used. This indexical is hidden because there is no word occurring in the 
belief report which refers to that type of mode of presentation.
^27gee àhiffer [1992] ; Schiffer [1987b], chapter 3; and Schiffer [1990]. 
l28Note that this is not only a problem with the traditional Fregean account of belief 
ascription but any account, and also the hybrid view under consideration, which takes 
belief reports to include modes of presentation. This is an issue which will be discussed in 
detail in the subsequent chapters — particularly the chapter on Fregean analysis of belief 
ascribing sentences. But it should be noted that Schiffer, in fact, cannot use this objection to 
the Fregean view if his aim is to make a case for the hybrid view. So it seems that this 
objection really does not help Schiffer in any way.
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(3) Everyone w ho has ever know n W ittgenstein believes th a t he is a 
genius.
A ccording to Schiffer, the  Fregean proposal suggests th a t there is a 
particu la r m ode of p resen ta tion  m  of W ittgenstein  and  a m ode of 
presen tation  m ' of a particu lar p roperty  of being a genius such tha t 
w hoever know s W ittgenstein believes the proposition <m, m ’>. But as 
the w ell-know n argum ent against the Fregeans goes, this is really too 
strong a requirem ent on the tru th  of (3). It is impossible for everyone who 
has ever know n W ittgenstein to share a single m ode of presentation of 
him . There are d ifferen t w ays in  w hich d ifferen t peop le  th ink  of 
W ittgenstein, and further argum ents are needed to show w hy we pick out 
a single m ode of presentation  and claim that anybody w ho knew  him  
believed him  to be a genius under that particular mode.
Even if we are able to make this choice. Schiffer points ou t another 
difficulty in the general Fregean account of belief ascriptions which takes 
m odes of presentation to be the content of belief reports. In the first place, 
the belief that Fido is a dog m ay truly be ascribed to different people even if 
they think of Fido and doghood in radically different ways. Hence 'this 
shows that 'that Fido is a dog' makes no con text-independent reference to 
a m ode-of -presentation containing p r o p o s it io n . '^29 M oreover, the 'that'- 
clause does no t m ake any c o n te x t-d e p e n d e n t reference to m odes of 
presen ta tion  of Fido and doghood either. O ne m ay correctly repo rt 
som eone's belief even if no t in  a position to specify the m odes of 
presentation that person has for Fido and for doghood in tha t particular 
context. A nd, 'if it makes neither a context independent nor a context 
dependent reference to such a proposition, then it makes no reference at 
all.* 130 The point of m aking this objection against the Fregeans is to show 
tha t there can be no specific m ode of presentation involved — context 
d ep en d en t or otherw ise. So if m odes of presen ta tion  com e into  the 
sem antics of belief ascrip tion  a t all, they m ust be m entioned  non- 
specifically (that is, by  existentially quantifying over them) as it is done in 
Schiffer's variety of the hybrid view. Hence, one of the m otivations for
129schiffer [1992], p.508. 
13®ibid, p.508.
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giving a hybrid analysis of belief ascription is due to the problem s tha t a 
Fregean account faces. Instead of taking a thought (in the Fregean sense) to 
be the only reference of a ‘that’-clause w ithin a belief ascription, they think 
that its partial contribution consists in referring to a singular proposition 
m ade ou t of the references of the constituent expressions and  w hich is 
fixed in a particular context.
Like the Fregean proposal, the naive view  of belief ascription, 
according to these philosophers, is inadequate for provid ing  us w ith  an 
acceptable sem antics of belief report. Crim m ins, Schiffer and  others^ 
th ink  th a t it is unacceptable even w ith  the refinem ents suggested by 
Salm on. C rim m ins rebu ts  the four argum ents (m entioned  in  the 
previous section) by show ing that the naive view is neither an inevitable 
consequence of broad  semantic principles, such as direct reference and 
com positionality , nor does it get good enough su p p o rt from  Grice’s 
criterion of cancellability. The naive view  seems to depend heavily on the 
p rinc ip le  of articu la ted  com positionality  and d irect reference of the 
expressions occurring in the belief report. But there are counter-examples 
to bo th  full a rticu la tion  and  d irect contribution. Cases w here full 
a r tic u la tio n  fails , in v o lv e  th o se  w h ere  som e c o n s titu e n ts  are  
unarticu lated  and  are to be determ ined by context. W hen w e say 'it is 
raining ', it is obvious tha t the verb 'to rain ' m ust have as argum ents at 
least a tim e and  a place — it m ust have, as C rim m ins says, 'm ore 
param eters' in it than w e explicitly think it to have. The principle of direct 
contribution, on the other hand, is defeated by cases like Quine's example 
'G iorgione was so-called because of his size'. In this exam ple the nam e 
'G iorgione' does no t stand  sim ply for the person b u t its contribution 
consists in referring to the nam e itself. Therefore, both these principles are 
insensitive to the variations in belief reports due to variations in contexts. 
Both these points will be discussed in m ore detail in the next section.
So, as Schiffer sums up the position of a Hybrid theorist:
H ere, then, is ou r situation. We are m otivated to see [l]'s
(that is 'Fido is a dog') 'that'-clause as a referential singular
Schiffer [1987a], and Crimmins [1992], chapter 1.
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term  w hose reference is the proposition that Fido is a dog. 
w e m u st ho ld  the  reference of th is 'tha t'-c lause  to be 
determ ined  by its syntax and  the sem antic values of the 
w ords in the 'that'-clause have in it. Those semantic values — 
cannot be m odes of presentation, and the only viable option 
is that they are Fido for Fido', and doghood for 'dog'. A t the 
same tim e we cannot accept the representation of [1] as [4]
(that is, 'B (Ralph, <Fido, doghood>), for w e also w ant to 
allow that Ralph does not believe that Fido is a shmog.^^^
These, then, are the reasons which m otivate philosophers to take a 
hybrid approach. On the one hand, these philosophers do not w ant to face 
the difficulties that a Fregean faces as to the unavailability of the particular 
m ode of presentation to the ascriber. On the other hand, they think that 
the tru th  intuitions about belief ascriptions, being genuine, need to be 
explained by bringing in modes of presentation, in an im portant way, into 
the sem antics of belief ascribing sentences them selves. The w ay these 
philosophers introduce m odes of presentation into the semantics of belief 
ascribing sentences is by existentially quantifying over them . This helps 
them  to avoid the difficulties the Fregeans face as it elim inates any 
reference to any specific m ode of p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  H  3
^^^Schiffer [19921, p.509. Even the predicate position in a belief ascription is taken to be 
opaque. Suppose Ralph comes across a race of creatures which he thinks he has not 
encountered before. He introduces the term 'shmog' to refer to individual members of this 
species. Unbeknownst to him, however, schmoghood is doghood. He has not come across a 
new species but only a new race of dogs. In a case like this we would want to say that Ralph 
does not believe that Fido is a schmog, though, in fact doghood is shmoghood and Ralph 
does believe that Fido is a dog.
133xhere is a prima facie way to avoid the difficulties centring around modes of 
presentation and yet not accept an hybrid analysis of the kind suggested by Schiffer. This 
analysis would avoid the introduction of a structured Russellian proposition into the 
semantics of the belief ascribing sentence like, Ralph believes that Fido is a dog'. It is a 
proposal of roughly the following form;
Om)(3m’) (m is a mode of presentation of Fido & m’ is a mode of presentation of 
doghood & B ( Ralph, <m, m’>)).
This proposal is very different from the Hybrid View, as the proposition representing the 
content of belief is made out of modes of presentation, and therefore, is not Russellian. 
Against suggestions of this kind, Schiffer’s argument is that it has devastating problems in 
cases where we say Ralph says that Fido is a dog'. If we say that in uttering 'Fido is a 
dog', Ralph really made a proposition containing modes of presentation of Fido and 
doghood, then 'there would be a specification of what he said that is other than that Fido 
is a dog' and that refers to a mode-of-presentation-containing proposition. But it is clear 
that there need be no such alternative specification of what he said.'(Schiffer [19921,
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Before going on to  the discussion as to w hat m ay be taken to be 
w rong w ith giving a semantics of belief report of this general kind, it is 
w orth  looking into one of the H ybrid Views in m ore detail, and w orth  
trying to bring ou t the general features of this kind of account. I shall here 
concentrate on the sem antics of belief reports p rov ided  by Crim m ins 
[1992], w hich is a fu rther developm ent of the sem antics p roposed  by 
Crimmins and Perry [1989], and is a special version of the hidden indexical 
theory proposed by Schiffer [1992].
3.4, M ark Crim m ins on the Semantics of Belief Reports
According to Crim m ins, the two features which we should keep in m ind 
w hen giving semantics of belief reports are:
(a) the fact of context sensitivity of belief reports, and,
(b) the way in which expressions occurring within a belief report function.
A belief report exhibits the context sensitivity analogous to a use of the 
sentence 'it is rain ing ' or a use of the term  'you'. As has just been 
m entioned, when, in a context, w e utter the sentence 'it is raining', some 
additional argum ent or param eter is required in order for the utterance to 
express a complete proposition, which can be regarded as true or false, and, 
therefore, we tacitly refer to these additional facts. These can be regarded as 
the unarticulated constituents of the proposition that are provided by the 
particu lar context of an utterance. In a sim ilar w ay, the proposition  
expressed by a belief report contains an unarticulated constituent — the 
unarticulated constituent being the w ay the believer is said to believe the 
proposition. So a tacit reference is m ade to the way of believing in the case 
of a belief report. Let us take tw o exam ples of belief reports w here the 
nam es occurring w ithin the 'that'-clause refer to the same person,
(4) Lois Lane believes that Superm an can fly.
(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly. ^  34
p.506) A special form of this view is found in Graeme Forbes’s writings. It will be discussed 
in detail in the next chapter.
134Le|. as indicated earlier, take the Superman story to be true.
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There m ust be some relevant difference betw een 4 and 5 which w ould 
enable us to explain how  4 can be true while 5 is false. As Bach remarks.
In Crim m ins' view  the relevant difference does not m eet the 
eye (or ear): the p roposition  expressed by a belief report 
contains an 'unarticulated  constituent', nam ely, the w ay the 
agent is being said to believe the specified proposition. The 
occurrence of 'be lieves' determ ines th a t som e  w ay of 
believing is being  tacitly referred  to, b u t w hich w ay of 
believing this is, like any provision  of an unarticu la ted  
constituent, is determ ined pragm atically ...135
Furtherm ore, proper nam es and other expressions tha t occur w ithin the 
belief report have a double role:
(a) the semantic role which they play in simpler sentences; and,
(b) the pragm atic or contextual role that helps to determ ine the constituent 
of the claim made.
Their function can be explained by using Quine's example again,
(6) Giorgione was so called because of his size.
As Quine points out, (4) should be paraphrased as,
(7) Giorgione was called 'Giorgione' because of his size.
The reason for paraphrasing (6) in the above w ay is tha t the nam e 
'G iorgione', w hich occurs in the 'so-called' construction, no t only picks 
ou t the reference of the name, that is the painter Barbarelli, bu t also the 
nam e Giorgione' itself — the nam e w hich was used to refer to the m an 
because of his s i z e .  136 Crim m ins claims that the sam e k ind  of th ing
135 Bach, [1993], p.432.
13&It should be noted that Crimmins makes a slight change in the way 4 is paraphrased 
into 5. He thinks that it is better to paraphrase 4 as 'Giorgione was called that because of 
his size', where 'that' functions as a demonstrative which picks out a particular name in a 
relevant context. It accommodates cases where the artist is called by a name, apart from 
Giorgione', say, 'Mr. Big' because of his size.
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happens in cases of proper names occurring w ithin a belief context. Names 
w ith in  a context of this k ind  p lay a dual role as well. There are tw o 
features exhibited by a 'so-called* construction' which Crim m ins w ants to 
attribute to belief reports. One is that the claim m ade w ith  the help of a 
belief report depends on the total circumstances of the report, because tacit 
reference is m ade to contextually determ ined objects. The other feature is 
that nam es and other expressions in a belief report can play tw o roles — 
both a semantic as well as a pragm atic role (just like the nam e 'Giorgione' 
in the so-called construction). The reason w hy the report Tom believes 
that Cicero is a Roman' is true, while the report Tom believes that Tully 
is a Roman' is false is due to the fact that though the tw o nam es refer to 
the same individual, they contribute differently to the utterances.
In cases of belief reports like, 'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman', 
Tom has to think of Cicero and the property of being a Roman, that is he 
m ust believe the singular Russellian proposition, represented as <Cicero, 
be ing  a R om an>, an d  he m u st, a t the sam e tim e, have som e 
represen tation  of Cicero and  som e representation  of being a Roman. 
Am ong the representations that figure in belief contexts, representations 
of th ings are w h at C rim m ins calls 'notions', and  represen ta tions of 
properties and relations are w hat he calls 'ideas'. The 'w ay of believing' is 
com posed of the particular representations ^  37 em ployed by the agent to 
represent objects and properties or relations that the proposition is about. 
W hat w e claim in a belief report is th a t 'the agent believes a certain 
proposition in a w ay such that certain ideas and notions are responsible 
for representing  certain constituents of the p roposition .'138 A nd these 
ideas and  notions constitu te the unarticu lated  constituents of a belief 
report. In reporting  beliefs of this kind we should keep in m ind w hat 
Crimmins calls a thought map. A thought m ap, according to him, is
... a structural type such that a particular belief is of that type
just in case the belief involves certain ac tu a lly  ex isting
137part of what distinguishes Crimmins"s account from the hidden indexical theory 
introduced by Schiffer is that the way of believing is composed of particular 
representations rather than types of modes of presentation.
138Crimmins, [1992], p.l52.
96
representations (notions and ideas) in a certain structural 
arrangement, [my underline]
Beliefs involving notions and ideas are given by thought maps. So, 
if an agent at a particular time t believes a proposition p involving 
particular notions and ideas, then he believes p in a way given by a 
thought map. An example would make the point clear. Suppose I report a 
belief of Susan's as
(8) Susan believes that Smith fired Tom.
According to Crimmins' view of the semantic structure of belief reports, it 
is claimed that Susan has a belief in a proposition which is about two 
individuals Smith and Tom and about the relation of firing, with 
particular notions and ideas associated with this content. Therefore, the 
content of the utterance of 8 can be represented in the following way:
(3r) [ Believes ( Susan, t, < Fired, < Smith, Tom »  , r ) &
Involves (r, Involves (r, n j 'g ^ ) .  Involves (r, i pi yed)  1
This says that there is a thought map such that Susan believes the singular 
proposition under that thought map, and this thought map involves a 
particular notion of Smith, a particular notion of Tom, and a particular 
idea of being fired that Susan attaches to the respective names and the 
predicate. In simpler terms, the claim is that Susan at a particular time t 
believes a proposition p in a way that involves her representations 
nSm iths  ^Tom , ip ired. So, in a proposal of this kind we existentially 
quantify over thought maps which, however, involve particular notions 
and ideas. But this representation does not capture the whole of the claim 
made in the belief report 8. The report not only takes into consideration 
the particular notions and ideas associated with Susan's belief, but it also 
tells us which particular notions and ideas are responsible for determining 
the relevant contents of belief. As Crim m ins says, 'The "how" 
information expressed in belief reports includes information of this kind, 
about which representations are (allegedly) responsible for which roles in
^39ibid, p.153.
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the proposition (allegedly) b e l i e v e d . I n  8 the notion is
responsible for determining the firer, is responsible for determining 
the firee, while is responsible for determining the property firing.
This is what Crimmins calls the responsibility clause of a belief report. A 
better way of representing the content of the utterance of 8 would thus be,
(3r) [ Believes ( Susan, t, < Fired, < Smith, Tom » ,  r) &
Responsible ( r. Smith ) &
Responsible ( r, Tom ) &
Responsible ( ipiy^d, r. Fired ) ] .
According to Crimmins the responsibility clause adds to the semantics of 
belief reports in two ways:
First it places some internal requirements on the alleged 
belief; it must involve certain notions and ideas. Second, it 
places relational requirements on the belief with respect to its 
content: the notions and ideas in the belief m ust be 
appropriately related, via ties of responsibility, to the roles in 
its content. This belief report specifies three things about the 
agent's alleged belief: its component, its content, and the 
connections between its component and its content,
This is, in brief, the account of belief reports given by Mark Crimmins. The 
above semantic account, and any account essentially of this kind, depends 
heavily on the phenom enon of unarticu la ted  constituency. The 
responsibility clause, as brought forward by Crimmins, is really the 
unarticulated constituent of the prepositional content which has no overt 
expression in the sentence mentioning it explicitly. It is, however, used by 
the semantics as an essential building block of the statements' content. As 
we have noted earlier (see section 3.2) the Direct Referential account of 
belief report is supported by the principle of articulated compositionality. 




full articu la tion , like the unarticu la ted  reference to the place in an 
utterance of the sentence It is raining'. According to Crimmins
To assum e that the principle of articulated com positionality 
applies to belief reports is to assum e that belief reports are not 
underarticu la ted ; and  w e have no reason to m ake this 
assum ption. The claims m ade in belief reports m ay well be 
sensitive to param eters that are fixed in context, yet are not 
contributed semantically by any overt expressions.
Crim m ins is of the opinion that, apart from the fact that full articulation is 
not a general principle governing the semantics of uses of sentences, there 
is a strong  reason to believe th a t belief reports  have unarticu la ted  
constituents. This is provided by our having conflicting intuitions about 
truth-values of uses of belief-ascribing sentences composed of parts which 
have the same referents. So he says, 'If there is no differences in w hat the 
expressions provide , w here can the difference in prepositional content 
come from? O nly from  w hat no expression p r o v i d e s . ’ 1^3 A rticu la ted  
constituents, therefore, are not always the only things that statem ents are 
about. W e w ill d iscuss m ore ab o u t the w ork ing  of u n articu la ted  
constituents in belief reports in the section which is to follow.
If notions and ideas are, in this way, tacitly referred to, how  does a 
belief ascriber m anage to com municate which of these notions and  ideas 
he is talking about? The answ er to this question is that they are provided 
by  th e  context of the u tterance of the  expression — by the  to tal 
circum stances under w hich the sentence has been u ttered . Very often 
w hen  som eone's belief abou t a particu la r object is rep o rted , it is 
contextually determ ined which notion of that object the belief involves. It 
is, therefore, possible for the speaker to ascribe a belief content w hich 
includes that notion w ithout explicitly specifying the notion in question, 
simply because the context supplies it. In this framework, w hat is explicitly 
stated by a belief report like, 'Ralph believes that Fido is a dog' is that the 




w hich the em bedded sentence expresses. But the statem ent also includes 
som ething which is not explicitly articulated and nevertheless belongs to 
w hat is said.
In the case of an ordinary belief report, we take for granted that the 
believer has some norm al notions and  ideas which are the constituents of 
a belief report. A notion  or an idea is norm al just in case the agent 
represents the object and the property in the usual way — w ith the normal 
beliefs and recognitional capacities w hich are essential for having that 
notion or idea. Though it is true tha t w hat counts as norm al depends on 
the in tent and  the purpose of the discourse and the com m unity am ong 
which the agent is being considered, it is not im possible to see w hat the 
norm al notion or idea w ould be in the particular context of an utterance. 
For example, if we report the belief of a person P about John Major, then 
w e assum e that P has a norm al notion of John Major, Again w hen we 
report a belief of P involving the property  of being tall, then  we assum e 
that he has a norm al understanding  of w hat tall is, w hen to apply  this 
predicate to a person etc. Let us consider Crim m ins’ ow n example.
Sarah believes tha t Jackson will be the President
In reporting this belief it is evident that the reporter is talking about Jesse 
Jackson and that by 'the President' she means the President of The U nited 
States of America. She assumes that Sarah has a norm al notion of Jackson 
and  a norm al no tion  of w hat constitu tes the p roperty  of being the 
President of America. Therefore, 'it is an extremely good bet that she has a 
norm al notion of Jackson in the sense just described. A nd w hen all parties 
to the dialogue know  that it is an extremely good bet that a certain notion 
exists, and  such a notion is relevant, then it can be talked about w ith a 
belief report. Of course, w e can im agine an example in which, through a 
series of coincidences, Sarah has never heard of Jackson. In that case there 
w ould  be a presupposition failure leading to the failure of r e f e r e n c e . ' ^ ^ 5  
As it has already been pointed out, the norm ality requirem ent varies from 
context to context. In cases w here the speakers are no t involved in
1 4 4 i b i d ,  p . l 5 8 .  
1 4 5 i b i d ,  p . l 5 9 .
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discussing A m erican politics, the norm al notions and  ideas associated 
w ith  individuals and properties w ould  vary. Suppose the reporter, in a 
gathering consisting of persons w orking in a particular com pany, w here 
both  she and Sarah w ork, u tters the sam e sentence. In that case Jackson 
m ay be som eone holding an im portant position in the com pany and the 
property of being a president is the property of being the president of that 
com pany. In cases like this the  sam e sentence m ay involve different 
norm al notions and ideas.
C rim m ins’s account is, no  doub t, very  sim ilar to  the  h id d en  
indexical account of belief report provided by Schiffer. Believing is not a 
tw o-place b u t a three-place relation betw een a believer, a structu red  
proposition consisting of objects and  properties, and  w ays of believing 
p rov ided  by the responsibility  clause. H ow ever, there is an im portan t 
respect in which Crim m ins's view  differs from the h idden  indexical view 
as found  in Schiffer. The h idden  indexical view  in troduces w ays of 
believing into the semantics by existentially quantifying over them  and 
therefore avoiding reference to particu lar m odes of presentation. For 
Crim m ins a w ay of believing is com posed of particular representations; 
tha t is, belief reports are taken to refer literally to particular notions and 
ideas. Someone m ight say that, contrary to w hat I claim , Crim m ins’s 
account is a quantificational account. But, as has been em phasised earlier, 
C rim m ins’s account, though it quantifies over thought-m aps, claims that 
the thought m ap involves particular notions and ideas of the believer and 
makes reference to them.
Crimmins account is not the same as Salmon's naive view. H aving 
rejected the argum ents p u t forw ard  by the naive view  against tru th  
intuitions about belief reports, he shows that ways of believing enter into 
the tru th  conditions of belief reports, and, thus, are an integral part of the 
semantics of belief report. Crimmins sum s up the essential features of his 
semantic analysis of belief ascribing sentences in the following way:
In  repo rting  w h at som eone believes, I argue, w e refer
explicitly to the structured proposition that allegedly is the
co n ten t of h er belief and  also  t a c i t l y  to  in te rn a l
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representations tha t allegedly are involved in the belief. In 
general, I argue that our ways of talking about thought are in 
one w ay extrem ely direct and  in  another shot through w ith 
pragm atic subtleties. W hen w e say w hat som eone thinks 
about or believes, the objects of thought or belief we attribute 
are determ ined by the referents of our words. But we add  tacit 
provisos about how  they think about the alleged objects of 
thought or belief.
H opefully  it is clear by now  th a t Crim m ins's account of belief 
ascription is a version of the H ybrid View, as it involves both a structured 
Russellian proposition and  some w ays of thinking about the objects and 
properties. The hybrid nature of these reports m ay be m ade clearer if we 
consider the entities w ith w hich such an account deals. There are three 
things to be taken into consideration in case of a belief report:
(a) The proposition expressed by or the semantic content of the em bedded 
sentence of a belief report;
(b) The reference of the 'that’-clause w ithin the reported belief; and,
(c) The ascribed belief content.
In Crim m ins's fram ew ork, a belief report like, 'Tom believes that 
Cicero is a Rom an', explicitly states th a t the believer John believes a 
certain  proposition . This p roposition  is the sam e as the  p roposition  
expressed by the em bedded sentence 'Cicero is a Roman'. The proposition 
expressed by the em bedded sentence is constituted by the object referred to 
by the nam e Cicero' and  the p roperty  referred  to by the pred icate  
'Roman'. The reference of the 'that' clause is the same as the reference of 
the em bedded sentence, w hereas, the content ascribed to the believer is
p.ix.
can here note that there might be two different version of the Hybrid View 
depending on whether we equate or distinguish a and b. According to Crimmins and Schiffer 
the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence and the referent of the 'that'-clause 
are the same — that is, they take the 'that'-clause to refer to what the embedded sentence 
expresses. But there might be another possible version of the Hybrid View which can 
maintain that the embedded sentence in a belief report refers to a Russellian proposition, 
while the that'-clause refers to something richer — the embedded sentence together with 
some kind of mode of presentation. However, for our understanding of Crimmins’s account we 
don’t have to separate a from b.
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m uch m ore com plex — it includes relevant m odes of p resen tation  of 
objects and properties. H ence there are two different k inds of things 
involved in a belief report and thus, the view can legitim ately be called a 
H ybrid View. But analysing belief reports in this way, which avoids certain 
difficulties of the Fregean and  the Russellian accounts, is not w ithou t 
difficulties of its own.
3.5. The H ybrid View Evaluated
One of the very first problems w ith the H ybrid View, concerns the logical 
form  of the belief report. A ccording to a theory of this general kind 
'believing is a three-place relational predicate (or a four-place relational 
predicate if w e take into consideration the time of utterance) one of whose 
argum ents is the w ay of believing itself. So the report Ralph believes that 
Fido is a dog' should  be paraphrased  and expanded in  the m anner of, 
'Ralph believes tha t Fido is a dog in  a w ay w  or un d er the m ode of 
presentation  m'. But from  the m ere fact that to believe som ething, one 
m ust believe it in some w ay or other, it does not follow tha t the w ay of 
believing or the m ode of p resen tation  should  be regarded  as a th ird  
argum ent of the relation  of believing. It looks m ore like a tw o-place 
relation w ith  an adverbial qualifierais. Por example, someone m ight walk 
at one pace or another, bu t that does not make walking a relation between 
the w alker and the particular pace at which he walks. Perhaps a w ay of 
believing is like pace w ith respect to walking. Its three-place form  is not at 
all explicit as the three-placedness of the verb 'gives' is. If w e say 'She gave 
the car', the sentence rem ains incomplete till we specify to w hom  she gave 
it, e.g. 'She gave the car to her son', and  is an answ er to the question 'to 
w hom  did  she give it?', bu t no one, in an ordinary context in which he 
repo rts  Ralph's belief, is asked the question u n d e r w h at m ode of 
presentation does Ralph believe that Fido is a dog?'.
In answ er to this objection, a proponent of the H ybrid View m ight 
say that it is precisely due to this peculiarity of the belief relation that his 
account says th a t belief reports  m ake ta c it references to m odes of 
presentation. In fact, the complexity of a belief report can be revealed by
148This has been suggested by Schiffer [1992], and by Bach [19931...
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bringing out the complex logical form of the sentence ascribing the belief, 
and therefore, this should not be taken as a serious objection to the 
analysis in question. I am inclined to agree that this is not a serious 
objection to the Hybrid View. But it may be that one way to press the point 
a bit further is to argue that only if ways of believing are constituents of 
the proposition which the belief is about, can it be supposed that a belief 
report must refer to them. Only then would failing to refer, even tacitly, to 
a way of believing the thing believed, entail that the belief report did not 
express a complete proposition. But for the Hybrid View, as the 'that'- 
clause in a belief report expresses a Russellian proposition, the belief being 
ascribed must also be a belief in a Russellian proposition. So, in no way 
does the m ode of presentation tacitly referred to enter into the 
proposition b e l i e v e d .  ^ ^ 9  And therefore, one might argue that the mode of 
presentation does not constitute a third argum ent in the relation of 
believing. Hybrid theorists might come back and say that I am missing 
their point altogether here. The very fact of tacit reference to a mode of 
presentation indicates that the mode of presentation does enter into the 
proposition believed. Maybe I am. So, I might as well leave this point of 
controversy and move to those others where there seem to be some more 
definite and philosophically interesting problems involved.
Before going into the more serious difficulties that the Hybrid View 
seems to face, two distinctive features of this view need highlighting. One, 
which has already been m entioned, is that it takes both the singular 
Russellian proposition and some kind of mode of presentation to be the 
semantic or tru th  conditional content of a belief report. Recall that 
according to philosophers adhering to this view, there is a difference 
between the reference of the 'that'-clause on the one hand, and the 
content of the ascribed belief on the other. The mode of presentation that 
is included in the content of the belief report is the unarticulated 
constituent provided by the context of the utterance, and this shows the 
context-sensitivity of the report analogous to the context-sensitivity of 
utterances like 'It is raining'. It is 2 o'clock' etc. The sentence 'Cicero is a 
Roman' in the belief report 'Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman' refers
^49]sjote that this problem does not occur in case of a Fregean analysis of belief report 
because they take the mode of presentation to be a constitutive part of the proposition 
believed.
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to  a Russellian proposition . The term s ’Cicero* and  'Roman* in  the 
em bedded sentence 'Cicero is a Roman' makes no contribution other than 
referring to the individual in  question and  the property  of being Roman 
w hich the individual is supposed to instantiate. In this respect there is no 
difference betw een 'Tom believes th a t Cicero is a Rom an' and  Tom 
believes th a t Tully is a Rom an'. The difference in their tru th -value, 
how ever, is due to  the difference in their unarticu la ted  constituents 
provided by the contexts of the utterances of the respective sentences. That 
is w hy it is the unarticulated constituents that are regarded  as full-fledged 
truth-conditional constituents of sentences like Tom believes that Cicero 
is a Roman'. This, then is the picture of the H ybrid View.
The second feature of the H ybrid  View consists of how  m odes of 
presentation are introduced in to the semantics of belief reports. There are 
tw o alternative w ays in w hich they m ay be introduced. O ne w ay is by 
specifically referring  to them , and  the o ther w ay is by existentially  
quantifying over them. In the case of the first alternative, which seems to 
be one w ay of interpreting Crim m ins's account — as he seems to say that 
specific notions and ideas are involved in a belief report — an objection 
sim ilar to the one against the Fregean account can be raised. It is the 
problem  concerning how  w e are to know  w hich particu la r m ode of 
presentation  is being referred to. To avoid this problem  (which really 
seem s to  be an im portan t one) philosophers have tried  to in troduce 
m odes of p resentations in  a d ifferent way. A ccording to  the second 
alternative, in an ord inary  belief report we really existentially quantify 
over m odes of presentation or the unarticulated constituents. So we can 
say that a report like, Tom believes that Fido is a dog', in general, is to be 
paraphrased  along the following lines: There is a m ode of presentation 
such that Tom believes that Fido is a dog under that m ode of presentation. 
The advantage of this w ay of analysing belief reports lies in the fact that by 
avoiding reference to a particular m ode of presentation, this analysis can 
avoid the difficulties that a traditional Fregean account faces.
This w ay of introducing unarticulated constituents into an account 
of belief reports, however, implies a m arked difference in the functioning 
of unarticulated  constituents in an utterance like, 'It is raining ' and the
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function ing  of unarticu la ted  constituen ts in an u tterance like T o m  
believes that Fido is a dog’. The context of an utterance of 'It is raining' 
helps us in fully specifying the unarticulated constituent — in this case, the 
particular place, date and time, w here and w hen it is raining. A nd it is 
only after w e com pletely articulate the unarticulated constituents that we 
are able determ ine w hether the sentence 'It is raining' in the particular 
context of the utterance is true or false. But this kind of full articulation of 
m odes of presentation is not allowed in that version of the H ybrid View 
w hich  ex isten tia lly  q u an tifie s  over m odes of p re sen ta tio n . The 
unarticu la ted  constituent is articulated, b u t articulated in a m ore non­
specific way.
I w ould  now  like to m ention a type of difficulty afflicting any 
general analysis of this sort. The m ain difficulty w ith  the H ybrid View 
involves a tension betw een claims m ade by the theory itself. N ote that the 
hybrid  theorists em phasise the context-sensitivity of belief reports but, at 
the  sam e tim e, w hen dealing w ith  sentences em bedded w ith in  belief 
reports, they seem to play dow n the factor of context-sensitivity. They 
insist that the semantic value of the em bedded sentence in a sentence like, 
'Ralph believes that Fido is a dog', is a singular proposition that does not 
include the unarticulated  m odes of presentation w hich are contextually 
provided. For them  the unarticulated constituent is a constituent of the 
proposition  expressed by the belief report bu t no t a constituent of the 
singular proposition expressed by the em bedded sentence. One may find a 
tension between these two claims — the general claim about unarticulated 
constituency, which provides the basis for their account of belief reports, 
and  the particu lar claim that the em bedded sentence in  a belief report 
refers to a s in g u la r p ro p o sitio n  uncon tam inated  by  u n articu la ted  
constituents. The obvious question th a t arises is th a t if unarticu la ted  
constituents can contextually enrich the in terpretation  of an utterance 
such as 'It is raining', w hy can we not say that they enrich the em bedded 
sentence 'Cicero is a Roman' in 'Ralph believes that Cicero is a Roman'? 
Furtherm ore, the fact tha t the sentence 'Cicero is a Rom an' in a belief 
report, m aking reference to a s ingu lar/ Russellian proposition, suggests 
that, at the level of an em bedded sentence, these philosophers accept the 
principle of strict com positionality —that is the reference of the whole
I
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sentence is determ ined completely by the references of its parts which are, 
or can be, fully articulated. But the principle of strict com positionality 
should be abandoned for belief sentences since the semantic value of the 
report depends upon unarticulated constituents which are not parts of the 
em bedded sentence. Their claim th a t strict com positionality should  be 
rejected for belief reports, and not in general, is an ad hoc one and  seems 
to be at odds w ith the great im portance they give to context sensitivity of 
expressions.
A H ybrid theorist m ight point out here that, contrary to w hat I say, 
unarticulated constituents can and do enrich the em bedded sentence in 
certain contexts. Let us take an example:
Tom believes that it is raining.
In th is case it is qu ite  obvious th a t the u n articu la ted  constituen ts 
determ ine both the semantic value of the em bedded sentence and that of 
the w hole report. W hat the speaker m eans is that Tom believes that it is 
now  raining in a certain contextually determ ined place . O n a H ybrid 
View, this w ould  m ean that the Russellian proposition , to w hich the 
em bedded clause refers, is determ ined, at least in part, by an unarticulated 
constituent. A nd on this view, the semantic value of the w hole report (but 
no t th a t of the em bedded clause) w ill be a function of certain  o ther 
unarticulated constituents — a m ode of presentation of the place and the 
m ode of presentation of raining. By appealing to exam ples of this kind, 
th e  h y b rid  th e o r is ts  m ig h t an sw er m y w o rrie s  a b o u t s tr ic t  
compositionality as well as about contextual enrichment.
The first step tow ards attem pting an answer to the H ybrid theorists 
here w ould  be to rem ind  ourselves of the feature of unarticu la ted  
constituents in the context of an ascription of belief w hich distinguishes 
them  from  unarticulated constituents in the context of an utterance of a 
sentence having an indexical expression. Let us try  to look at the point in 
m ore detail. By separating the unarticulated constituents of a belief report 
— that is, modes of presentation — from the proposition believed and then 
provid ing  them  in the analysis of the belief report by quantifying over 
them , these philosophers seem to in troduce m odes of presen tation  as
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having quite different functions from  the unarticulated constituents in  an 
utterance of Tt is raining'. This point m ight be m ade clearer w ith the help 
of an example. Suppose I ring u p  m y M other in India and  she asks m e 
'H ow  is the weather?' and I answ er by saying (as usual) 'It is raining'. She, 
of course, understands that it is raining in St. A ndrew s from  the context. 
She puts dow n the phone and tells m y Father, w ho is also quite eager to 
know  w hat the w eather is like in St. A ndrew s (hoping that he is going to 
hear som ething new  this time), 'M said that it's  raining'. W hat I w ant to 
em phasise here is that in a conversational situation like this, the place of 
u tterance cannot be separated  from  the proposition expressed by the 
sentence It is raining'. The unarticulated constituent of the sentence 'It is 
raining', that is, the place, is an inseparable part of the proposition that the 
sentence expresses. This feature will be accepted by the H ybrid theorists as 
well. W hy do I think so? I think that it follows from  their analysis of the 
prepositional a ttitude ascribing sentence itself. The analysis of a belief 
report like,
Tom believes that it is raining
along the line of an hybrid  account, w ould  be th a t Tom believes a 
Russellian proposition involving the place and raining under a m ode of 
p resen ta tion  of the place and the m ode of p resen ta tion  of raining. 
Therefore, the singular proposition, even in a belief report of the above 
kind , w ould  essentially  involve the place w hich is the  unarticu la ted  
co n stitu en t of the sentence 'It is ra in ing '. By co n trast m odes of 
presentation as unarticulated constituents of belief reports are not part of 
the proposition expressed by the em bedded sentence. They constitute the 
th ird  argum ent of the relation of believing.
So the analogy that the H ybrid theorists draw  between unarticulated 
constituen ts of a sentence like 'It is rain ing ' and  the  unarticu la ted  
constituents of a sentence like Tom believes that Cicero is a Roman' fails. 
There seems to be very little sim ilarity in the w orking of the two kinds of 
u n a rtic u la ted  constituen ts. I fail to  see w h a t s ign ifican t ro le an 
unarticulated  constituent of a belief report can play once it is separated 
from the proposition expressed by the em bedded sentence
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H aving noted this, we can form ulate our problem  in the form  of a 
dilem m a. To do this let us state Crim m ins's version of the H ybrid View 
once again. According to Crim m ins, w e can represent the content of a 
belief report, like Tom believes tha t Cicero is Rom an’ in  the following 
way:
( 3r ) [ Believes ( Tom, <Cicero, Roman>, r) &
Responsible ( ncicero, r ) &
Responsible ( iRomanr r ) ]
Let us note, in the first place, that the positions of the singular term  and 
the predicate expression in the structured Russellian proposition <Cicero, 
Roman> are open to substitution and are, therefore transparent. N ow  the 
question is as follows: are the modes of presentation of Cicero (notion of a) 
and  of being Roman (idea of F) specifically m entioned in the responsibility 
clause or are they introduced by existentially quantifying over them? The 
first case, that is the case where reference to particular notions and ideas 
are m ade, is no th ing  b u t a version of the Fregean view  of a ttitude  
attribution, and therefore, the problem  as to how  the belief-ascriber m ay 
know  these particu lar m odes of presentations, and  the problem  as to 
w h o se  m odes of presentation are being referred to, the believer's or the 
ascriber's, etc. still rem ain. If, on  the other hand, notions and  ideas are 
q u an tified  over, then  th e  occurrence of the s in g u la r term  in  the 
responsibility clause (that is, the position of 'Cicero' in 'ncicero ') w ould be 
tra n sp a ren t — it is the same Russellian proposition which is presented in 
one w ay or the other. If this position is transparent, then the whole project 
of explaining failures of substitu tiv ity  of co-referential expressions in 
belief contexts by providing a correct analysis of belief reports fails. In this 
case we have to say that both  'Tom believes that Cicero is Roman' and 
Tom  believes th a t Tully is Rom an' are true. ^  50 it  seem s, how ever, 
impossible to suggest that the occurrence of 'Cicero' in nc icero  is opaque, 
because in that case we have to explain w hy it is opaque. The problem  of 
explaining opacity still rem ains, it is only shifted to another level, and 
there are no resources available to explain it at this level.
ISOfhis same dilemma can be shown to occur in the generalised version of the Hybrid View, 
which represents a belief report of the form X believes that a is P in the following way: 
(3m) (B (x, <a, F>, m) & m presents <a, F>)
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These difficulties, I think, arise from  separating  the proposition  
believed from the w ay it is believed. Once modes of presentation are not 
taken to be a part of the proposition believed (the proposition  believed 
being a Russellian proposition), and are provided as a th ird  argum ent of 
the belief report, w e have to say th a t different m odes of presentation  
p resen t the  sam e R ussellian  p roposition . In  th a t case, m odes of 
presentation will have no role to play in the explanation of the failure of 
substitu tion  of co-referential nam es in  a belief context. The H ybrid  
theorists  have either to say th a t the em bedded  sentence refers to  
som ething m ore complex, or give up  the claim that in  all cases of belief 
report there is a tacit reference to a m ode of presentation. So, the H ybrid 
View, w hether it be of Schiffer's type or of Crim m ins's type has some 
intrinsic difficulties. The m ain aim of this chapter was to bring ou t these 
difficulties. To do that we needed to fully characterise the H ybrid View, 
show how  it differs from the Russellian account on the one hand and the 
Fregean account on the other, and exam ine the general assum ptions on 
which it depended. The first major part of the chapter w as engaged in 
doing that. Having, hopefully, raised cogent doubts about the hybrid view, 
we can now  m ove on to the discussion of the Fregean account and the 
Russellian account of belief ascriptions in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER 4
On the Fregean Account of Belief Ascription
4.1. P relim inary Rem arks
W e have seen, in the previous chapter, tha t the H ybrid  View of belief 
ascription — an account w hich takes both a Russellian proposition and 
some kind of Fregean notion of sense to be the content of belief ascriptions 
and  thus essential in providing a semantics of belief reports — does not 
w ork, due to some inherent difficulties of the account. We should also 
note that an account of this general kind, is given by someone who does 
no t take the de rejde dicto d istinc tion  betw een beliefs seriously , and  
therefore, thinks that a single account of belief ascription w ould be able to 
bring out the nature of any kind of belief whatsoever^^i. But we have tried 
to show , in an  earlier chapter, th a t there is a genuine de rejde dicto 
distinction, and therefore w hatever semantics we give of belief ascribing 
sentences m ust capture this distinction. W hether a belief ascription is de 
re or w hether it is de dicto, very im portantly, depends on the context of 
the utterance of the sentence ascribing belief — the context which, in turn, 
determ ines the nature of the proposition referred to by the 'that'-clause. 
N ow , w hat I am  trying to say here is that the kind of belief involved on 
one side of the distinction can be show n by thinking of belief as a relation 
betw een a thinker and  a Russellian proposition, while the kind involved 
on the other side of the distinction can be captured by thinking of belief as 
a relation betw een a thinker and a Fregean proposition. N either approach 
to the semantics of belief ascribing sentences by them selves bring ou t the 
distinction. The Fregean view  of a ttitu d e  ascrip tion  can be said  to 
correspond to the de dicto cases, w hereas the broadly Russellian view can 
be said to correspond to the de re cases. Thus we are left w ith the orthodox 
Fregean account and the Russellian account of belief ascription.
l51por example, Richard [1990] and Crimmins [1992] both of whom advocate some form of 
Hybrid View of belief ascriptions, try to show that the de rejde dicto distinction does not 
hold — either at the level of belief or at the level of ascriptions of belief. One of the 
reasons for their rejection of the distinction at the level of belief ascriptions may be due to 
the fact that they reject the distinction at the level of belief itself.
I l l
O ur aim in this chapter is to closely analyse the views of Frege and 
his later followers; in particular w e should be looking at how  they take 
some kind of modes of presentation or senses to be the content of a 'that'- 
clause. A discussion of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, 
like ascription of belief, is, no doubt, incom plete w ithou t a thorough 
d iscu ssio n  of F rege 's acco u n t of a ttitu d e  a ttrib u tio n . T hough  
com paratively  fam iliar, it is com plicated and  is subject to various 
in terpretations depending  on w hat role one assigns to the sense of an 
expression occurring w ithin an a ttitude ascribing context. H ow ever, his 
view  is regarded by philosophers as one of the best ways of understanding 
attitude ascriptions, and solving some of the im portant puzzles that arise 
in these contexts. As w e all know, according to Frege, in a belief ascribing 
sentence like, 'Sarah believes th a t M ark Twain is the au thor of Tom  
Sawyer*, the 'that'-clause picks ou t a thought, a thought being the sense of 
a sentence — a sense w hich is com posed of senses of constituen t 
expressions. So the though t th a t is expressed w hen Sarah says 'M ark 
Tw ain is the author of Tom Sawyer* is the result of com bining a sense 
associated w ith  the nam e referring to the individual M ark Twain and a 
sense associated w ith  the predicate referring to the property  of authoring 
Tom Sawyer, To understand  Frege's position, it is essential to provide 
answers to the following two questions:
(a) W hat exactly does Frege mean by the sense of an expression?
(b) H ow  is the notion of sense used in understanding sentences ascribing 
propositional attitudes?
It will become clear, in the discussion which is to follow, that the above 
tw o questions are very m uch inter-related. An explanation of w hat Frege 
takes to be the sense of an expression, in good part, depends upon how  it is 
used in explaining som e puzzling  phenom ena in propositional attitude 
ascriptions. Therefore, it is almost impossible to separately answ er the two 
questions.
It should also be noted that, although Frege takes a thought to be the 
sense of a complete assertoric sentence and the reference of a 'that'-clause
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in a propositional a ttitude  context, our discussion here, w ill m ainly 
concentrate on his account of the sense of a subsentential expression. A 
though t associated w ith  a sentence, being com posed of senses of the 
c o n s titu e n t ex p ress io n s  of th a t  sen tence , w ill h av e  w h a te v e r  
characteristics the senses of expressions, which are its com ponents, have.
4.2, Frege’s Account of Sense
In the very first three paragraphs of his article 'On Sense and  Reference' 
[1966], Frege introduces the notion of the sense of an expression — a notion 
essential for the understanding of an expression. In explaining w hat Frege 
takes to be the sense of an expression, w e may proceed by doing two things. 
In the first place, we will m ention some of the m ain functions that Frege 
assigned to the sense of an expression (this will constitute an answer to 
the second question m entioned  above). In the second place, we will 
com pare the notion of sense w ith  that of reference (which will, in turn , 
constitute an answer to the first question) and try to point out his reasons 
for introducing the sense of an expression over and above its reference.
4.2.1. Sense and its functions
Frege [1966] starts his discussion by pointing ou t w hy w e need sense over 
and  above reference. U nderstanding his reasons for introducing senses of 
expressions will help us in understanding  w hat exactly he m eans by the 
sense of an expression. One of the m ain reasons for introducing sense over 
and  above reference, is for him  to allocate to the sense of an expression 
various kinds of functions.
The first function that Frege allocates to the sense of an expression 
is to explain the difference in cognitive values betw een pairs of identity 
statem ents. In try ing  to  bring  ou t the difference in cognitive values 
between a statem ent of equality like 'a=a' and one like 'a=b', Frege says:
a-a  and a-h  are obviously statem ents of different cognitive 
value; fl=a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be 
labelled analytic, w hile statem ents of the form  a=h often
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contain very valuable extensions of our know ledge and 
cannot always be established a priori.
’a=a' and a=b' correspond schematically to pairs of identity s t a t e m e n t s ^ ^ s  
like 'H esperus is H esperus’ and 'H esperus is Phosphorus'. The difference 
in their cognitive values is due to the fact that the term s 'H esperus' and 
'Phosphorus', in spite  of having  the sam e reference, differ in  sense. 
Differences in w hat tw o w ords are rightly  understood to say is due to 
attaching different senses to them . A nd he dem onstrates the need to 
recognise such a feature of understanding by pairs of identity statements of 
the above kind. His purpose is to exhibit that pairs of statem ents which 
agree in reference, that is, they speak about the same object and the same 
property /re la tion , m ust nevertheless be recognised to differ in w hat each 
is rightly understood to state. That is w hy he says
It is natural, now , to th ink of there being connected w ith  a 
sign (name, com bination of w ords, letter), besides th a t to 
w hich the sign refers, w hich m ay be called the reference of 
the sign, also w hat I should like to call the sense of the sign, 
w herein  the  m ode of p resen ta tion  is contained. In our 
exam ple, accordingly, the reference of the expressions the 
point of intersection of a and b' and 'the point of intersection 
of b and  c' w ould  be the same, bu t not their senses. The 
reference of 'evening star' w ould  be the sam e as th a t of 
'm orning star', bu t not the s e n s e . ^ 5 4
So w e m ay say th a t the sense of a w ord, like 'the m orning star', is 
w hatever it  is abou t u n d erstan d in g  of a w ord  w hich accounts for 
differences in cognitive value betw een the two pairs of identity statem ents
152 Frege [1966], p.56.
^53There are two things about pairs of identity statements of this kind which should be 
mentioned here. In first place, Frege's choice of contrasting pairs of identity statement 
made it impossible for him to say that they each differed from the other in having 
different truth-conditions. As the corresponding parts of the two sentences referred to the 
same things there could not be conditions in which one of them is true and the other false. 
Furthermore, the names occurring on either side of the identity predicate, like 'Hesperus' 




in  w hich that w ord  and  its co-referential expression occur — it is that 
which is needed to identify the w ay things are to be understood to be. The 
w ay in which the r e f e r e n t ^ ^ s  jg understood by a person, w hen he knows a 
poin t as the point of intersection betw een a and b, is very different from 
the w ay he know s it as the po in t of intersection betw een b and c. As 
D um m ett points out,
... [the] understanding which a speaker of a language has of a 
w ord  in th a t language .... can never consist m erely in his 
associating a certain thing w ith it as its referent; there m ust be 
some particular means by which this association is effected, 
the knowledge of which constitutes his grasp of its s e n s e . ^ 5 6
A bout the notion of sense, it should also be pointed ou t tha t associated 
w ith  a particular w ord, there m ay be m any senses w hich determ ine the 
re feren t of th a t w ord , o therw ise there w ould  be no argum ent for 
introducing sense in the first place. For Frege, w ords cannot share a sense 
bu t differ in reference. So, though the notion of sense was in troduced to 
correspond to all the features of understanding over and above reference, 
in fact, senses that w ords bear, fully identify their proper understandings. 
Once the sense of a w ord on a particular understanding is identified, the 
reference is not needed to d istinguish one understanding  from  another. 
This is very m uch in conform ity w ith  Frege's idea th a t a w ell-form ed 
gram m atical expression representing a proper nam e can have sense bu t 
lack any reference. We will come back to this point in our discussion of 
the relationship between sense and reference.
The second function of the Fregean theory of sense is that senses, or 
m ore precisely, the senses of complete a s s e r t o r i c ^ ^ ?  sentences, which Frege 
calls 'though ts’, are regarded  as objects of propositional a ttitudes like
155\Ye will, here, use the terms 'referent' and 'reference' in the same way as standing for 
the object/individual the name is a name of. So we are overlooking the stipulation made by 
Dummett [1981], saying that 'reference' stands for the relation of referring, whereas 
referent' stands for the object referred to by the expression.
^56[)ummett [1981], p.93.
^57See Dummett, [1981] pp.364-65. An assertoric sentence is one which is used to make an 
assertion, and it is complete, as a complete utterance is the smallest linguistic unit with the 
help of which a linguistic act, like assertion, can be performed.
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belief. This particular function is assigned to thoughts to  solve a puzzle 
involved in propositional a ttitude  ascriptions. The problem , as it will 
become clear, and as it has already been m entioned in the introduction, 
can be taken to be a generalisation of the problem  concerning identity  
s ta tem en ts . It is th e  p u zz le  concern ing  the  a p p a re n t fa ilu re  of 
su b s titu tiv ity  of co -referen tial s in g u la r term s in  certa in  contexts, 
particularly in propositional attitude ascribing contexts, that is, in reports 
of the  form  'X believes th a t p '. C ontexts w here  the  p rinc ip le  of 
substitutivity of co-referential expressions fail (these are know n as 'opaque 
contexts'). To be clear about the role a Fregean thought plays in this kind 
of context, w e need  to know  w h at is m eant by the  p rinc ip le  of 
substitutivity of co-referential singular terms, and how  this principle fails 
in attitude ascribing contexts.
To u n d e rs tan d  the  su b stitu tiv ity  p rinc ip le , w e can s ta rt by 
rem inding ourselves of Leibniz's Law or the Indiscernibility of Identicals. 
According to this Law, if x and y are the same objects then x and y have the 
sam e properties. So, if 'St. Petersburg' and  'Leningrad' refer to the sam e 
place, the city they refer to will have the same property, like the property 
of having a population of over one million; or if Twain and  Clemens are 
the same person then they have the sam e property, like, the p roperty  of 
being the author of Huckleberry Finn . This Law allows us to substitute 
one expression for another expression standing for the same object in a 
sentence w ithout any change in truth-value of the whole sentence. This is 
w h a t is know n as the  p rinc ip le  of su b stitu tiv ity  of co-referential 
expression, and can be schematically r e p r e s e n t e d ^ ^ s  the following way:
Given that t i  and t2 are singular term s and S ( ) is a sentential context in 
w hich t i  occurs,
tl= t2  S(ti)
S ( t 2 / t l )
158see the introduction to the Section on 'Opacity and Attribution of Belief by Forbes in 
Harnish [1994], p.323
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S ( t2 / t l )  is obtained from S(ti) by the replacem ent of t% by t2- t i  and t2, 
being co-referential, are talking about the same object, and w e know  that 
according to Leibniz's Law, if x and y are identical then w hatever is true of 
X is true of y and vice versa. N ow  given that t l  and t2 are identical and that 
S ( ti)  is true , w e can im m ediately infer th a t S ( t2 / t i )  is tru e  as well. 
T herefore , Leibniz 's Law , th o u g h  a p rin c ip le  of m etaphysics , is 
im plem ented in formal systems of deduction by the rule of substitutivity 
of identity . We can take a sim ple exam ple of an inference using  the 
principle of substitutivity of co-referential expressions.
A. George Orwell = Eric Blair
George w rote Animal Farm
Therefore, Eric Blair wrote Animal farm.
This principle seems to be intuitively plausible. If one can use a sentence 
containing a particu lar nam e to say som ething tru e  about the object 
specified by that name, then surely, we can use some other nam e standing 
for that same object in the sentence to say something true. Given the fact 
tha t the tw o nam es 'George O rwell' and  'Eric Blair' refer to the sam e 
person and  the fact that George Orwell w rote Animal Farm, w e can quite 
legitim ately infer that Eric Blair w rote Animal farm. But it seems^^^ very 
easy to show that the principle of substitution of co-referential expressions 
does not preserve tru th  in m any cases. These are cases w here sentences 
like 'G eorge O rw ell w ro te  Animal Farm' lie w ith in  the scope of a 
propositional a ttitude ascribing verb like 'believes', as in Tom believes 
tha t George Orw ell w rote Animal Farm'. The fact that the principle of 
substitutivity fails in these cases can be shown w ith the help of examples 
of inferences w here sentences of this kind occur. They are inferences like 
the following:
B. George Orwell is Eric Blair
Tom believes that George Orwell w rote Animal Farm
Therefore, Tom believes that Eric Blair w rote Animal Farm
use the word 'seems' here, because I will go on to explain below that, if Frege is right, then 
the apparent failures are merely apparent.
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B is an unso u n d  inference.^^® C onsider the situation  w here Tom is 
unaw are of the fact that George Orwell is Eric Blair. In that case, we cannot 
substitu te  the nam e 'G eorge O rw ell' for "Eric Blair' and  arrive at a 
conclusion w hich is true.^^^ This is quite ev iden t if w e consider the 
Superm an story. As the story goes, Lois Lane doesn't know  that Superman 
and  Clark Kent are one and the sam e person, and therefore, though she 
believes that Superm an can fly, she doesn't believe that Clark Kent can. So 
the following is an invalid argum ent:
c. Superm an is Clark Kent
Lois Lane believes that Superm an can fly 
Therefore, Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly.
One of the m ost im portant problem s in the Philosophy of Language is to 
give a satisfactory account of these cases. A satisfactory account w ould 
consist in giving a semantics of belief ascribing sentences by showing how 
the expressions w ithin the em bedded sentence work. The Fregean notion 
of sense helps in explaining aw ay this failure of substitu tiv ity  of co- 
referential expressions in attitude contexts of the above kind by arguing 
that subsentential expressions (like names) occurring w ithin 'that'-clauses 
in attitude attributions refer to som ething of a very different kind from 
the reference of those expressions occurring outside the a ttitude verb. 
W hereas the expression 'H esperus' custom arily  refers to the p lan et 
Venus, w hen it occurs in a sentence like, 'John believes tha t H esperus 
rises in the evening' the nam e 'H esperus' refers to its custom ary sense. 
This validates the substitu tion  of any expression hav ing  the sam e
160The failure of substitutivity of identity occurs, as it is well known, in modal contexts as 
well. One example due to Quine is the following. Though the two sentences 'the number of 
planets is 9' and it is necessary that 9 > 7' are both true, from them it does not follow ' it is 
necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7', since it is only a contingent fact that 
number of planets is 9.
l^^Taking the inference to be unsound, in a way, presupposes that the truth-condition of the 
belief ascribing sentence depends upon the believer's acceptance of the truth of the sentence. 
Someone might say, that both the belief ascribing sentences in the inference B are true, 
though Tom doesn't assert them to be so. One explanation might be that B and any inference 
of that general kind, are not invalid or unsound inferences, but they are pragmatically 
incorrect — a view to be discussed later.
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customary sense as 'Hesperus', but it does not validate the substitution of 
an expression merely having the same customary reference.
4.2.2. Sense and Reference
We can now turn to the consideration of the relationship between the 
sense and the reference of expressions in trying to understand the notion 
of sense. Sense, for Frege, is one of the most im portant ingredients of 
meaning, the two others being tone and force. According to Dummett's 
interpretation of Frege, the sense of an expression is that part of meaning 
which is relevant to the determination of the truth-value of the sentence 
in which the expression occurs, and this can be made clear if we consider 
how Frege distinguished between the tone and the sense of an expression. 
The words 'dead' and 'deceased' do not differ in sense, that is, they do not 
possess anything which w ould lead to the difference in truth-value 
between sentences in which they occur. Insofar as they differ in meaning 
at all, their difference lies in having different tones. Another example 
given by Frege is the difference in meaning between the connectives 'and' 
and 'but'. The replacement of one by the other does not change the truth 
value of the sentence, but the tone might change completely.^^^ But this 
way of differentiating the notion of sense from other ingredients of 
meaning, as Dummett points out^^t 'serves to distinguish sense from
162prege deals with quotation contexts in an analogous way. The name 'Hesperus', when  
occurring within quotation marks as in the sentence ’ "Hesperus" is an eight letter word’ 
refers to itself.
^^ I^t is an interesting question whether the change in tone within the scope of an attitude 
verb would result in a change of truth-value in attitude ascriptions. Suppose Ralph reports 
Tom's belief about Harry as Tom thinks that Harry is a nigger'. Hearing this Tom might 
protest by saying that 'I think that Harry is a black but not a nigger'. According to a 
Fregean, the two sentences 'Tom thinks that Harry is a nigger' and Tom thinks that Harry 
is a black’ do not differ in truth value, but they differ in the tone conveyed by the two 
sentences. They can say that both the ascriptions are true, but misleading — and this 
misleadingness is due to adding something more to the belief report. This can be compared 
with reports which are misleading in the sense of being incomplete. (An example of this 
kind of report has been discussed in Chapter 4.) So, it seems that true reports can be 
misleading in two ways — one is where it is misleading because it does not say all that is 
required to capture the reported believer's belief, the other is where it is misleading 
because it says more than is required to capture the reported believer’s belief. The report 
Tom believes that Harry is a nigger' is misleading in the latter sense. Unfortunately we 
cannot enter into a detail discussion on this issue, and will confine ourselves to the 




other ingredients in meaning: but, for the rest, it is, in itself, purely 
programmatic.' The only way in which we can understand the Fregean 
notion of sense is by comparing it with his notion of reference. Frege 
himself tried to that as well.
About the notion of reference of an expression, Dummett says that 
it should not be regarded as an ingredient of meaning in Frege's system. 
What does Dummett mean when he says this? The claim that the notion 
of reference is not an ingredient of meaning does not, for Dummett, mean 
that reference has nothing to do with meaning. This claim about reference 
is a claim that 'our understanding a word or an expression never consists, 
even in part, merely in our associating something in the world with that 
word or e x p r e s s i o n . H e r e  again the notion of understanding of an 
expression comes in. As it is known, for Dummett, a theory of meaning is 
a theory understanding. So,
what we have to give an account of is what a person knows
when he knows what a word or expression means, that is,
when he understands it.^^^
In giving a description of how someone comes to understand a word or an 
expression, our aim is to give a clear account of what this ability, when 
acquired, consists in. And once we are in a position to give a general 
account of what it is to know the meaning of a word or an expression, we 
will be able to derive, as a consequence, what it is for two expressions to 
have the same meaning or for an expression to have a meaning at all. So, 
when Dummett says that reference is not an ingredient of meaning in the 
context of discussing Frege, what it means is that someone who does not 
know the reference of an expression does not thereby show that he does 
not understand or partially understand the expression. The understanding 
which a speaker of a language has of a word in that language, can never 
consist of his associating an object/individual as its referent: there must be 
a particular means through which a reference is associated, and that 




a sentence the references of the constituent w ords are essential, and  the 
sense of a w ord, by providing conditions for determ ining the reference, 
helps us in determ ining the truth-value of the whole sentence.
If sense is characterised in the w ay that D um m ett characterises it— 
th a t is, as th a t in g red ien t of m ean ing  w hich  is re lev an t to the 
determ ination of the tru th-value of the sentence in w hich the expression 
occurs — then someone m ight w onder w hy we need the notion of sense 
over and  above the notion of reference. If w e consider the w ay in which 
Frege treats the notion of reference it w ould seem that once the reference 
of w ords in a sentence is determ ined, the truth-value is also determ ined. 
Frege does hold that the replacem ent of one expression in a sentence by 
ano ther co-referential expression leaves the tru th -value  of the w hole 
sentence intact. So the sense of an expression will coincide w ith  the 
reference, or, at least, there w ou ld  be an one-to-one correspondence 
betw een the sense and the reference of an expression. But Frege certainly 
thinks that we associate m any senses w ith one reference. Finding our w ay 
ou t of this dilem m a, according to Dum m ett, lies in  recognising the fact 
that reference is not the ingredient of meaning. To quote D um m ett here.
If reference w ere an ingredient of meaning, then indeed  the 
reference of a w ord w ould exhaust — or determ ine — its senses, 
since no th ing  m ore w ou ld  need  to  be know n abou t its 
m eaning in order to fix the tru th-value of any sentence in 
w hich it occurred... There w ould then genuinely be no room  
for a notion of sense to be squeezed in betw een reference and 
tone. But reference is not an ingredient of m eaning, and so 
sense can still be explained as constituting that p art of the 
meaning of a w ord or expression which needs to be grasped in 
order to decide the truth-value of sentences containing it; and 
this m eans : th a t p a rt of its m eaning w hich determ ine its 
reference.^^^
H aving noted this let us again come back to the w ay in which Frege 
him self introduces the distinction betw een sense and reference. In 'On
p.91.
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Sense and  R eference', Frege s ta rts  h is d iscussion  by  considering  
expressions that are regarded as singular terms , that is, p roper names and 
definite descriptions.^^® The reference of a proper nam e is the object that 
the p roper nam e stands for. Hence, it is the p lanet Venus w hich is 
regarded  as the reference of the  nam e 'the m orning  s ta r’. Then he 
introduces the notion of sense to explain the property  of inform ativeness 
that some identity statem ents possess, which cannot be explained in terms 
of their references.
As D um m ett points out^®^, the sense of a proper nam e cannot just 
be its having the reference it has. If the sense of a nam e m erely consists in 
its having the reference that it has, then the fact of inform ativeness of 
identity  statem ents cannot be explained either. D um m ett spells ou t the 
argum ent as follows^^®:
If the sense of a nam e consisted just in its having a certain 
reference, then  anyone w ho understood  the nam e w ould  
thereby know  w hat the object it stood for, and  one w ho 
understood tw o nam es which had  the same reference w ould 
know  that they stood for the same object, and  w ould  know 
the tru th  of the statem ent of identity connecting them , which 
could therefore not be inform ative for him.
There are m any iden tity  statem ents w e encounter about w hose tru th- 
values w e are unsure. But if sense is explained in the w ay it is, the 
understand ing  of an identity  statem ent w ould im m ediately lead to the 
recognition  of its tru th  or falsity , w hich, therefore , w ou ld  n o t be 
inform ative any longer. That is w hy, Frege, in explaining w hat the sense 
of a nam e is, introduces the notion of the m ode of presentation or the way 
of identifying the object. W hat Frege w ants to say is tha t in grasping the 
sense of a nam e w e come to connect the nam e w ith  the m ode of 
identify ing the object, so, tw o co-referential nam es can have different 
senses by having different m odes of identifying the reference associated
it is well known, unlike Russell, Frege takes definite descriptions to be on a par with 
proper names.
^^^Dummett [1981], pp. 94-6.
170ibid, 95.
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w ith  them. The different conditions of identification that are associated 
w ith  the different expressions, provide w hat Frege calls different 'routes’ 
to the reference. The two nam es, 'Afla' and  'Ateb', though have the same 
reference, their reference is arrived at by two different routes. The sense of 
an expression, therefore, can be regarded as the conditions that anything 
m ust satisfy in order to be the reference of the expression. It should be 
noted at this point that there is a difference betw een taking senses to be 
m odes/w ays of identifying an object and taking them  to be conditions that 
anything m ust satisfy in order to be the reference of a name. The first way 
of interpreting the notion of sense has the consequence that there cannot 
be any sense w ithout there being reference, because the very idea of 
m ean s/w ay s of identifying an object makes no sense unless there is an 
object w hich can be identified  — senses of this kind are called 'de re 
s e n  s e s '171 recen t lite ra tu re . W hereas, accord ing  to  the  second 
interpretation, w here a sense is taken to be the conditions that anything 
has to satisfy to be the reference, there can be sense w ithout there being 
any reference. If sense is a condition that anything m ust satisfy in order to 
be the reference, then there can very well be conditions which, in fact, is 
not m et by anything.
Frege him self thought that an expression can have sense w ithout 
having any reference. According to Frege, every well-formed grammatical 
expression representing a proper nam e has sense, bu t that does not m ean 
th a t a reference always corresponds to such a sense. Furtherm ore, the 
sense of a com plex expression is com posed o u t of the senses of its 
constituent expressions. Therefore, the grasp of the sense of a complete 
sentence requires the grasp of the senses of its constituents. A nd the sense 
of a declarative sentence is w hat Frege calls a thought. A thought, as 
understood by Frege, plays the role of w hat is traditionally taken to be a 
proposition. This w ould become clear once w e point out the characteristics 
that Frege associates w ith thought. These three features are the following:
(a) thoughts are bearers of unrelativised truth-value;
171 This kind of interpretation is found in Evans [1982], and has been developed by John 
McDowell [1984].
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(b) they  are  the objects of p rop o sitio n al a ttitu d e  an d  hence are 
psychologically real; and
(c) the existence of the thought, in no w ay depends upon the existence of 
the object the thought is about, that is the objects tha t are determ ined as 
references of constituent e x p r e s s i o n s T ^ z
If the notion of sense is understood in this way, then a straight forw ard 
answ er can be given to the substitu tiv ity  problem  as it is b rough t ou t in 
inference B. The reason w hy the two sentences
1. Tom believes that George Orwell w rote Animal Farm
2. Tom believes that Eric Blair w rote Animal Farm
differ in tru th-value is that the 'that'-clauses in 1 and  2 re fe r  to two 
different thoughts. Due to the peculiarity of the context, the expressions 
em bedded inside the content do no t refer to their norm al referents bu t 
refer to their norm al sense. The sentence 'George Orw ell w rote Anim al 
Farm ' and  the sentence Eric Blair w rote Anim al Farm' express tw o 
different thoughts for Tom, since the first has the sense of 'George Orwell’ 
as a constituent, w hile the second has the sense of Eric Blair' as a 
constituent. W hat happens in a belief context is that these expressed senses 
become the referents of the tw o 'that'-clauses, that is, in  a context of this 
k ind  the tw o nam es 'George Orw ell’ and Eric Blair' do not refer to their 
custom ary referent.
4.3. Intersubjective Variations in Sense and the Resultant Problem
The Fregean approach seems to give us a neat and easy solution to the 
apparen t problem  of substitu tion in the propositional a ttitude ascribing 
contexts. But let us now  see w hether the notion of sense as used by Frege 
is itself w ithout any difficulty. A problem  that m ay be raised is due to the 
fact of intersubjective variations in senses. One of the m ost natural ways 
of u n d erstan d in g  the sense of a p roper nam e is the association of 
c o n c e p t s ^ 7 3  or descriptions that the user connects w ith the name. These
172see Noonan [1984], p.21.
173»Concepts' here does not refer to Frege's technical notion of concepts, which roughly, for 
Frege are references of predicate expressions in sentences.
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concepts may be given by one or tw o descriptions that the user associates 
w ith  the name. Frege seems to accept this w hen he uses the exam ple of 
'Aristotle* and  says th a t how  opinions as to w h at senses are to be 
associated w ith  the nam e m ight differ. For some, the associated sense 
m ight be 'the m ost talented pupil of Plato', whereas, for som e others it 
m ight be 'the teacher of A lexander the Great who was born in Stagira'. As 
Forbes says, 'if there are ever tw o names w ith the same sense for you and 
d iffe ren t senses for m e, th en  th e  sense  of one nam e varies  
i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y ' 1 7 4 .  So i t  is quite plausible that the senses that different 
people associate w ith co-referential names may very well differ. About this 
intersubjective variations in senses Richard rem arks,
..., given the fact that our concepts tend to differ, as does our 
education, culture, and  general Weltanschauung , it will be a 
com m on occurrence th a t the senses we associate w ith  our 
w ords differ, even though their reference does not.^75
In the  d iscussion  w hich is to follow , it w ill becom e ev iden t th a t 
intersubjective variations do pose problem s in attitude attributions which 
a Fregean should answer. The problem  can be brought out w ith the help of 
a fam iliar exam ple th a t has already  been m entioned  several tim es. 
Suppose the Superm an story is true, that is, suppose Lois Lane doesn 't 
know  that Superm an and Clark Kent are one and the same person. Now, 
suppose Ralph reports
3. Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly.
If Frege's analysis of reference shift of expressions in opaque contexts is 
applicable, and if we grant the fact of intersubjective variations in sense, 
then we can legitimately ask, which sense of the nam e 'Superm an' are we 
talking about in this case? Does the nam e 'Superman' refer to
(a) the sense Lois customarily attaches to the name? or,
(b) the sense Ralph customarily attaches to the name? or.
^ 7 4 p o r b e s  [ 1 9 9 0 ] ,  p .5 4 5 .  
1 7 5 R ic h a r d  [ 1 9 9 0 ] ,  p .6 5 .
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(c) does it perform  some other function?
Generally, if A utters a sentence of the form 'B 0 s  that S', does 'S’ refer to 
B's sense or does it refer to A's sense? The first kind of view can be called 
a 'believer-oriented' account of the phenom enon of reference shift, while 
the second can be regarded as the 'ascriber-oriented' account of the same 
p h e n o m e n o n . ^ 7 6  A ccording to the believer-oriented view , the nam e 
'Superm an' and  the predicate 'can fly', in the above-m entioned belief 
ascribing sentence refer to the m ode of presentation of Superm an and the 
m ode of presentation of the property  of the ability to fly that the believer 
Lois associates w ith  the expressions respectively. The ascriber-oriented 
view  says that it is the reporter's or the ascriber's m odes of presentation 
tha t are to be associated w ith the expressions occurring w ithin the belief
context. I!I
Both Forbes [1990] and Richard [1990] have tried to argue that none 
of the two views work. So let us try  to see w hat their argum ents are. We |
can start w ith  the believer-oriented view. The believer-oriented view  
suggests that in ascribing a belief to a person the ascriber m ust refer to the 
senses that the believer associates w ith the expressions w ithin the 'that'- 
clause, bu t this view  seems to face tw o problems. The first objection, is 
that, if it is the believer’s senses w hich are being referred  to in our 
ascription of a belief, then the fact of false ascription to the believer cannot 
be explained in m any cases. F o r b e s ^ 7 7  gives an example of Ralph ascribing 
a belief to Lois by using the following sentence
4. Lois believes that M atti Nykaenen can fly.
Suppose Lois does not know  that M atti N ykaenen is the great Finish ski 
jum per and does not even know  that there is a sport like ski jum ping. In 
this case there is no sense that Lois associates w ith the 'that'-clause that 
can be referred to by Ralph, then  in tuitively  4 seem s to be a false 
ascription— we are ascribing to Lois a certain proposition that she does not 
believe. This is quite clear if w e consider the truth-value of the negation of
176a  discussion of these two kinds of accounts are found in Forbes [1990] Richard [1990] 
177 Forbes [1990], p.551.
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4. The negation of 4, that is, Tt is not the case that Lois believes that M atti 
N ykaenen can fly' or Lois does not believe that M atti N ykaenen can fly' is 
obviously true. But if w e take the Fregean analysis of the believer oriented 
view, then this negation cannot be regarded as true.
W hy can we not regard the negation of 4 to be true  in a Fregean 
account of the believer-oriented view? The reason is as follows. The 
believer oriented analysis has to say that there is no proposition to which 
the 'that'-clause in 4 refers, as Lois does not have any sense associated w ith 
the expressions w ithin the 'that'-clause. N ow  we know  that, for Frege, if a 
subexpression of a complex expression (in this case it is a sentence) fails to 
refer the whole expression (that is the sentence) w ould fail to refer as well. 
Given this, if the 'that'-clause in 4 fails to refer to any proposition, 4 itself 
fails to refer and is, therefore, devoid of any truth-value. A nd if 4 fails to 
have a truth-value the negation of 4 w ould fail to have any truth-value as 
well. But our ordinary intuition surely is that both 4 and  its negation 'it is 
not the case that Lois believes that M atti N ykaenen can fly' have definite 
truth-values — 4 is a false ascription, while its negation is a true ascription. 
The consequence of the believer-oriented view  -  tha t the negation 4 is 
tru th -v a lu e less  — is, su re ly , coun ter-in tu itive . Far from  tak ing  the 
negation of 4 as truth-valueless we take it to be definitely true. Therefore, 
Forbes concludes, 'it is unclear that the believer-oriented view could find a 
w ell-m otivated w ay of ascribing the truth-value True to the negation of 
5.178
The second problem  w ith  the believer-oriented view  is a general 
one. The view  seems to require that in ascribing a belief to someone, the 
ascriber m ust know  the exact w ay in which the believer thinks about the 
objects referred  to by the expressions w ith in  the content-clause. In 
reporting a belief like 'Lois believes that Superm an can fly' the reporter 
has to know  Lois's senses for Superm an and the property of flying. But it 
is quite unlikely that in every case of a belief report, the reporter w ould 
know  the exact w ay in w hich the believer represents the objects of her 
belief. One m ight, at this point, say that this objection is based on a strong 
presupposition  that in referring to som ething w e m ust have identifying
178ibi(j  ^p.548. (by 5, Forbes means the sentence 'Lois believes that Matti Nykaenen can fly'.)
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know ledge of the th ing w hich is being referred to. But the believer- 
oriented account need not make such a strong claim. In m any cases we can 
refer to a p e rso n /th in g  w ithout know ing exactly w h o /w h ich  h e / i t  is. 
Suppose w e say 'Smith's m urderer is insane' w ithout know ing w ho this 
person  is. In order to refer to Sm ith's m urderer w e need  no t have 
identifying know ledge of Smith's m urderer. In a similar way, we can refer 
to  the believer's m odes of p resen ta tion  in the belief rep o rt w ithou t 
know ing w hat exactly those m odes of presentations are. So the m ore 
general w orry about the believer-oriented view seems to be misplaced.
One may try  to reform ulate his w orry about the believer-oriented 
view  w ithout m aking the strong presupposition. It m ight be argued that 
w hen we claim (as the believer-oriented account does) th a t it is Lois's 
sense which is being referred to in the report 'Lois believes that Superman 
can fly', the ascriber m ust at least aim  at referring to Lois's sense for 
Superm an, though  he m ay no t have identify ing  know ledge of th a t 
particu la r sense. A nd the  problem  is to explain  how  or by  w h at 
m echanism  the believer comes to h it on to Lois's senses so that w e can 
say that the report is a true report. As Forbes says, 'How is the reference (to 
the believer's sense) accomplished? After all Ralph (the reporter) m ay not 
have stood to Lois's sense for either nam e (either 'Superm an' or "Clark 
Kent ) in any of the familiar relations which bestow a capacity to think of 
an object; for example, he need not have dem onstratively identified either 
sense. But w ithout a mechanism, the capacity to refer to a sense seems like
magic.'^ 79
Even if the second objection does not w ork, the first objection 
against the believer-oriented view  provides us w ith adequate grounds for 
rejecting it. We, therefore, can agree w ith Forbes that a belief ascription 
like 4 w ould not be able to refer to the senses that the believer possesses. 
So, do we then accept the ascriber-oriented view, that is, do w e say that the 
'that' clause in a belief ascription refers to the senses tha t the ascriber 
associates w ith  its constituent expressions? It seems, for reasons I shall 
now  set forth, th a t if the believer's sense for a nam e occurring w ithin  
a ttitude ascriptions is different from the ascriber's/reporter's  sense, then
:79porbes [1990], p.547.
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the reporter w ould  no t speak tru ly  if he tries to ascribe the belief by 
referring  to his sense for the expression. The ascriber-oriented view , 
according to Forbes, m ay be ru led ou t by considering ascriptions w here 
Ralph, who is aware of the identity of Superman and Clark Kent, says,
5. ’Lois believes that Superm an can fly bu t Clark Kent cannot'.
Suppose th a t R alph associates the  sam e sense w ith  the  expressions 
'Superm an' and 'Clark Kent'. In a case like this, the proposition expressed 
by the  sentence 'Superm an can fly' for him  is contradictory  to the 
p ro p o sitio n  expressed  by the  sentence 'C lark K ent cannot fly'. So, 
according to the ascriber-oriented view , that is, according to the view  
which claims that it is the ascriber's sense for 'Superm an and 'Clark Kent' 
that is being referred to in  5, in ascribing the belief to Lois by uttering 5, 
Ralph is ascribing Lois an explicitly contradictory belief. But surely Lois 
does no t possess any contradictory  beliefs w hen she sincerely says, 
'Superm an can fly bu t Clark can't', and, furtherm ore, there seems to be a 
clear in tu ition that Ralph can u tter 5 to say som ething true about Lois's 
state of m ind. Therefore, Ralph cannot be said to be referring to his ow n 
senses for the constituent expressions of the content clause.
The above example cannot be challenged by saying that if the names 
'Superm an' and 'C lark Kent' express the same sense for Ralph, he cannot 
use 5 truly. In this particular context, the whole point of Ralph m aking a 
report of a kind like 5 is to bring out the fact that Lois is ignorant about the 
identity  of Superm an and Clark Kent. To do that, Ralph needs to use 5 to 
express a tru th  about Lois's belief.
W hen Ralph uses a sentence like 5 to report Lois's belief, the tru th  
of the belief report is really based on w hat m ight be called the 'Echo 
Principle'.^®® The principle says that if both A and B use a sentence S in 
such a w ay that its constituents, w hen they use it, refer to the same things, 
then if A can express a belief using S, then B can use S to ascribe the belief 
to A. So having heard Lois say 'Superm an can fly bu t Clark Kent cannot', 
Ralph can use 5 to report Lois's belief. But in this case the believer's way
l®ORichard [1990]p. 80.
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of expressing her belief becomes im portant in the belief ascription, and 
therefore it is the believer's w ay of understanding  w hich becomes m ore 
im portant.
A sim ilar exam ple has been discussed by Salm on [1986, p. 121] 
Suppose Smith, a Police Surgeon, is determ ined to apprehend a jewel thief 
called Jones. Before setting out on his mission he scrutinises the FBI's file 
on Jones thoroughly, looks at pictures, interviews people w ho knew  Jones 
and  so on. From studying  the file Smith comes to believe that Jones is 
dangerous. Suppose further, having learned that Sm ith is on his trail, 
Jones changes his appearance altogether (maybe goes th rough  plastic 
surgery). He, how ever, does not change his nam e, since it is such a 
com m on nam e. N ow , on his search. Sm ith comes across Jones, is 
completely fooled by him, concludes that he is another m an, and becomes 
quite a good friend of Jones. But one day he overhears a conversation 
betw een Jones and another m an, and  notices that the m an is extrem ely 
frightened of Jones. From this he concludes Jones, m y new -found friend, 
is dangerous'. N ow , suppose someone who definitely know s Jones to be 
the jewel thief (and associates the description 'the infam ous jewel thief 
w hom  Sm ith w ants to cap tu re ' w ith  the nam e 'Jones') ascribes the 
following belief to Smith,
Smith believes that Jones is dangerous.
A ccording to the ascriber-oriented view  Jones' refers to the sense the 
repo rter associates w ith  the nam e 'Jones'. W ith the use of the above 
sentence we are attributing to Smith a belief to the effect that the crafty 
jewel thief nam ed 'Jones' w hom  he w ants to capture is dangerous. But, it 
seems obvious that Smith has no such belief.
The above discussion seems to suggest that neither the ascriber- 
oriented nor the believer-oriented view  is satisfactory. H owever, that does 
no t im ply that belief ascriptions never refer to senses. O ne suggestion 
m ight be that attitude attributions are am biguous betw een the believer- 
o rien ted  and  the ascriber-orien ted  view s. W hether, in  a p articu la r 
utterance, w e should  take the ascriber's m ode of p resen tation  or the
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believer's m ode of presentation depends upon the context in w hich it is 
uttered. This m ight be a way of understanding sentences of the above kind 
— it m ight be that belief ascriptions are am biguous in this way. There is, 
how ever, an account of belief ascription which is neu tral betw een the 
believer and the ascriber-oriented view, but, at the same time, sensitive to 
the inter-subjective variations in sense.
The fact of intersubjective variations in senses and the resu ltan t 
am biguity should not lead one to reject the Fregean account of attitude 
attribution altogether. Graeme Forbes, w ho develops a semantical account 
on Fregean lines, says,
... the m oral I draw  from this^®  ^ is not that Frege's account of 
intentional contexts is fundam entally flawed. It is rather that 
when w e drop the idealization of intersubjective constancy of 
linguistic senses, the basic elements of the Fregean approach 
have to be deployed in a less straight-forw ard w ay to get 
plausible semantic analyses of belief attributions.^®^
In the next section we will discuss how  exactly Forbes uses the notion of 
senses to account for the semantics of belief reports.
4.4, Forbes on a M odified Fregean Account
In the light of our previous discussion, it should be noted that Forbes's 
semantics of attitude ascriptions m ust,
(a) use some kind of notion of sense analogous to Frege's; (2) be sensitive 
to the intersubjective variations in sense,
(b) try  to accommodate the 'echo principle', and
(c) avoid the problem s tha t a ascriber oriented and a believer oriented 
account of belief reports face.




Before going into the discussion of Forbes’s account, let us consider 
another response, a response very similar to Forbes's, here. The reason for 
considering this response is to show  how  this response tries to avoid the 
difficulties resulting from  intersubjective variations in sense and still use 
the notion of sense in provid ing  a semantics of a ttitude attributions. A 
Fregean can say tha t a w ay forw ard m ight be that in cases w here Ralph 
says, 'Lois believes that C lark Kent can't fly', he is referring to neither 
Lois's nor his ow n sense of Clark Kent. He is referring to senses in a very 
general w ay by quantifying over them , and not by specifically referring to 
his or the believer's sense. W hat he is saying in uttering the sentence Lois 
believes that Superm an can fly', can be represented in the following way:
(3m)(3m ')(m  is a m ode of presentation of Superman and  m ' is a m ode of 
presentation of flying & B(Lois, the proposition that m  has m').
An account like this w ould not require to specify which and  whose sense 
is being referred to in a belief ascription, and at the same time, retain the 
Fregean spirit. W hat it is saying, is that for some w ay of thinking of 
Superm an and  som e w ay of 'can fly', Lois believes the p roposition  
consisting of those two ways of presentations. A semantical account of this 
k ind helps the Fregean in giving an analysis of problem atic cases like the 
one discussed in the previous chapter,
6. Everybody who knows W ittgenstein believes that he is a genius.
On the above suggestion w e are no t referring to ind iv idual m odes of 
presentations at all. So 6 can be paraphrased as:
(Vx)(x knows W ittgenstein (3m)(3m')(m is some m ode of presentation 
of W ittgenstein and m' is some m ode of presentation of the p roperty  of 
being of genius & x believes <m, m'>)).
One obvious objections to a proposal of this kind should be discussed here. 
It is a similar objection to that which was raised against the hybrid view at 
the end of last chapter. The proposal suggests that a belief ascription of the 
fo rm
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X believes that a is F 
should be paraphrased in the following way,
A. (3m)(3m')(m presents a & m' presents F & B(X, <m, m ’>).
In other w ords, this suggests, that for some way of thinking of a, X believes 
the proposition consisting in that w ay of thinking of a in conjunction with 
the w ay of thinking of F. But this analysis makes the position of 'a' w ithin 
the 'that'-clause transparent. It seems that we can replace 'a* by any co- 
referential expression, like 'b', w ithout changing the tru th-value of the 
whole sentence. So from A w e will be able to derive
B. (3m)(3m')(m presents b & m' presents F & B(X, <m, m'>).
From this we can get
X believes that b is F.
According to this analysis, from  the sentence 'Lois believes that Superman 
can fly' we can get the sentence 'Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly’, and 
both  the sentences tu rn  ou t to be true. But this is surely  not w hat we 
w anted. One thing that seems to be em erging from the above discussion 
and from the use of w hat is know n as the 'echo principle' is that the actual 
nam e (which occurs w ith in  the belief operator) that the ascriber uses in 
reporting someone's belief, plays a very crucial role. For example, w hen 
Ralph says Lois believes tha t Clark Kent can't fly' the use of the nam e 
'Clark Kent' by Ralph is very im portant, because that is the nam e that he 
heard Lois using in reporting her ow n belief.
The m oral w hich should  be draw n  from  the above m entioned  
problem  is that, in an analysis of certain cases of belief ascriptions, we need 
to p rov ide some further restrictions w hich w ould preclude this k ind  of 
substitution. We have seen that the hybrid view fails to provide us w ith 
any restriction of tha t kind. Forbes [1990] tries to avoid this problem  by 
bringing in a contextual factor that is, in many cases, extremely im portant
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in reporting a person's belief so that communication betw een the reporter 
and  the hearer can take place. W hat the report should do, is to specify how  
the believer w ould  express his or her belief, and th a t can be done by 
specifying the very nam e that the person w ould use in expressing his or 
her belief. Forbes, in sum m arising his own proposal, says.
Reflection ... indicates that the actual name the ascriber uses 
in  m aking his ascrip tion  p lays a role th a t none of the 
proposals canvasses so far has m anaged to capture. ...when 
Ralph comes ou t w ith  (6)^ ®®, he is surm ising  som ething 
roughly  to the effect tha t for Lois there is some body of 
classified conditions concerning Clark K ent ... which she 
associates with the name "Clark Kent" and  w hich includes 
the condition of "can't fly" classified "believed to be true". ...
In o ther w ords, these ascriptions m ust be represen ted  as 
adverting in some way to the nam e the believer w ould use in 
expressing the belief.^®^
This proposal suggests tha t the sense of an expression is labelled by the 
nam e the believer and  the ascriber uses. There are th ree im portan t 
observations we can m ake here. In the first place, by  associating the 
particu lar nam e the believer w ould  use had  she expressed her belief, 
Forbes avoids the problem  tha t endangered the quantificational account. 
Furtherm ore, by indicating that there is som e body of classified condition 
that Lois has concerning Clark Kent, he avoids the problem  referring to 
Lois's or the ascriber's particular sense for Clark Kent. The last po in t is 
about which nam e the reporter should use in his report of someone else's 
belief. Is Forbes saying that, in order correctly to report someone's belief, 
we m ust use the very nam e actually used by the reported believer? Surely 
that cannot be the case, for two reasons:
(a) the reported believer m ay not have actually expressed her belief at all 
by using that nam e, she m ay have expressed her belief by using some 
other name; or
1®3’(6)' refers to the sentence 'Lois believes Clark Kent can't fly'. 
^ ® 4 p o r b e s  [ 1 9 9 0 ] ,  p . 5 4 9 .
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(b) the reported believer m ay not have expressed her belief at all.
Forbes accepts these points, and in a footnote^®® gives an example w here a 
believer m ight actually refrain from  using the nam e that the ascriber uses 
in  reporting  his belief. She m ight have religious p roh ib ition  against 
u ttering  or even w riting a name. That m ay be the reason w hy he later 
fo rm ulates the  condition  by the nam e the believer w o u ld  u se  in 
expressing his belief. That is, in  order correctly to report someone's belief, 
we m ust use a nam e that the reported  believer w ould have used had  she 
expressed her belief. It need not be a nam e she actually uses. H aving 
clarified this prelim inary point, let us now  turn  to his m ain proposal. The 
first tw o points w ould  becom e clearer in the course of the discussion 
w hich is to follow. H ow ever, w e should  note that there are fu rther 
problem s regarding which nam e the reporter should use in a belief report, 
and  we will get back to them  after having explained Forbes's account of 
the sem antics of belief report. To un d erstan d  th is w e can s ta rt by 
explaining his notion of dossier of information, because he takes a sense of 
a nam e to be very m uch the same as dossiers of inform ation labelled by a 
name. It is a notion that he borrows from Gareth Evans.
According to Forbes, senses of expressions are theoretical entities 
w ith  explanatory properties, entities posited by the sem antic theorist to 
explain the semantic intuitions of language understanders. For example, 
Frege arrives a t the notion of sense by elaborating his in tuitions about 
certain identity  sentences. The p roperty  of a sense w hich explains our 
intuitions about propositions of which it is a constituent I call its cognitive 
significance. It is the cognitive significance of a thought w hich determ ines 
th a t the believer will take a particular a ttitude to it, ...'^ ®® H e further 
holds, in the Fregean spirit, that thoughts p  and q can be said to have the 
same cognitive significance if and only if it is a priori that a rational being 
w ho grasps both takes the sam e attitude tow ards them  at the same time. 
So w hat is needed is an account of the cognitive significance of the sense 
of a nam e 'which can replace the nam e in the context "it is a priori that"  
w ithout affecting tru th  value.'^®7




Forbes’s explains the notion of a cognitive significance of a nam e in 
term s of the m etaphor of a dossier. W hen we receive inform ation about 
particular objects and w ant to save those pieces of information, we create a 
dossier in w hich these inform ation are stored. If w e gather any new  
inform ation about the object or the individual, we take it that, that too 
w ill be stored  in  the dossier. That is, to use Forbes's w ords, w e file 
'classified conditions'. W hat is a classified condition? In answ er to this 
question Forbes says,
a condition is som ething  an object can satisfy, and  the 
classifier is w hat specifies the subject's attitude to a certain 
related  proposition. Possible classifiers for conditions are 
"believed to be true" and "hoped to be true." The role of a 
nam e is to identify a file for a particular object — as I shall p u t 
it, we use names to "label" dossiers.^®®
So, w hen w e come to hear a new  nam e w hich w e take to stand  for a 
particular individual, a dossier is created w ith that particular nam e as its 
label in which the classified conditions are stored. The hypothesis about 
the cognitive significance of a nam e that this m etaphor brings out is that 
'the sense of a nam e "NN" has the cognitive significance "the subject of 
this dossier," w here the dossier referred to is the one labelled "NN": our 
w ay of thinking of N N  is as the subject of this dossier.'^®^
One m ight here ask w hether the notion of cognitive significance 
that Forbes advocates fare w ith the test of substitutivity w ithin the scope of 
'it is a priori that'? It seem s correct to say th a t for any subject w ho 
understands the nam e "NN", it is a priori that N N  is NN. But can we say 
that it is a priori for any such subject that N N  is the subject of this dossier, 
in  case w here "NN" refers to B's "NN"-dossier? There seem s to be an 
obvious counter-example to the claim. Suppose, you come to know a piece 
of inform ation about som eone called 'Jim', and create a dossier to store 




corne across someone w hom  you take to be Jim and start storing pieces of 
inform ation you gather into the dossier labelled 'Jim \ But, after a while, 
you come to know  that the person is not Jim bu t he is Tom. In a situation 
like this, it seems reasonable for you to say 'Jim is not the subject of this 
dossier', and in saying this you do not seem to be contradicting an a priori 
truth. Forbes has two alternative solutions to this problem , and as both of 
them  are equally acceptable he doesn't argue for one over the other.
The first solution is as follows. Surely, before you discovered your 
error of identification, 'Jim is the subject of this dossier' was a priori for 
you. H ow ever, once you learn  tha t the person is no t Jim b u t Tom, 
relabelling of the dossier takes place — that is, you relabel w ith  Tom' the 
dossier previously labelled 'Jim'. Furtherm ore you create a new  dossier 
labelled 'Jim' into w hich you transfer the original inform ation for which 
the now  relabelled dossier was first created. N ow  when you say 'Jim is not 
the subject of this dossier', the dem onstrative refers to the old dossier 
w h ich  has been  re labelled  'Tom '. T herefore you  are n o t rea lly  
contradicting the proposition that you previously expressed w ith Jim is 
the subject of this dossier'.
The alternative solution doesn 't require any change of sense in 
'N N '. According to th is account the original in troduction  to  the nam e 
'N N ' is sufficient to secure its public reference. N ow , w henever you 
receive new  inform ation about MM and enter that into your 'NN' dossier, 
you really file a piece of m isinform ation about N N  in your 'NN' dossier. 
W hen you come to know  that MM and N N  are tw o different people, you 
transfer all the m isinform ation from you 'NN' dossier to a new ly created 
dossier labelled 'MM". Now, you can truly say 'N N  is no t the subject of 
this dossier' so long as 'this dossier' refers to the new ly created 'MM' 
dossier. Both these proposal explains w hy 'N N  is the subject of this 
dossier' is a priori for you, though you can truly say 'NN is not the subject 
of this dossier'.
W hen can w e say that tw o nam es have the sam e sense? — Forbes 
says that tw o nam es can be said to have the same sense only w hen they 
nam e the sam e dossier. This he explains w ith the help  of an example.
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Suppose Ralph is som eone w ho has never heard  of Superm an or Clark 
Kent, and  suppose he comes to  m eet Superm an, w ho tells him , T am 
know n bo th  as 'Superm an' and  as 'C lark Kent". H earing  this Ralph 
creates 'a single double-labelled dossier'^^®, because the system  w hich 
creates the dossiers is governed by the constraint that in setting up  new  
ones for new  nam es it should aim for a one-one correspondence w ith the 
purported  objects'.^^^ The same thing happens w hen w e are introduced to 
someone by both her real nam e and her nick name. If the person is called 
by the nam es 'Elizabeth' and  'Beth', and w e come to know  that they are, 
w e create a single dossier labelled by both  the names. In situations like 
these, the tw o nam es label the same dossier and can be said to have the 
same sense.
H aving briefly explained how  Forbes understands the notion of 
sense, w e can now  explain how  this notion of sense is used  in giving a 
semantics of belief reports. A n im portant point should be noted here. If a 
dossier is labelled by a nam e, then the sense which a nam e expresses will 
be labelled by th a t nam e as well, since in articu lating  the cognitive 
significance of a sense w e m ake reference to the dossier labelled by the 
name. H aving explained the sense of an expression in this way, Forbes 
p u ts  forw ard an analysis of belief ascriptions w hich w ould  avoid the 
problem  faced by the analysis m entioned in the beginning of this section. 
In providing his analysis of belief ascriptions in term s of the sense of an 
expression, Forbes says.
W ithin the context of a use of a nam e "NN" by A in a belief 
ascription to B, a sense is then said to be so labelled if and 
only if the articulation of the cognitive significance of that 
sense dem onstratively identifies a dossier of B's labelled by a 
nam e w hich is a linguistic coun terpart<B,A > of "NN".^92
W hat is a linguistic  co u n te rp art of a nam e w ith in  a belief report? 
According to Forbes, for a nam e t' to be a linguistic counterpart of t, it is 





relativised to a pair of thinkers — the believer and the ascriber. A sense 
m ay be said to be labelled by any nam e which is a linguistic counterpart of 
the nam e used by the ascriber in specifying the proposition.
Using this notion of sense of an expression we can understand  à de 
dicto belief report. In a de dicto belief report the linguistic counterpart of 
the nam e in the ascription is the nam e itself — the nam e which is being 
used  by  both  the believer and  the ascriber. This w ould  p reven t any 
substitution w ithin the content clause of a belief report to take place. For 
example, w hen Ralph hears Lois u tter 'Clark Kent can't fly' and on that 
basis says, 'Lois believes tha t C lark Kent can't fly', the analysis w hich 
Forbes proposes says that Clark Kent is such that for Lois's so-labelled way 
of thinking of him , Lois believes that he can't fly. As Forbes points out, 
from  this we cannot infer that Lois believes Superm an can 't fly because 
Lois does not possess a dossier labelled 'Superm an' containing 'can't fly’ 
classified 'believed true ', though she posses such a dossier labelled Clark 
Kent. It is in a de dicto belief report that the names behave in the w ay that 
'Giogione' does in Q uine's exam ple 'G iorgione was so-called because of 
his size'. Both in the so-called construction and a de dicto belief report the 
w ords that are being u ttered  themselves are salient and  relevant. That is 
w hy substitution fails to preserve truth. Therefore, in a de dicto singular 
belief report the reporter specifies the dossier by using the w ord that the 
agent w ould himself use to express the alleged belief.
W e m ight here come back to the problem  th a t w e left behind  
som etim e ago. It is this question: In order to correctly report another's 
belief which nam e should w e use? We said that the reporter m ust use the 
nam e which the reported believer w ould use had she expressed her belief. 
But this requirem ent m ay seem to be too exacting. There m ight not have 
been a unique nam e that the reported believer w ould have used — there 
m ight be a range of nam es associated w ith  the sam e dossier, and the 
rep o rted  believer m igh t have u sed  any  one of th ese  nam es. To 
accom m odate this k ind  of situation the requirem ent should  no t be so 
strict. It m ight be only that the reporter should use one of the nam es that 
the reported  believer w ould  have accepted if she heard  w hat is being 
reported. But w hat happens if the reporter is using another language to
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report someone's belief? W hat happens if the believer is a m onolingual 
speaker, say a French speaker, whose belief we w ant to report in English 
and we use an English equivalence of the nam e he uses in  French? There 
is no w ay that the believer can accept this foreign name, because it is not a 
mem ber of the believer’s accepted class According to Forbes in this kind of 
cases a less trivial application of the linguistic counterpart relation takes 
place. So, the English nam e that the ascriber uses has as the linguistic 
coun terpart the nam e, say the French nam e, th a t the believer uses. 
Therefore, the analysis of the English sentence ascribing belief to the 
French speaker w ould ascribe the right truth-value since the English and 
the French nam es are each other's linguistic counterparts relative to the 
English-speaking ascriber and the French-speaking believer.
However, the obvious question here is, w hat are the conditions that 
need to be satisfied in order for a nam e N ' to be a linguistic counterpart of 
N? Forbes is not very clear in answ ering this question. He thinks that for 
N ’ to be a linguistic counterpart of N , it is required that they have the 
same custom ary reference, and are always relativised to a pair of thinkers : 
the ascriber and the believer. But linguistic counterpart relation cannot be 
explained in term s of just having the same reference. And, I think that it 
is here that the notion of dossier comes into play. So the proposal is as 
follows: in order for N ' to be a linguistic counterpart of N , N  and  N ' 
should label the same dossier. But is this not a too stringent requirem ent? 
Does it no t preclude the possibility that the believer's and  the ascriber's 
dossiers m ight diverge about the sam e person? These questions seem to 
legitimately threaten Forbes's analysis of belief ascriptions.
W e can try  to answ er the above questions b road ly  w ith in  
Forbes's framework, bu t w ith a modification. The suggestion is that for 
N ' to be a linguistic counterpart of N, it is not necessary that they label 
exactly the same dossier. W hat is required is that N ' and  N  label tw o 
dossiers w hich belong to the sam e type, that is, the dossier that the 
ascriber associate w ith  N ' and the dossier that the believer associate 
w ith  N , though distinct, are instances of the sam e type of dossier. 
W hen som eone th inks of an  object th ro u g h  som e dossier of 
in fo rm ation , the  th o u g h t is ab o u t the object from  w hich  the
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inform ation is derived, and is true iff the object in question possesses 
w hatever property  the thought ascribes to the object. In a case w here 
the ascriber and  the believer both think of the reference through some 
dossier, the dossiers can be said to belong to the sam e type iff they 
contain overlapping inform ation, and  the ascription is true  iff these 
overlapping inform ation are true of the object. This proposal seems to 
overcome the difficulties that Forbes's account of linguistic counterpart 
faces. By interpreting the notion of dossiers of inform ation in this way, 
this account reveals the im portance of the notion in ascriptions of a 
class of beliefs. Therefore, it can be regarded a genuine w ay forw ard in 
accounting for de dicto belief ascriptions.
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CHAPTER 5
On the Russellian Account of Belief Ascription
5.1. Contrasting Frege and Russell
We have noted, in the previous chapter, how  a de dicto belief report can 
be prov ided  on the Fregean line. We have also, in  the course of the 
d iscussion , com paring  the  d ifferen t sem antical accounts of belief 
ascrip tions w ith  the Russellian. N ow  it is tim e to see w hat are the 
philosophical m otivations for developing a sem antics in this line. O ur 
ow n reason is prom pted  by the fact of trying to capture de re beliefs — 
beliefs w here the relation betw een the believer and the object of belief is 
not m ediated by modes of presentation. The difference between Frege and 
Russell on a ttitude ascriptions is clear in the following correspondence 
betw een the two philosophers.
Frege writes to Russell,
Dear Colleague,
... M ont Blanc w ith  its snowfields is not itself a com ponent p art of 
thought that M ont Blanc is m ore than 4,000 metres high . . . .  The sense of 
the w ord  'm oon' is a com ponent p art of the though t tha t the m oon is 
sm aller than  the earth. The m oon itself (i.e. the denotation of the w ord 
moon') is not part of the sense of the w ord 'moon'; for then it w ould also 
be a com ponent part of the thought. We can nevertheless say: The moon 
is identical w ith the heavenly body closest to the earth'. W hat is identical, 
how ever, is no t a com ponent p art bu t the denotation of the expressions 
'the moon' and 'the heavenly body closest to the earth'. ... The identity is 
not an identity of sense, nor part of the sense, but of denotation......
In reply Russell writes.
Dear Colleague,
... Concerning sense and denotation, I see nothing bu t difficulties which 
I cannot overcome. ... I believe that in  spite of all its snow fields M ont 
Blanc itself is a com ponent p a rt of w hat is actually  asserted  in  the
proposition 'M ont Blanc is m ore than 4,000 metres h igh ' we assert ... a
certain complex (an objective proposition, one m ight say) in which M ont 
Blanc is itself a com ponent part. If we do not adm it this, then we get the
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conclusion that w e know  nothing at all about M ont Blanc In the case
of a sim ple p roper nam e like 'Socrates', I cannot d istingu ish  betw een 
sense and denotation; I see only the idea, which is psychological, and the 
object........
The contrasting thoughts tha t are expressed by Frege and Russell 
about w hat a proposition is, brings ou t the m odern dispute betw een the 
Fregeans and  the Rusellians in  analysing the content of propositional 
a ttitude ascribing sentences like, 'Ralph believes that Cicero was a Roman 
orator'. As w e m ight recall, for a Russellian^^^ the contribution of a proper 
nam e in a sentence is nothing m ore or less than w hat the nam e refers to. 
This is the case even in cases w here  the  nam e is em bedded  in a 
propositional attitude ascribing context. Therefore, 'Cicero' in  the sentence 
'Cicero is a Rom an orator' not only refers to the indiv idual, it does so 
even w hen  it occurs in the sentence 'Ralph believes tha t Cicero is a 
Rom an orator'.
The Russellian account can be regarded as involving the following 
view s regard ing  the natu re  and  function of p ropositions, nam es and  
predicates:
(a) A ccording to the Russellians,^^^ propositions are, to  be taken as 
structured  entities com posed of the individual referred to by the subject 
term  of the sentence and  the p roperty  or relation referred  to by the 
p red icate . So, the sentence 'F ido is a dog' expresses a s tru c tu red  
proposition w hose structure can be presented as the ordered  pair <Fido, 
doghood>. As N athan Salmon says^^^
... the p roposition  th a t is the inform ation  con ten t of a
declarative sentence (w ith respect to a given context) is
l^^Excerpts from the correspondence between Frege and Russell in 1904. Taken from Frege 
[1980], p p .l63 ,169
should be noted that Russell himself changed his view about proposition and what 
their relation is to sentences. His view on proper names like, 'Socrates' went through major 
revisions as we ail know.
^^^There is a very clear exposition of the Russellian account of propositional attitude 
ascribing sentence in Richard [1990], pp. 108-28. Salmon [1986] and [1990] defends this kind 
of account. Similar arguments are found in the writing of Donnellan [1990], and Soams, 
[1987].
196salmon [1990], pp. 215-6.
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s tru c tu red  in a certain  w ay, and  tha t its s tru c tu re  and 
constituents m irror, and are in some way readable from, the 
s tructure and constituents of the sentence containing tha t 
proposition.
(b) A ccepting the view  expressed by Russell in  rep ly  to  Frege, the 
Russellians hold that the content of an ordinary proper nam e, like 'Mont 
Blanc', 'Fido' , 'Cicero' etc., is sim ply its reference. They take a sim ilar 
view  regard ing  the content of uses of dem onstratives and  indexicals. 
Again, we can quote from N athan Salmon^^^.
'... the contribution m ade by an ord inary  p roper nam e or 
o ther sim ple singu lar term  to securing the  in form ation  
content of, or the p roposition  expressed by, declarative 
sentences (with respect to a given possible context of use) in 
w hich the term  occurs ... is just the referent of the term , or 
the bearer of the nam e (with respect to that context of use). In 
the term ino logy  of Frege's Puzzle, I m ain tain  th a t the 
inform ation value of an o rd inary  proper nam e is just its 
referent
(c) Russellians assign contents to other expressions in a sim ilar way to that 
of p roper nam es, so that predicates are said to refer to properties or 
relations.
(d)The R ussellians take p ropositional a ttitu d e  ascrib ing  verbs like, 
'believes' to be a relation betw een an individual and  a proposition having 
the characteristics stated in a.
W hat are the philosophical im plications in accepting the above 
characteristics of propositions? — One seems to be evident. If som eone 
accepts (a) and  (b) — that is, a proposition is a structured entity and the 
content of a proper nam e is sim ply its referent — then it leads him  to 
saying that the replacem ent of a nam e w ith  a co-referential nam e in a 
sentence doesn 't affect the proposition expressed by the sentence, and
197ibid, p.216.
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therefore if one of them  is true  so is the other. From this it im m ediately 
follows that the content of the two nam es 'Eric Blair' and 'George Orwell' 
is the same, because their content is exhausted by their referent, and the 
tw o names are co-referential. If the proposition expressed by the sentence
(1) George Orwell w rote Animal Farm '
is structured out of the referents of the constituent expressions, (so that it 
has the structure like, <George Orwell, being the w riter of Animal Farm >) 
then the proposition expressed by the sentence
(2) 'Eric Blair w rote Animal Farm '
is the same as the one expressed by (1).
The R ussellians extend  their view  about p roposition  and  the 
function of a proper nam e to belief ascriptions as well. According to them  
the  contents of beliefs fo rm ulatab le  using  o rd in a ry  p ro p er nam es, 
dem onstratives, indexical and other sim ple singular term s are singular 
structured  propositions directly about some individual w hich occurs as a 
constituents of the proposition. Given the w ay in which Russellians take 
p roper nam es to occur in belief a ttribu tion  and given th a t the 'that'- 
clauses are tw o nam es of one and  the sam e proposition, they have to 
adm it that the tw o sentences,
(4) Tom believes that George Orwell w rote Animal Farm
(5) Tom believes that Eric Blair w rote Animal Farm
cannot differ in tru th  value. So substitution of one nam e by the other co- 
referential nam e w ould  preserve truth. M ost of us find this position to 
seem to be obviously incorrect. Intuitively, it seems obvious that due to 
Tom's ignorance about the identity George Orwell and  Eric Blair, he will 
assent to (1) bu t dissent from (2), In that case it will be true to report Tom's 
belief w ith the use of (4), bu t false to report his belief w ith  the use of (5). 
So, substitu tion of one nam e by another in the pair (4) and  (5) doesn 't 
seem  to preserve tru th . This goes against the Russellian account and
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therefore, it is absurd to adhere to a Russellian analysis of belief ascription. 
This makes it essential to understand why philosophers have opted for an 
account of this kind at all.
5.2. M otivations for R ussellianism
There are various reasons which have prompted philosophers to embrace 
some form of Russellianism. We can point out three reasons. The 
justification or evidence for Russellianism comes from the role that 
propositions are said to play in contexts other than the propositional 
attitude ascribing ones, the way we usually ascribe attitudes and how, in 
certain contexts, propositional attitude attributions are taken to be de re.
5.2.1. The Role of Proposition outside Belief Ascriptions
As has been pointed out, singular propositions, composed of individuals 
and properties, are regarded as objects of propositional attitudes by the 
Russellians. But, apart from having an im portant role as objects of 
propositional attitudes, propositions are traditionally taken to be the 
bearers of truth and falsity as well as necessity and possibility. Let us 
concentrate on the role of propositions outside the propositional attitude 
ascribing contexts. It can be argued that the best way of understanding the 
role of propositions in these contexts is by way of taking the content of 
proper names, demonstratives and indexicals to be simply referring to an 
object or an individual so that co-referential names make exactly the same 
contribution to a proposition.i98_An example would make the point clear. 
In an utterance or an use of the sentence
(6) He (pointing to Tom) is happy,
the content of ’he' in this particular context is the individual Tom, and 
the reference of ’he’ would change according to the context of the 
utterance of (6). So a use of the sentence 'he is happy' is true in a particular 
context c iff the individual determined by the use of 'he' is happy in that
l^®This point has been discussed by Richard [1990] , pp.112-14. It is also a consequence of 
Kripke's argument that proper names are rigid designators.
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(6) to be true at a particular context it seems necessary and sufficient that 
the person referred to by 'he* in that context be happy. Therefore, 'if the 
co n trib u tio n  of 'he ' to  the  p ro p o sitio n  is sim ply  som eth ing  th a t 
determ ines a reference in the w ay m entioned above, then the content of 
'he', and other such term s, seems to be nothing m ore or less than  the 
individual nam ed This w ay of understanding the w orking of proper 
nam es and  dem onstratives helps in our uses of statem ents of necessity 
and possibility. Suppose someone utters the sentence
(7) It is possible that Tom is happy.
(7) is true iff the proposition expressed by the sentence Tom is happy' is 
possibly true. A nd any sentence of the general form 'It is possible that S' is 
tru e  iff the proposition  expressed by 'S' is possibly true. C onsider a 
sentence similar to 7:
(8) There is someone who is not happy bu t could have been happy.
A natural partial symbolisation of 8 can be
(8)'. (3x)(x is not happy & it is possible that x is happy).
N ow  this sentence can be regarded  as true w hen there is an individual 
such that 'It is possible that x is happy ' is true w hen the variable 'x' is 
assigned the ind iv idual i as its value . This w ay of un d erstan d in g  
quantified sentences like 8' seems to commit us to Russellian proposition. 
If an open sentence like 'x is happy' expresses a proposition only w hen 'x' 
is assigned an in d iv id u a l, such propositions are to be individuated simply 
in  term s of the ind iv idual assigned to the variable as its value.^^® 
Therefore quan tifica tion  in to  m odal contexts p ro v id es us w ith  an 
im portan t ground for positing Russellian propositions. It gives us prim a 
facie reasons for supposing that the content of some term s are nothing 
m ore than their reference.
199Richard, [1990], p .ll3 .
700Quantifiers are treated objectually here — one of the natural way of reading quantifiers.
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Having noted this, let us consider belief reports like the following:
(9) There is someone who isn't happy, he could have been happy and Lucy 
believes that he is happy.
A plausible way of symbolising 9 would be,
(9)'. (3x) (x is not happy & it is possible that x is happy & Lucy believes that 
X is happy).
If we think, following the above argum ent, that a Russellian 
proposition is assigned in case of 'It is possible that x is happy', then it 
seems natural to assign a Russellian proposition to 'Lucy believes that x is 
happy'. As Richard points out^ot, if the two 'that'-clauses refer to two 
different propositions then it becomes difficult to explain why (9) seems to 
correctly imply David believes something which is contingently true.^oz
So what follows from this discussion is that the proposition that 
Hesperus is rising just is the proposition that we get by assigning Hesperus 
to 'x' in 'x is rising'. Now, the Russellians contend that the same is true of 
the proposition that Phosphorus is rising, since assigning Hesperus to 'x' 
is the same as assigning Phosphorus to 'x'. This immediately leads us to 
admitting a Russellian proposition as the objects of belief ascriptions, like 
'David believes that Hesperus is rising.
70:Richard [1990], p .ll5 .
707a  Russellian account of propositional attitude ascribing sentence would help us in 
explaining some problematic cases which the Fregeans cannot. Consider the sentence
Tom believes that Paul is happy and he sure ly is happy.
As Segal, [1989] points o u t , 'he' is straightforwardly ananaphoric to 'Paul'. One of the most 
plausible way of understanding sentences of the above kind is to take the content of 'Paul' 
and 'he' to be the same — and the sameness lies in their having the same referent.
The same may be said about ascriptions like.
Everybody who knows Wittgenstein believes that he is a genius,
whose quasi-regimentation might be,
(3x) (x=Wittgenstein & (Vy)(y knows x y believes that x is a genius)),
the variable x' takes the individual referred to by the proper name to be its value.
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5.2.2. Considering the Way Beliefs are Ascribed
O ne very  im p o rtan t considera tion  th a t leads ph ilo sophers  to take 
Russellianism seriously comes from  the general w ay in  which we ascribe 
a belief to someone. Very often w e are indifferent to w hat indexical, 
dem onstrative or proper nam e we use in reporting a belief, so long as the 
reference is preserved.703 As Richard^o^ rem arks
...if I po in t at Tw ain and  say, 'H e’s happy ', any  of the 
follow ing seem  correct report of w hat I say: MR said that 
Twain is happy, MR said that Clemens is happy, MR said that 
you (we are addressing Twain) are happy, MR said that I am 
happy (Twain is speaking). This certainly suggests tha t the 
term s are m aking exactly the sam e contribu tion  to the 
proposition determ ined by the em bedded sentences.
W e can w ith  the help  of an exam ple show  that ou r o rd inary  tru th - 
in tu itions (the in tu ition  that 'X believes tha t a is F' is true  w hile 'X 
believes that b is F' is false even w hen 'a' is co-referential w ith 'b') are 
incorrect. Richard has show n that if a person can say 'I believe that a is F' 
and  if 'a' and  'b' are co-referential nam es, dem onstratives or indexicals, 
then the person can also truly say *I believe that b is F'. This follows from 
the w ay w e reason about attitude attribution. 705 jh is  exam ple has already 
been m entioned in the chapter on the H ybrid View. I th ink  tha t it is 
necessary to repeat this exam ple so that it becomes clearer as to w hy a 
Russellian account is needed in some contexts.
Suppose a person A is talking to som eone, say B, th rough  the 
telephone. She also sees a w om an across the street in a phone booth and a 
steam roller is about to crush tha t booth. She does no t realise that the
203jqere it should be noted that this kind of indifference is essential in some contexts. In 
case of a belief report, it is not only the believer and the reporter who are important, the 
hearer — the person to whom the report is conveyed— is important as well. For the success 
of our communication in a context which is sensitive to this factor, what w e require, at most, 
is to get the reference right.
204Richard [1990], pp. 116-7.
705This argument is developed in Richard [1983] and [1990].
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person with whom she is talking is the very same person who is in 
danger. She reports the whole thing to B and says
(10) I believe that she is in danger.
But, surely A does not say,
(11) I believe that you are in danger.
Given our intuitions about attributions of beliefs, it would seem that 
while (10) is true (11) is false. Richard, however, argues that contrary to 
our intuitions, (10) and (11) in the described context, are both true. In fact, 
the truth of (11) follows from the truth of (10). To show this let us simplify 
the situation by assuming that A is the unique person watching B. 
Suppose that B is watching A's panicked behaviour and says,
(12) The person watching me believes that I am in danger.
Since (10) is true, so is (12). Since B's utterance of (12) heard by A through 
the telephone is true, A would speak truly if he were to utter through the 
phone to B the following sentence,
(13) The person watching you believes that you are in danger.
If B's use of (12) is true, then so is A's use of (13). But then 11, that is, T 
believe that you are in danger' follows from (13) and the further premise
(14) I am the person watching you.
As (13) and (14) uttered by A in this context is true, 11 will also be true. 
Therefore, Richard^o^ concludes.
The upshot of all this is that there is support in the way we 
talk and reason about attitudes for the Russellian's claim that 
substituting one name of a thing for another in a sentence
206Richard [1990] pp. 118-9
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doesn't change the proposition the sentence determines. The 
objection above — that someone who denies that so and so is 
almost invariably correct — should not by itself move one to 
reject Russellianism, for we seem to be committed to certain 
patterns of reasoning that belie this objection.
5.2.3, Considering De Re A ttributions of Beliefs
Another reason which has prom pted philosophers to think that singular 
terms are used referentially in propositional attitude ascription is the de 
re propositional attitude attributions.707 a  de re attribution of belief can 
be expressed in colloquial English as,
(15) Tom believes of Mary that she is happy.
Or, more formally,
(16) (3x)( X = Mary & Tom believes that x is happy).
Now the argument that follows is an argument by analogy, an analogy 
between individual constants and individual variables. It proceeds by 
showing that individual constants play a very similar role as individual 
variables and pronoun, differing from them only in their constancy.
The most im portant characteristic of a de re attribution is that it 
does not specify how Tom conceives of Mary in believing her to be happy.
Someone, like a Fregean, might say that this lack of specificity results from
tthe fact the name 'Mary' occurs outside the scope of the opaque or oblique j
context created by the believes that' operator, where it is open to j
substitution and existential generalisation. Though the factor that the I
Fregeans refer to is true, there is another fact which they ignore. It is the j
part that the last bound occurrence of the variable 'x' play in (16) and the 
occurrence of she' in (15). As it has already been noted in the discussion 
in A that 15 is true if and only if its component open sentence 'Tom |
707A discussion of this is found in Salmon [1990], pp. 223-7, and [1986] pp3-7.
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believes that x is happy ', in a particular context of its utterance, is true 
under the assignm ent of M ary as the value for the variable 'x'. But the 
open sentence 'Tom believes that x is happy' is if and only if Tom believes 
the proposition that is the content of the com plem ent open sentence 'x is 
happy ' under the same assignm ent of M ary as the value of x. N ow , as 
Salm on po in ts  out^os^ 'the fundam ental sem antic characteristic of a 
variable w ith an assigned value, or a pronoun w ith a particular referent, is 
precisely that its inform ation value is just its referent.' The content of 'x is 
happy ' and 'she is happy ' under the relevant assignm ent of the referent 
can only be the singular proposition about Mary that she is happy.
If this is true of variables and  pronouns, then it is true of the 
individual constants, at least in cases where a de re attribution takes place. 
In case of a de re attribution, the contribution of the p roper nam e to the 
content of the belief report is just its referent. There is another w ay in 
which the similarity between a proper nam e and a variable is brought out 
by Salmon709,
All of us are accustom ed to using  special variables or 
pronouns tha t have a restricted  dom ain over w hich they 
range. In o rd inary  English, the p ronoun 'he' often ranges
only over m ales, the p ronoun  'she' only over fem ales.......
The dom ain over which a variable ranges ... can be quite 
small in size. ... Could there be variables w hose range is a 
unit set? Of course there could.
N ow , the value of this kind of variable being restricted to a single object, 
w e could  call them  'invariab le  variables'. A nd p ro p er nam es and 
dem onstratives can be seen as invariable variables. N ote th a t for the 
purpose of the argum ent to work w e do not need the prem ise that proper 
nam es are variables of a special kind, a m ore w eaker prem ise that nam es 
are sufficiently analogous to a variable w ould do.
208jsjathan Salmon, 'A Millian Heir Rejects the Wages of Sinn ’, p.224. 
209ibid, pp225-7.
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These three, then are the considerations which lead philosophers to 
adhere to Russellianism in at least, some cases of attitude attributions. We 
can say that, if our argum ents for de re beliefs are correct, then de re beliefs 
can be best ascribed in a de re way — that is, by not bringing in any modes of 
presentation. In cases like this substitution of co-referential nam es w ithin 
belief-reports w ould preserve truth. Therefore, in providing a semantics of 
de re beliefs, we specify singular propositions, consisting of objects and 
properties the beliefs are about. As substitution of co-referential nam es do 
not m ake any difference to the truth-values of the relevant sentences, we 




It is now  tim e to  recapitulate the m ain line of argum ent tha t has been 
developed and argued for in the dissertation. In order to do that w e can 
start by highlighting tw o im portan t points. The first po in t concerns the 
overall structure of the discussion, w hile the second concerns the general 
philosophical fram ework w ithin which the discussion takes place.
A closer scrutiny of the pattern  of discussion reveals that it has a 
negative and a positive part. The negative part consists of tw o lines of 
argum ents:
(a) Firstly , I tried  to answ er the sceptical argum ents raised  against 
proposition from  Q uine’s thesis on the indeterm inacy of translation. His 
denial of m eaning facts poses an im m ediate th reat to the existence of 
propositions, w hich are taken to be objects of p ropositional a ttitu d e  
ascriptions. Finding a w ay of rebutting this kind of sceptical challenge is 
essential for our purpose, because in  the Introduction w e argue that a 
propositional attitude ascribing verb, like 'believe', can be taken to stand 
for a re la tion  betw een  the  person  w ho has th a t a ttitu d e  and  the 
proposition tow ards which that attitude is directed.
(b) Secondly, I evaluated some recent proposals of the semantics of belief 
ascrip tions of the 'H ybrid ' v arie ty  — proposals w hich take bo th  a 
Russellian proposition and some kind of m ode of presentation to be the 
content of a belief report. The m otivation for the proponents of a H ybrid 
View is two-fold: (1) these philosophers think that neither the Fregean or 
the Russellian (or the Direct Referential) accounts are correct in providing 
a semantics of belief report, and (2) they w ant to provide semantics which 
can apply to any kinds of belief whatsoever. However, I argued that, not 
only do the proposals get the truth-conditions of belief ascriptions wrong, 
they are unable to d istingu ish  betw een de re and  de dicto beliefs — a 
genuine distinction that needs capturing in an analysis of belief-ascribing 
sentences.
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The positive part of the discussion lies in arguing for the existence 
of a class of beliefs that are de re, and, furtherm ore, in show ing that the de 
re/de dicto distinction can be accounted for by distinguishing between tw o 
different types of propositions as their contents — a Russellian proposition 
corresponding to a de re belief, while a Fregean proposition corresponds to 
a de dicto belief. H aving done this, we develop two distinct semantics of 
belief ascriptions. A semantics advanced on the Fregean line and another 
advanced on the Russellian line helps in understand ing  the distinction 
betw een de dicto and de re beliefs respectively.
It m ust be clear by now  that the general philosophical fram ework 
w ithin  which the discussion takes place is provided by the tradition of 
Frege and Russell. We can contrast their views on attitudes broadly in the 
fo llow ing w ay. Frege w as of the  op in ion  th a t a ttitu d es  cannot be 
characterised sim ply in term s of the objects and properties tha t they are 
in tu itively  taken to be about. W hereas, Russell , o r m ore precisely, 
philosophers belonging to the Russellian tradition, hold that attitudes can 
be characterised by specifying the objects and properties they are about. 
This difference is reflected in their views of the behaviour of expressions 
occurring  w ith in  belief reports. A ccording to Fregeans, expressions 
occurring w ithin an attitude verb shift their references and refer to their 
custom ary senses. For Russellians, however, expressions w ithin the scope 
of attitude verbs behave in exactly the same w ay as they do outside the 
scope of such verbs.
These then are some observations on the general structure of the 
dissertation and the foundation on which the discussion is based. Now, let 
m e sum m arise the view  of attitudes and their ascriptions that has been 
argued for. In certain respects, the view  that has evolved through the 
argum ents agrees w ith the analyses given by both Frege and  Russell. After 
having argued for a dyadic relational structure of propositional attitude 
attributions, it has been shown that a semantical distinction still needs to 
be m ade betw een de re and de dicto propositional attitudes. H ow ever, if 
the de re/de dicto distinction is genuine, no single account can capture this 
distinction. Thus, one of the reasons for the failure of the H ybrid View is 
over generalisation.
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In certain contexts a belief is such that the semantic analysis of its 
report requires the specification of modes of presentation in order for the 
analysis to be correct. In a case like this substitu tion  of co-referential 
expressions w ithin the report fails. These are contexts which give rise to de 
dicto beliefs and a Fregean analysis of belief ascription is needed. In certain 
other contexts, our belief is such that the semantic analysis of the report 
does not, in any way, require any specification of the m ode of presentation, 
because the relation betw een the believer and the object of belief is 
contextual. These reports allow  for substitution of co-referential nam es 
w ithin the attitude verbs, and can be taken to be contexts giving rise to de 
re beliefs. The im portance of the proposal — a proposal th a t take the 
sem antical distinction betw een de re and de dicto beliefs seriously — is as 
follows: O ur thoughts about particular objects of the w orld are, in certain 
contexts, essentially direct, that is, they involve merely the objects and the 
properties. However, there are contexts in which the relationship between 
our thought and object is essentially indirect, involving some m odes of 
presentation of the object. Any semantics of attitude ascription should be 
sensitive to the different ways our thoughts relate to the world. The view 
argued for in this dissertation does try  to be sensitive in this respect, and 
therein, I hope, lies its merit.
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